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Abstract 
The nature of support for environmentalism - conceptualised here as attitudes 
and behaviour supportive of ecological prudence and the green movement - has 
grown to become a major issue of contention among contemporary social 
scientists. Some researchers suggest that support for environmentalism stems 
from a 'new' or 'new middle' class, post World War II generation and, in 
particular, from among highly educated and left leaning urban dwellers. Others 
maintain that social location has diminishing utility for explaining social 
phenomena, and claim instead that new value orientations are the key to 
understanding support for environmental movements and concerns. 
This research aims at reviewing and evaluating these claims. Part I reviews 
the theoretical arguments underlying the diverse class, generation and social status 
accounts of environmentalism. Critical evaluation of these accounts forms a 
springboard for empirical analysis. Part II examines empirically the social bases of 
environmentalism in Australia using nationally representative survey data. The 
impact of (new) class, status group, generation/cohort, and other aspects of social 
location, as well as 'postmaterial' values on environmental concerns and activism 
is assessed using multivariate techniques. Particular attention is paid to the 
hypothesis that support for environmentalism in Australia comes from certain 
status categories of people sharing similar lifestyles. 
In general, there is a weak relationship between social location and 
environmental commitment and activism, although the relative explanatory value of 
social location varies according to the aspect of environmentalism under 
consideration. Age, new class location, postmaterialist value orientations and 
political partisanship are the best predictors of environmental concerns and 
activism, while lifestyle also has an impact upon environmental group support. 
While 'social base' effects are discernible, they have limited utility for 
explaining environmental new politics. Like other aspects of the new politics, 
environmental concerns and activism in Australia are detached from the 'old' social 
bases of class, generation and status. Green supporters and sympathisers in 
Australia do not form clearly circumscribed social groupings, and they do not seem 
' 
to be motivated by the traditional group interests that propelled 'old' politics. The 
social constituencies of environmentalism appear to be vague and fluid thus posing 
a major challenge to the established sociological approaches to environmentalism. 
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Chapter 1 
Environmentalism, New Politics and Social Base 
In Australia, as in all advanced societies, the environment has become a major 
social and political issue. Its growth as a public concern and a source of social 
mobilisation is well documented, as is the rise of green parties over the last decade 
(Bean et al 1990, McAllister 1992, 1994, Papadakis 1993, 1994, Crook and Pakulski 
1995, McAllister and Studlar 1995). While green voting and green party formation 
have been extensively studied in Australia and elsewhere, I increasing public concerns 
about the environment and green movement activism are not as well understood. 
Attempts have been made to link the spread of environmental concerns with the rise of 
new classes, the formation of new status groups (especially radical intellectuals), the 
ascendancy of postwar generations, as well as postmaterialist value shift, and media 
exposure of environmental hazards (for example, Eckersley 1989, Papadakis 1993, 
Crook and Pakulski 1995). However, systematically conducted, empirically based 
sociological studies of environmentalism remain rare. This study aims to bridge this 
gap by critically examining the major 'social location' accounts of environmentalism, 
and by systematically testing their relative empirical 'fit'. The empirical section 
focuses on the Australian case, and utilises a variety of survey data from the 1990's. 
The key issue is the extent to which environmental concerns and activism in Australia 
are socially located in classes, status groups and generations. 
One of the most puzzling aspects of environmental social movements and public 
concerns is their 'floating' nature. The social composition of green movement 
supporters seems to defy the established wisdom of political sociology, which depicts 
political activism and associated ideological orientations and interests as located in 
specific social classes, strata, status categories, age groups or generations. Yet in 
This research does not examine environmental voting behaviour as there have been extensive 
studies of new politics parties in Australia (see Bean et al 1990, Marks and Bean 1992, McAllister and 
Studlar 1993, McAllister and Vowles 1994, Bean and Papadakis 1995, McAllister and Studlar 1995). 
spite of the wide recognition of this seemingly 'floating nature', the most popular 
accounts of environmentalism continue to link it with one or more of the established 
'social location' categories: new or middle classes, professional strata, urban 
intelligentsia, baby boomers, generation X and so on. 
The disparity between empirical studies that point to the 'floating' nature of 
environmental activism and concerns, and social theorising that attempts to ground 
environmentalism in a variety of social grids, has a demoralising and paralysing 
impact on environmental studies. It seems to perpetuate a divide between empirical 
studies, that use descriptive categories on the one hand, and largely abstract theorising 
that follows the classic social base models on the other. 
As the reference in the title to the 'social base' implies, this thesis focuses upon 
explanations of environmental concerns and activism that follow t_he 'classic' 
sociopolitical model, according to which political preferences and behaviour in 
Western societies principally reflect social-structural location and its historically 
evolving patterns (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lipset [1960] 1981). However, it is 
now widely accepted that the utility of social-structural explanations, class 
explanations in particular, are in decline (for example, see Clark and Lipset 1991, 
Franklin et al 1992). This decline, it is argued, is most pronounced in new forms of 
political activism, such as those associated with environmentalism (for example, see 
Crook et al 1992). Other aspects of social location have been investigated as 
alternatives to class, and the attention of political sociologists has shifted to political 
institutions and political culture. Yet while there is an extensive body of literature 
identifying and analysing non-class aspects of conventional politics, the association 
between these and new politics has not been examined in an equally systematic way. 
This is particularly so in Australia, where the relationship between support for 
environmentalism and occupational strata, status blocs and generational segments 
awaits rigorous examination. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first has a theoretical focus; it 
examines the major class, status and generational accounts of environmentalism. The 
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analytical clarity, theoretical consistency, and completeness of these accounts of 
environmental 'new politics' are critically assessed in Chapters 1to4. In Chapter 1, 
I begin by outlining the rise of environmentalism in Australia, in order to highlight its 
specificity. The diversity of environmental concerns and activism are then discussed, 
thereby preparing the grounds for a revision of the literature on environmental new 
politics and their social bases. In Chapter 2, new class accounts of environmentalism 
- linking environmental support with class interests - are discussed. Chapter 3 
examines generational accounts, such as lnglehart' s generational/value change thesis, 
which suggest that post war generations show greater propensity to support 
environmental activism. Status based explanations are discussed in Chapter 4, in 
particular, the claims that environmental concerns and activism are higher among 
'intellectual' status categories. A number of other social base explanations are also 
examined in this chapter, including those that suggest environmental concerns vary 
between religious, urban/rural, and ethnic categories. 
The second part (Chapters 5 to 7), consists of an empirical evaluation of the 
relative fit of these diverse 'social base' accounts of environmental concerns and 
activism using Australian survey data. Chapter 5 explains the development of the 
research models, describes the data, the dependent and independent variables, and 
analytic techniques. Environmentalism is conceptualised in this research as having 
both 'attitudinal' and 'behavioural' aspects. Utilising nationally representative survey 
data, the empirical analyses examine the social location of these two aspects using 
different multivariate techniques. Chapter 6 examines the 'attitudinal' aspects of green 
support, while the 'behavioural' aspects are explored in Chapter 7. 
The rise of environmentalism in Australia 
Concerns over the natural environment in Australia are not as 'new' as some 
claim, with a number of conservation organisations emerging in the mid to late 
nineteenth century (Hutton 1987, Papadakis 1993). Wootten (1985:25) maintains that 
the conservation movement in Australia has two separate sources; in the "scientific and 
natural history groups" formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
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in the "members of the outdoor recreation movement, principally bushwalkers, who 
developed their organisations in the first half of this century". Papadakis (1993:65) 
argues that groups like the "Field Naturalists' Section of the Royal Society established 
precedents for campaigns by conservationists in lobbying governments and 
government agencies, in attracting widespread popular support and in gathering 
information on conservation issues". The Wild Life Preservation Society of Australia, 
formed early this century, also "campaigned successfully to prevent mining and the 
exploitation of timber in Australia's first National Park at Port Hacking", and fought 
for "legislation to protect flora and fauna" (1993:66).2 The modem environmental 
movement is also predated by groups such as The Mountain Trails Club and the 
National Parks and Primitive Areas Council, that challenged established beliefs 
relating to nature (Papadakis 1993:68). 
However, a number of authors agree that the growth of the contemporary 
environmental movement was spurred by the campaign to save Lake Pedder in South 
West Tasmania from flooding in the early nineteen seventies. Holloway ( 1991 :78) 
points out that the campaign "laid the organisational and political foundations of the 
wider movement", with the Lake Pedder Action Committee "forming the basis of the 
Wilderness Society". Wootten (1985:25) claims that the fight to save Lake Pedder 
was a "landmark in the development of the conservation movement", arguing that it 
led to the "growth of the Tasmanian conservation movement and the development of a 
national consciousness". The Lake Pedder campaign also spawned the world's first 
green party, the United Tasmania Group (UTG) in 1972 (Holloway 1986, Parkin 
1989, Larmour 1990). 
Although the campaign to save Lake Pedder was lost when the lake was flooded 
in 1974, the political and organisational skills gained through involvement in the 
Pedder campaign were successfully employed in subsequent environmental actions 
(Easthope and Holloway 1989: 189). Perhaps the most important of these in terms of 
mobilising mass public opinion was the Franklin River Campaign of 1982-1983. The 
2 Naturalist organisations campaigned with some success to protect wildlife in the nineteenth century 
(Papadakis 1993:65). 
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Tasmanian Wilderness Society (now The Wilderness Society) formed in 1976 mainly 
from core members of the UTG, and played a key role in the Franklin Campaign. 
It was only in the 1980's that there emerged broad challenges to the 
institutional order, in the form of social movements like the one opposed 
to the construction of the Franklin Dam in Tasmania (Papadakis 
1993:68). 
The Franklin Campaign saw a coordinated effort to involve the mass media. 
The protest actions of demonstrators at the Franklin blockade were televised 
nationally, and as Doyle (1995:63) notes they "made great television, and middle 
Australia was watching". 3 Mass media coverage of this new social movement protest 
popularised the fight for the Franklin, mobilised mass support, and consequently had 
an impact upon national politics. As Papadakis (1989:95) notes, "movements make 
news: news makes the movement's issues public". The environment became a federal 
election issue championed by the Australian Labor Party, and the proposed dam 
development was halted upon the election of the new ALP Prime Minister, Mr Hawke 
in March 1983. A number of other major environmental 'victories' followed 
throughout the 1980's, including the protection of Kakadu and the Daintree, 
preventing the construction of the Wesley Vale pulp mill in Tasmania, and stopping 
the logging of National Estate forests in New South Wales and Victoria. 
While political activism on environmental issues fluctuates with 'crises'4 and 
campaigns, public concerns about environmentalism shows a somewhat curious, and 
more steady pattern. The percentage of Australians who believe that 'the 
environment' is the most important problem for the federal government, rose 
dramatically from five per cent in 1988, to twenty six per cent in 1989, and after 
dipping slightly remained stable at a level around twenty per cent into the 1990's 
(McAllister and Studlar 1993:354-355, Crook and Pakulski 1995:43). Public support 
3 Coverage of environmental issues and concerns in the print media also promotes environmental 
causes (Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986). Although newspaper coverage of environmental stories tends 
to wax and wane according to issue salience, the overall level of coverage has increased over time, and 
editorial policy now tends to be more sympathetic (Sylow 1994). 
4 By 'crises' I mean particular threats to the environment such as logging of pristine wilderness 
areas, or the threatened extinction of endangered species caused by flooding land for the construction of 
large dams. 
5 
for environmental groups tends to be lower and more stable, at around three per cent 
to five per cent.5 It may rise and fall in response to current 'environmental crises', 
and according to the emphasis placed upon 'the environment' as a political issue. 
Although support for 'the environment' as an election issue may have peaked around 
the time of the 1990 federal election, approval of environmental groups and popular 
concerns about environmental issues remain at a high level (Papadakis 1993:142, 
McAllister and Studlar 1993:354-355). Papadakis (1993: 11) notes that the 
"preoccupation with environmental issues represents only one aspect of the agenda of 
new social movements and of the new politics", and that within the new political arena 
"the issue of environmental protection has become the predominant theme". 
Similarly, Dalton (1988:110) suggests that "environmental groups have often 
spearheaded the New Politics challenge to the traditional political values of industrial 
societies" and further points out that "a large number of citizens are willing to sacrifice 
some economic growth and lower prices for an improvement in the quality of the 
environment". 
Environmentalism is seen as the most important and represe_ntative aspect of the 
new political phenomena in Australia. Green movements attract a growing number of 
supporters and sympathisers, and approval of environment groups and environmental 
group membership in Australia, is stable at relatively high levels (Papadakis 1993, 
1994).6 The environment is also an important issue internationally, particularly in 
Western Europe. In a survey of nine European countries conducted in 1990, on 
average over 90 per cent of respondents support the ecology movement, irrespective 
of nationality (Ashford and Halman 1994:78).7 While support for other social 
5 Group membership stood at 3 per cent in 1990 and 5 per cent in 1993, while those who are not 
members but have considered joining, comprise 22 per cent of the sample in 1990, and 18 per cent in 
1993 (Source: AES). 
6 Australian Electoral Study results show that 74 per cent of respondents in ·1990, and 73 per cent in 
1993 either strongly approve or approve of environmental groups. 
7 The breakdown of support by countries is as follows: Great Britain 92 per cent, Northern Ireland 89 
per cent, Republic of Ireland 94 per cent, West Germany 97 per cent, Netherlands 95 per cent, 
Belgium 93 per cent, France 91 per cent, Italy 92 per cent, Spain 90 per cent. 
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movements fluctuates markedly across national borders, the ecology movement is 
very popular in all Western European countries. 8 
Further, environmentalism seems to be unique in its political ascendancy and 
articulation. Among contemporary Australian new social movements (for example, 
anti-nuclear, peace, human rights, aboriginal, gay and lesbian rights, women's), only 
the environmental movement has succeeded in propelling politiCal representatives to 
federal and state parliaments,9 with two Green senators, and four Greens in the 
Tasmanian Lower House.to Although not strictly a 'green' party, the Australian 
Democrats may also be seen as a 'new politics party', and "one of the major 
proponents of environmentalism" (Papadakis 1993:5). Thus, there is little doubt that 
in Australia, 'the environment' remains an important long term political issue, with the 
public still "prepared to continue supporting policies that implied tax rises and 
increases in prices in order to address environmental problems" (Papadakis 1994:71). 
Green parties and new social movements are also popular in a number of other 
developed countries. In Western Europe, the (West) German Greens are Europe's 
most successful green party in terms of electoral support (Frankland 1995:39). The 
Belgian ecology parties Agelev and ECOLO are also politically successful, as are new 
politics parties in Austria, Finland, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland (Kitschelt 1989, 
Kolinsky 1989, Mtiller-Rommel 1989, 1990, Parkin 1989, Richardson and Rootes 
1995). 
Critics may argue that the electoral success of the new parties is limited, as their 
impact on policy formulation is minimal. Nevertheless, minor parties often have 
disproportionately greater power than the number of parliamentary seats they hold 
implies. In mixed party systems, small parties often hold the balance of power. In 
8 Ashford and Halman (1994:78) found that more people were in favour of the ecology movement 
(93%) than human rights (91 %), anti-apartheid (80%), disarmament (78%), nuclear energy (71 %), and 
the women's movement (62%). 
9 The Nuclear Disarmament Party previously held a Senate seat and polled 7.2 per cent of Senate 
first preferences in 1984 (Papadakis 1993: 181) 
lO The former 'Green Independents' were involved in the Green/Labor Accord in 1989. Although 
the Accord was short lived, the Greens still hold 4 seats in the Tasmanian House of Assembly 
(Larmour 1990), and after the 1996 Tasmanian elections once again hold the balance of power. The 
Green party formed on a national level in August 1992 (Papadakis 1993:180). 
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such cases the potential for these parties to impact upon policy formation significantly 
increases. I I 
What is environmentalism? 
The terms 'environmentalism', 'conservation', 'green', and 'ecological' cover a 
variety of quite different forms of activism, issue concerns and political preferences. 
Before the social base question is addressed, it is necessary to discuss these highly 
contentious concepts. There is some confusion over the meaning of 
environmentalism, with terms such as 'environmental', 'conservation', 'ecological' 
and 'green' all interrelated. Like many concepts in the social sciences, such terms are 
often used interchangeably, while they may have quite different meanings. The term 
'environmentalism' denotes a wide variety of issue-concerns, preferences, ideas, 
attitudes, and forms of activism. Vedung (1991) cited in Jehlicka (1994: 113), for 
example, defines environmentalism as "the movement in favour of a cleaner world, 
with less pollution, less depletion of natural resources, conservation of wilderness 
areas and recycling of resources". It also subsumes members of 'Green' political 
parties and their supporters, and a large section of the public who sympathetic to 
environmental issues. In a broad sense, environmentalism also encompasses 
'environmentally friendly' patterns of consumption and marketing,12 and is 
occasionally linked with 'alternative lifestyles' (see Milbrath 1984, Poguntke 1993). 
Therefore, as Papadakis (1993:46) suggests, "being an environmentalist can mean 
many different things to different people". 
Typically, the term 'environmentalism' encompasses concerns over quite 
diverse environmental issues. They range from the largely urban-based issues relating 
to waste disposal and air pollution, to ecological concerns over preservation of pristine 
wilderness, and agricultural concerns over soil conservation. They may be local (for 
11 The two Green senators and the Australian Democrats effectively hold the balance of power in the 
Australian Senate. 
12 Ozone friendly appliances, recycled products, products not tested on animals or which respect the 
rights of other species such as free-range eggs, 'dolphin safe' fishing methods, and so on. 
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example pollution of waterways), national and international (for example acid rain), or 
even have a global impact (for example the 'greenhouse effect'). 
In an empirical study of the dimensions of environmentalism in Australia, 
McAllister (1994:22) identifies three dimensions: "a cosmopolitan dimension, 
encompassing national and international concerns; a local dimension focussing on 
general concerns; and a local dimension concerned solely with damage to land". He 
finds greater support for 'cosmopolitan' issues than localised concems.13 In a 
somewhat similar vein, Crook and Pakulski (1995) find two distinct clusters of 
environmental issue concerns - 'green' and 'brown'. They suggest that the 'green' 
issue cluster (logging of forests and destruction of wildlife), are most closely 
associated with the goals of environmental groups and their "young, active, radical 
and left-leaning" followers (1995:51). On the other hand, the broader 'brown' 
concerns (about pollution and waste disposal), "have no obvious or natural 
ideological/discursive home, just as their constituency has no specific cultural, social 
or political milieu" (1995:54). 
Concern over environmental issues is expressed in a variety of ways. These 
range from public opinion expressed at the polling booth, to joining environmental 
groups through to participation in environmental activities such as protests, rallies and 
blockades. Conventional parties are not always willing to accommodate the issues 
important to environmentalists, and the relatively new green parties are rarely able to 
exercise any serious political power.14 The broader environmental movement 
therefore remains important as a means of mobilising mass public support in order to 
bring pressure to bear on governments. Lowe and Goyder (1983:9) suggest that 
The environmental movement consists of a number of environmental 
groups, the organisational embodiment of the movement, and what 
might be termed the attentive public: those people who, though they do 
not belong to any of the groups, share their values. The attentive public 
13 Such 'cosmopolitan' issues include depletion of the world's forests, the greenhouse effect, 
destruction of the ozone layer, extinction of plants and animals, logging of native forests, dumping 
toxic waste at sea, disposal of industrial waste, pollution of rives and lakes, and land degradation 
(McAllister 1994:28). 
14 While they hold the balance of power in some instances, they are rarely able to implement 
policies. 
9 
for the environmental movement would include the readership of 
various environmental magazines, students of environmental studies in 
schools, colleges and universities, sympathetic members of the design 
and land-use professions and the many people who, through their 
personal convictions, behaviour, and life styles, express their concern for 
the environment - for example, organic gardeners, health food devotees, 
outdoor enthusiasts and supporters of recycling schemes. 
Although there is little consensus over what is meant by the term 'environment', 
one obvious distinction may be made between the 'natural', and the 'human' created 
environment. This divide gives rise to different types of environmental organisations 
and new social movements. Dobson (1990:3), for example, suggests that concerns 
over the 'human' and the 'natural' environment are expressed by conse-rvation and 
environmental organisations respectively. He maintains that conservation 
organisations, such as the British National Trust, express concern for the environment 
"principally through the restoration of and care for old and striking buildings and their 
grounds" (Dobson 1990:3). At the other end of the spectrum, environmental 
organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth "typically confront the 
negative effects of the environment of the late-twentieth century society and try to 
ameliorate them" (1990:3). This reflects not only different types of concerns but also 
different approaches to goal attainment. Yet even organisations with similar goals 
sometimes adopt very different strategies to achieve them, ranging from "spectacular 
forms of direct action, as in the case of Greenpeace" to "expert arid patient lobbying, 
the preferred tactic of Friends of the Earth" (Dobson 1990:3). 
Eckersley (1992a), distinguishes between 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric' 
environmental perspectives. The former is "characterised by its concern to articulate 
an eco-political theory and practice that offers new opportunities for human 
emancipation and fulfilment in an ecologically sustainable society" (1992a:26). On the 
other hand, the 'ecocentric' approach "pursues these same goals within the context of 
a broader notion of emancipation that also recognises the moral standing of the non-
human world and seeks to ensure that it, too, may unfold in its many diverse ways" 
(1992a:26). Elsewhere she claims that "despite the loose equation (most often made 
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by journalists) between 'Greens' and 'environmentalists', most Green movement 
activists and Green political candidates are concerned with a broader political agenda 
that includes yet goes beyond environmental protection to include the full range of 
social issues" (Eckersley 1992b: 158). 
In A Green Manifesto for the 1990s, Kemp and Wall (1990:1) suggest that 
"Greens (with a capital G) believe in a new kind of politics of harmony and justice that 
demands an end to poverty, the introduction of ecological economics ... disarmament, 
real democracy and much else besides". On a similar theme, Dalton (1994:45-50) 
argues that different types of environmental groups reflect distinct orientations or 
'shades of Green'. Environmental mobilisations with a 'conservation orientation' are 
concerned with "the perpetuation of species, the protection of habitats, and the 
preservation of a nation's heritage as represented by its cultural monuments and 
environment" (Dalton 1994:46). However, the 'ecological orientation' "differs from 
conservationism in its political concerns and fundamental political ideology" (Dalton· 
1994:46-47). Dalton (1994:47) also maintains that conservationists "generally accept 
the existing sociopolitical order" while ecologists "advocate a basic change in societal 
and political relations as a prerequisite for addressing environmental problems". 
Milbrath (1984:72) also touches on this theme, claiming that "we must make a 
distinction between environmentalists who wish to retain the present socio-economic-
political system and those who wish to drastically change it". However, he maintains 
that "Environmental organisations typically try to appeal to both types" (Milbrath 
1984:72). Cotgrove (1982:10) makes a similar distinction. He suggests that the 
"environmentalist movement has been forced to change from a consensual to a 
conflictual movement, from a concern with reform within a framework of consensual 
values to a radical challenge to societal values". Others such as Cohen (1985) and 
Papadakis (1988), note that the 'radicalism' of new social movements is 'self-
limiting'. Papadakis (1988:433) points out that the "emergence and durability" of the 
West German Green Party may be "explained in terms of an attempt to reconcile 
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innovative with established organisational fonns" and "radical goals with reformist 
political practice". 
Perhaps the most widely recognised difference is between environmentalism 
understood as a set of sentiments and issue specific attitudes, and environmentalism as 
fonns of activism. Following this distinction, I conceptualise environmentalism in 
tenns of attitudes (concerns) and behaviour (activism). Environmental concerns seem 
to be widespread, while environmental activism is more socially circumscribed. 
Environmental attitudes are associated with diverse and often distant objects, such as 
native forests, wildlife, and soil erosion. Many environmental sympathisers are 
concerned about endangered species, or wilderness areas they favour protecting, but 
are not involved in protest activities. Similarly, while most people in Australia 
approve of environmental groups, very few actually join these groups or participate in 
their activities.15 Joining and/or participating in environmental groups is a behaviour 
that demonstrates a higher level of commitment to environmentalism than purely 
'attitudinal' concern over an environmental issue. It typically requires physical effort, 
may involve a degree of danger, and on some occasions even leads to incarceration. 
These two aspects of environmentalism are operationalised as dependent 
variables in Chapters 5 to 7. I turn now to the classic explanatory accounts of politics, 
where political behaviour is explained in terms of key political cleavages and their 
associated social bases. 
The 'classic' social base model 
Political sociology is built upon the keystone of socio-structural explanation, 
whereby the main political cleavages and the institutions that represent them are seen 
as reflections of some historically shaped major social divisions. Consequently, 
15 Lowe and Goyder (1983:9) suggest that these sympathisers or 'attentive public' are part of the 
environment movement as they share the values of the movement. 
It should be stressed that the distinction between attitudes and behaviour is ideal. Favourable attitudes 
toward the environment may increase one's propensity to become involved in an environmental 
group. However, joining an environmental group does not necessarily imply active participation, and 
although voting for a green party is certainly a behaviour, it is one that does not require a high level 
of commitment. The distinction between 'attitudinal' and 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism 
is explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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modem Western politics - conventional and unconventional - has been traditionally 
analysed in political sociology16 by reference to major social cleavages and their 
respective socio-structural referents or 'social bases'. The notion of a 'social base' 
implies that specific social locations - class, religious, regional, ethnic, or urban/rural -
form the base 'grid' for political-ideological cleavages. The major parties and 
movements reflect these cleavages and represent the interests and ·outlooks of the 
structurally shaped and organisationally elaborated social referent-categories (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967, Lipset 1981). 
Such accounts, supplemented by explanations in terms of 'political culture' ,17 
have predominated in political sociology since the late 1950's, with social class 
interpretations by far the most prevalent in the analyses of politics in modem Western 
nations. Maciver (1947) cited in Alford (1963:38) suggests that "the party-system is 
the democratic translation of the class-struggle. It postulates national unity beneath the 
divisions of class [and] the rationalisation of class interests so that these can make 
appeal on the grounds of their service to or compatibility with the national interest". 
Robert Alford (1963:38), agrees that in "the modem democratic state, the political 
parties have developed largely as instruments of various class interests". These 
structural, 'social base' explanations came to form a 'paradigm' in political sociology, 
largely due to Lipset's ([1960], 1981) seminal work, Political Man: The Social Bases 
of Politics. This theme is also present in the work of Bendix and Lipset ( 1966), 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and others. While the popularity of class accounts among 
Western scholars is relatively new, their origin is quite old. The inspiration for these 
structural interpretations lies in the classical works of the nineteenth century 'founding 
fathers' of.sociology, especially Karl Marx and Max Weber. 
Marx maintained that social relations, including political relations, were based 
upon economic (especially property) relations, and that social change was propelled 
16 For a critique of political sociology see Sartori (I 969). 
17 'Political culture' accounts can be seen are supplements to structural 'social base' accounts (see 
Almond and Verba 1963, Almond and Verba 1980; for critique see Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
McAllister (1992:21) notes that "Much that could not be explained about political behaviour in 
contemporary political systems using other concepts was attributed to political culture". 
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by conflicts between major classes with opposing class interests .. Although he never 
fully elaborated his class schema, Marx (1977b) defined class by relationship to the 
dominant means of production. However, as Crompton (1993:28) points out, Marx 
also insisted that classes (Klasse fur Sich) are "real social forces with the capacity to 
transform society" .18 
While class was regarded by scholars sympathetic to Marx as the most important 
base of politics in modern Western capitalism, it was by no means seen as the only 
one. Religious and ethnic-territorial divisions also had a strong impact on political 
conflict, and were usually seen as reflecting status groups and categories (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). 
If Marx was credited with laying the foundations of class accounts of politics, 
status interpretations of politics can be attributed to Max Weber. For Weber 
(1968:306), status groups were a "plurality of persons, who within a larger group, 
successfully claim ... a special social esteem".19 While he did not deny the importance 
of class and class conflict, Weber suggested that both stratification and political 
conflicts in modern Western capitalism also reflect status interests (ideal interests) and 
institutional-organisational divisions. 20 
18 Marx was primarily interested in the impact of class-actors as the main agents and the driving 
forces of historical transformations. As Marx and Engels ( 1979:79) stressed in the opening of the 
Communist Manifesto, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles". 
According to Marx, social change occurred when the established ruling classes were challenged by 
politically maturing emergent classes. Under a capitalist system, the state was effectively controlled 
by, and acted in the interests of the ruling class, thus maintaining the status quo (1977a). However, 
Marx predicted the ultimate demise of capitalism, through the mobilisation of the numerically 
stronger working class realising its 'true' interests - determined by its objective class position - and 
rising up to overthrow its oppressors. Therefore, politics for Marx was always class politics. He was 
concerned mainly with 'the two great classes' of bourgeoisie and proletariat in his writings on 
capitalism, and although he refers to a plethora of classes in 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte', he did not set forth an actual class schema. 
19 Status groups based upon 'social esteem', emerge "by virtue of their own style of life" (Weber 
1968:306). Status groups defined in terms of 'esteem' or 'honor' may be contrasted with 'class 
situations' which for Weber (1968:302) are based upon "control over goods and skills and their 
income-producing uses within a given economic order". 
20 While the 'state' for Weber did not act in the interests of any particular class or status group, it 
was as Orum ( 1983:64) suggests, "an arena of constant conflict and involves the representatives of a 
variety of different status groups". Moreover, it was the struggle of a particular status group (the 
Protestant divines) for social recognition and ascendancy that laid the foundation for a unique and 
'peculiar' Occidental rationalism (Weber 1965). Status conflicts also laid the foundation for the 
subsequent class conflicts, typical of modern Western capitalism. In pre-modern and Oriental 
societies, however, status conflicts and status politics were more central than class conflicts and class 
politics. The ascendancy of Chinese mandarins, Hindu Brahmans and medieval European aristocracies 
were the outcome of status conflicts and status struggles. 
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The Weberian notions of status group and status conflict have grown into 
popular explanatory concepts in accounts of political organisations and behaviour (for 
example, see Turner 1988). In modem societies, Weberians insist, status group 
interests are often reflected in political preferences, ideological convictions and voting 
patterns. Political parties are often formed with the specific aim of representing the 
interests of religious or ethnic groups - both of which are status based. Where distinct 
parties based upon such status groups do not emerge, the higher status religious and 
dominant ethnic groups tend to support 'conservative' or rightwing parties, whereas 
lower status groups are inclined to support parties with reformist policies or a leftwing 
ideological stance. 
The models of politics derived from Weber and Marx were drawn together in 
more recent accounts of politics. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Lipset ([1960] 1981) 
claimed that modem Western political divisions could be explained in terms of 
underlying social cleavages that emerged in the post-Reformation period. Such 
political 'fault lines' included principally class, religious, ethnic-national and 
urban/rural cleavages, or combinations of these. In the most developed Western 
societies, politics was divided on the basis of these historical cleavages and their social 
referents (Lipset 1981). 
Social cleavages and new politics 
The classic 'social base' accounts as advanced by Lipset and Rokkan, are 
widely seen as useful for explaining the political configurations in modern western 
countries until around the 1970's. However, since then, the classic class model of 
politics has come under question, especially when applied to the 'new politics' and 
'new social movements'. Class based interpretations of politics, in particular, have 
been called into question in recent years, even by Lipset and his collaborators (Clark 
and Lipset 1991, Clark et al 1993). According to these critical accounts, the political 
configurations in the West are undergoing a process of change, signalling class 
dealignment and a weakening or even a decomposition of class and class politics. 
Clark et al (1993) point to a number of causes: the rise of the welfare state, 
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diversification of the occupational structure, rising affluence, changing political party 
dynamics, and the rise of dual labour markets (1993:297-298). Inglehart (1990a), 
who seems to embrace some aspects of the decomposition thesis, maintains that 
change is caused by generational shifts in value orientations resulting in a higher 
emphasis being on quality of life issues, self-actualisation and civil liberties. These 
shifts, in tum, lead to new norms of political participation and participatory activism, 
new 'third parties', independent politicians and the new social movements -
collectively known as the 'new politics' .21 Dalton (1988) offers a less 'culturalist' 
account. He outlines a number of factors which contribute to class/partisan 
dealignment and the decline of cleavage politics in advanced Western societies. These 
include: unprecedented economic growth, the expansion of governmental control over 
economic and social issues, the development of the welfare state, restructuring of the 
labour force, increased urbanisation, increased education, and the growth of the 
electronic mass media (1988:5-7). The most important aspects of_ change for Dalton 
(1988:7) are the increases in the level of education which leads to "growth in political 
skills and resources, producing the most sophisticated publics in the history of 
democracies". 
Perhaps the most comprehensive and radical account of political change comes 
from neo-Marxist quarters. Offe (1985) goes so far as to suggest that a shift in 
'political paradigms' has been occurring. He sees new politics as cutting across the 
old political divisions. The new politics, comprising new social movements 
(environmental, human rights, peace, disarmament etc.), and the new (especially 
'green') political parties, 'challenge the boundaries' and the content of 'old' 
conventional politics (Table 1.1). One aspect of this challenge is the changing nature 
of social actors and changing social foundations of politics. 
21 Poguntke (1993:9) defines the new politics as "the interrelated extension of participatory 
dispositions and techniques and the partial change of the political agenda through the surge of a new 
set of political demands". 
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modes of action 
Source Offe (1985:832) 
old paradigm 
socioeconomic groups acting as 
groups (in the groups' interest) 
and involved in distributive 
conflict 
economic growth and 
distribution; military and social 
security, social control 
freedom and security of private 
consumption and material 
progress 
(a) internal: formal organisation, 
large-scale representative 
associations 
(b) external: pluralist or 
corporatist interest 
intermediation; political party 
competition, majority rule 
new paradigm 
socioeconomic groups acting not 
as such, but on behalf of 
ascriptive collectivities 
preservation of peace, 
environment, human rights, and 
unalienated forms of work 
personal autonomy and identity 
as opposed to centralised control 
etc. 
(a) internal: informality, 
spontaneity, low degree of 
horizontal and vertical 
differentiation 
(b) external: protest politics 
based on demands formulated in 
predominantly negative terms 
New politics, class and partisan dealignment 
Under what Offe (1985) terms the 'old political paradigm', politics in advanced 
Western societies is dominated by 'catch-all' or volksparteien (people's parties), 
which ideally represent the broad interests of the major industrial classes. These large 
parties function as "major political stabilisers by anchoring the loyalties of large 
sections of the population, and by stabilising voting patterns" (Crook et al 1992:88). 
There are a number of reasons for this political stability. Political parties traditionally 
garner interest-based mass appeal, with political cleavages running mainly along class 
lines. Left-leaning social-democratic parties are supported by the working classes, 
while liberal-conservative parties represent the middle and upper classes (Lipset 1960, 
1981). As a result of these class linkages, the major parties enjoy strong and enduring 
voter loyalties. The large 'catch-all' parties actively cultivate their 'natural' 
constituencies of stable supporters, through systematic appeals based upon class 
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rhetoric and class issues. Political 'partisans' feel "affective ties to political parties" 
and their support is therefore relatively reliable (Balcer et al 1981:195). A minority of 
the electorate are swinging voters who bring about changes in government, yet by and 
large political life is relatively predictable. 
Over the last few decades, however, this predictability has been diminishing. 
Partisan support is on the decline, and socio-political configurations in the West are 
undergoing serious transformation. The great industrial classes are losing their 
coherence and are no longer closely linked with the major political parties.22 There 
are increasing numbers of new political parties and independent candidates, and social 
movement protest activities occur on a regular basis. Most importantly, these 
ascending parties, groups and movements, can not be linked in terms of composition 
and concerns with any of the major 'industrial classes'. 
These changes give rise to theories of class and partisan dealignment (Crewe 
and Denver 1985, Dalton et al 1984, Rose and McAllister 1985, Dalton 1988). The 
class dealignment thesis postulates a "progressive divorce between the main industrial 
classes and their organised political representation" (Crook et al 1992:139). Empirical 
evidence based on the Alford index of class voting led Minkenburg and Inglehart 
(1989:84) to conclude that "social class voting has declined almost continually in all 
major Western countries".23 Similar conclusions have been reached by Rose and 
McAllister (1985), Clark and Lipset (1991:403) and Clark et al (1993:312). Crook et 
al (1992: 139) identify "four overlapping processes" involved in the decline of class 
voting. These processes are 
the fragmentation of the major parties; declining consistency in voting; a 
declining identification with, and allegiance to, the major parties 
which traditionally represent class interests; and the decreasing 
polarisation of the old class/party blocs (Crook et al 1992:139). 
22 The changing structure of the workforce is an underlying factor here, as, due mainly to 
automation, the manual sector has decreased and the non-manual increased in.size over time. Major 
parties have consequently attempted to broaden their support base, and now aim to capture votes from 
all sectors of the electorate. 
23 Alford's index is calculated by subtracting "the percentage of persons in non-manual occupations 
voting for the Left parties from the percentage of persons in manual occupations voting for Left 
parties" (Alford 1963:79-80). 
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The dealignment process also involves a decline in partisanship. Crewe and 
Denver (1~85: 17) note that "[l]n a period of partisan dealignment, the pool of 
relatively unattached electors swells: more voters are 'up for grabs' ".24 Dalton 
( 1988: 188) suggests that "voters are not simply defecting from their preferred party in 
one or two elections. Partisan dealignment means that there is more than just a 
temporary erosion in partisan loyalties." A decrease in the level of trust in the major 
political parties is concomitant with the dealignment processes. However, this 
"growing cynicism" toward the major parties has not led to "political alienation and 
apathy" but to "a preference for expressive participation among the young, educated 
white-collar categories" (Crook et al 1992:139).25 
Perhaps the most important reason for this trend toward dealignment is the 
"failure of parties to deal successfully with contemporary political issues" (Dalton 
1988:191). Inglehart (1990a:357) argues along similar lines, suggesting; 
the established political parties came into being in an era dominated by 
social class conflict and economic issues, and tend to remain polarised on 
this basis. But in recent years, a new axis of polarisation has arisen 
based on cultural and quality of life issues. Today, the established 
political party configuration does not adequately reflect the most 
burning contemporary issues, and those who have grown up in the 
postwar era have relatively little motivation to identify with one of 
the established political parties. 
While support for the major parties has declined in recent years, support for 
Left-Libertarian parties - which do not fit the cleavage model of politics, especially the 
class model - consistently increases (Kitschelt 1990). The political void created by the 
large parties neglect of the new issues partially explains the rise of these new politics 
parties. The value-based claims of new politics supporters are often incompatible 
with, or unable to enter the instrumentally rational domain of conventional politics. 
As Berger notes, " [T]he new agents, conflicts and values are political; but they can 
not be integrated into traditional political institutions" (1979:40). 
24 They qualify these remarks by suggesting "this does not necessarily undermine the established 
party superstructure, let alone transform it in a predictable direction. The main parties might grab 
votes from each other" (Crewe and Denver 1985: 17). 
25 Participation among new politics supporters also differs in that it tends to be unconventional. 
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Key aspects of environmental new politics 
Environmentalism is an element of this emerging configuration of 'new 
politics'. The major differences between the 'old' and 'new' political configurations 
are outlined in an ideal typical sense in Table 1.2. The major points in Table 1.2 set 
the agenda for discussion in this section. 

















legal rational authority 
organisation based elites 
materialist 
economic/physical security 




- government interventionism 
- social welfare 
class, 
religious, regional, ethnic, 
rural/urban 
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new politics, third or 
left-libertarian parties, 
independents 
new social movements 
issue networks 














Sources: Dalton 1988, Veen 1989, Muller-Rommel 1990, Kitschelt 1989, Inglehart 1990a, Pakulski 
1991. 
Political organisations: old and new 
Major volksparteien (people's parties) dominated politics in the West under the 
'old' political paradigm (Veen 1989). However, in recent times smaller 'new politics' 
and 'Left-libertarian' parties also play an important role (Milller-Rommel 1990, 
Kitschelt 1989).26 These small new, left-Libertarian or 'third parties' issue an 
26 Political commentators are at odds as to exactly when the new political cpnfigurations began to 
emerge. 
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electoral challenge to the established parties, to the extent that many Western political 
systems are transforming into mixed party systems (Mtiller-Rommel 1990, Kitschelt 
1990).27 New politics parties, together with the new norms of political participation 
and issues espoused by new social movements, undermine the control of the milieu 
parties, and the integrity of corporatist politics based upon this control (Baker et al 
1981, Dalton 1988, Gibbins 1989, Keuchler and Dalton 1990, Crook et al 1992). 
The dominant Western political system, described by Kitschelt (1993:20) as the 
'organisational democratic model', "combines proportional representation of parties in 
the legislature, a functional division of government power, parliamentarism, 
bargaining and cooperation between party elites, and top-level ties to important interest 
groups".28 New politics parties, by contrast, tend to be more participatory than 
representative. Their political agendas also differ from those of conventional political 
parties. They exhibit "strong concerns for equal rights" and civil Jiberties, are pro-
ecological, anti-nuclear, and often demand "unilateral disarmament" (Mtiller-Rommel 
1990:217). These 'left-libertarian' parties "oppose the priority given to economic 
growth in public policy making, an overly bureaucratised welfare state, and 
restrictions placed on participation which confine policy making to the elites of well 
organised interest groups and parties" (Kitschelt 1990:9).29 Baker et al (1981:294) 
note that "where the old parties have refused or been unable to incorporate New 
Politics goals, new parties have been formed to specifically cater to New Politics 
voters".30 Support for these left-libertarian or new politics parties is strong among 
supporters of new social movements. Papadakis (1988:433) notes the link between 
27 This is more apparent in many European countries where electoral idiosyncrasies allow small 
parties to win more seats. In Australia, the Australian Democrats and Greens remain small parties, 
although both parties have had an impact upon Federal (in the Senate), and state politics (Tasmanian 
House of Assembly). 
28 Kitschelt (1993) also defines two other democratic types, the 'liberal democratic' and 'direct 
democratic' models. The 'organised democratic' system is common in European democracies, whereas 
the USA is an example of Kitschelt's 'liberal democratic' model. 'Direct democratic' processes are 
typically found in new social movements. 
29 The terms 'Left Libertarian' (Kitschelt 1989, 1990) and 'New Politics' parties are used here 
interchangeably, in accordance with Milller-Rommel (1990:211). 
30 Although it is noteworthy that the major parties have developed environmental policies in order 
to win the 'green' vote. In Australia, the federal ALP, for example, successfully pursued the green 
vote throughout the 1980's. 
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the Green Party and the peace and ecology movements in West Germany. Milller-
Rommel (1990:218) suggests that "in many cases we can detect alliances between 
New Politics parties and new political movements. In this respect, the New Politics 
parties differ substantially from the established parties." 
It is important to stress that while old and new political configurations may 
coexist, 'old politics' remain dominant in all developed societies, including Australia. 
As Papadakis (1993:3) notes, "old politics are by no means dead ~r irrelevant". Baker 
et al (1981) explain that old politics remain dominant because old political issues are 
still the most important for the majority people. They point out that "most voters are 
still primarily concerned with the economic and security issues of the Old Politics" 
(1981:293). However, new politics parties can have a destabilising effect upon the 
two party system. The new parties and independents representing new political issues 
may erode the major parties' stronghold on power, and encroach upon their once 
exclusive social constituencies. In some instances, such as with the Australian Labor 
Party, major political parties may attempt to assimilate new political issues into their 
policy agendas. However, as McAllister and Studlar (1995:213) warn, such a ploy 
may add to the "long-term instability of their party system". 
Extra-political forms - new social movements 
Under the old political configuration, elected governments alone are legally 
empowered to control state and military affairs. Yet they are often influenced by 
various lobby and pressure groups which are not directly accountable to the people. 
Such groups seek to influence government decision-making in order to pursue their 
own interests. For example, trades union press for higher wages or improved 
working conditions; business groups lobby for industrial reform or reduced company 
taxation. Corporatist agreements, particularly tripartite agreements involving 
government, business and trades union, are common in many modem Western 
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democracies.31 Under these corporatist arrangements powerful extra-political groups 
are able to monopolise political decision-making and policy formulation.32 
Old political institutions are organised (in an ideal-typical sense) to provide the 
most efficient means of obtaining desired ends. 33 The Zweckrational or instrumental 
issues and claims of old politics are dealt with by bureaucratic organisations which are 
specifically designed for such purposes (although in practice many question their 
efficiency). The instrumental nature of old political claims are compatible with, and 
indeed require, organisations that are "social units (or human groupings) deliberately 
constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals" (Parsons cited in Etzioni 
1964:3). Old politics tends to be pragmatic politics, where deals are made and 
compromises reached in order to achieve desired ends. 
While new social movements share some characteristics with the lobby and 
pressure groups of old politics (for example, they seek to influence governmental 
decision making), they are arguably driven less by sectional interests and to a greater 
extent by higher order values and globally important issues. The lineage of the new 
social movements may be traced to the 1960's student movements in the USA and 
Europe (Dalton 1988), and to the American civil rights movement (Burgmann 1993). 
Dalton et al (1990:3) suggest that the student movement "marked the beginning of a 
broader wave of social change that has affected virtually all advanced societies". This 
new wave of social movements ( eg. environmentalism, human rights, peace, 
women's, nuclear disarmament), reflect issues that are not sectionally based, unlike 
those of the 'old' or 'populist' (Offe 1985:837) fascist and labor movements. The 
new social movements "signify a shift from group-based political cleavages to value-
and issue-based cleavages that identify only groups of like minded people" (Dalton et 
31 Crook et al ( 1992: 137) suggest that "bureaucratic-corporatist politics" is focused on "stability, 
freedom, security, and economic growth, stressing national security, and translating value 
commitments into the language of sectional interest and appropriate administrative procedures". 
For Wilson (1990:69) the "neo-corporatist model stresses the exclusive relationships between a 
handful of privileged groups and the state"; the corporatist model "posits the presence of a single 
group for each interest sector: labor, employers, farmers, veterans, and so on". 
32 Crook et al (1992:137) suggest that new politics "emerged in response to the form, content, and 
idiom of the bureaucratic-corporatist politics, in particular in opposition to subtle constraints and 
restrictions coded into the political institutions and cultures of liberal corporatism". 
33 Which Weber (1947: 115) refers to as Zweckrational action. 
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al 1990:12). They tend to be non-hierarchical, anti-bureaucratic, loosely structured 
entities, comprised of voluntary supporters rather than members, and may be defined 
as "recurrent pattem[s] of polymorphous and value-charged protest activities" 
(Pakulski 1993a:133). 
New social movements are 'new' because the issues they raise are new. 
lnglehart (1990b:63) maintains that they "are new not only in their goals, but also in 
their political style and in the factors that mobilise their activists". In a similar vein, 
Nedelmann (1984:1033) suggests this 'newness' lies in "the differentiation of types of 
movement, the differentiation of means of action, the differentiation of types of 
demands raised, and the differentiation of types of interaction patterns between these 
different movements". 
The 'newness' of new social movements also stems from the manner in which 
they are able to mobilise public support, most notably via the mass media. They 
attempt to change the attitudes of the mass public, but seek to achieve this mainly 
through 'unconventional' political activities, such as protests, rallies and staged media 
events. Movement 'leaders' skilfully utilise symbols and slogans. Symbol 
manipulation serves to mobilise diverse groups of supporters, who are unified by a 
common slogan or banner, such as 'NO DAMS'. Movement issues are often ready 
made 'stories' which are highly suitable for media consumption. New social 
movements are highly critical of opponents, and new political issues have a tendency 
to be controversial, which further adds to their media marketability. 
The protest activities of new social movements not only sends a 'loud' message 
to the mass public, but also serves to mobilise potential activists and to promote 
solidarity among existing activists. However, protest demands "are articulated in 
mostly negative logical and grammatical forms, as indicated by key words, such as 
'never', 'nowhere', 'end', 'stop', 'freeze', 'ban' "(Offe 1985:830). In a sense, this 
could be viewed as an attempt to change established norms. However, new social 
movements may rarely be said to have a plan for what 'should be', they are more 
effective at stating what 'should not be'. Adopting a 'negative' stance serves to 
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enhance the mobilisation of potential supporters, as it is easier to mobilise people from 
diverse backgrounds to take a negative stand than to achieve positive solidarity.34 
New movement activists do not attempt to change the state in a broad sense. 
They may be 'anti-systemic' in their orientations, but tend to work within established 
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political frameworks. Even though they employ unconventional ineans of protest, 
these are usually aimed at changing government policy, rather than changing the 
system of government. The influence of new social movements, then, stems not from 
direct participation in the conventional political system, but from bringing indirect 
pressure to bear on government and business elites, via public opinion (Baker et al 
1981). 
New social movements are value driven to a greater extent than 'old' social 
movements. Participants often pursue movement goals (in so far as social movements 
have clear goals) because of a belief in their intrinsic worth. In the case of ecological 
movements, the environment is seen as important in its own right, not because of its 
potential use value. In Weberian terms, social movement supporters act in a 
Wertrational (value-rational) rather than a Zweckrational manner (Weber 1968:24-25). 
Not everyone agrees on the 'newness' of new social movements. Poguntke 
(1993:10) for example, maintains that "apart from the ecological issue and the strong 
concern with individual self-determination and self-realisation-most goals associated 
with the New Politics are not recent inventions". He suggests that what is new is "the 
specific combination of goals that originate from diverse political camps, as well as 
their radicalism and the higher salience attributed to them which makes the New 
Politics a political tendency in its own right" (Poguntke 1993:10). However, while 
also reluctant to accept that new social movements are really 'new', Miliband 
(1989:97) concedes, 
it is clear that the new social movements of recent decades have been 
immeasurably larger, stronger, more vigorous and ambitious, and also 
more effective, than many of their predecessors. In this senl)e, they are 
34 If supporters of particular new social movement supporters are asked what they stand for, their 
views would probably diverge significantly, given the diverse nature of their constituency. 
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'new', and represent a remarkable phenomenon, with a deep reach into 
the moral and political culture of contemporary societies. 
Organisation, legitimacy and leadership 
Under the old political configurations, elected governments have legitimate 
power of command within institutional structures. Governments, political parties and 
bureaucracies in Western democracies are all hierarchically organised. Political 
institutions, and indeed bureaucratic, business and trades union are dominated by 
organisational elites - "persons with the power to affect organisational outcomes 
individually, regularly, and seriously" (Higley et al 1979:3). A prerequisite of elite 
power, as Almond and Verba (1989:343) point out, is that the "involvement, activity, 
and influence" of the voting public is limited. Under the old polit~cal paradigm, voters 
are "relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites" (1989:343). This 
provides elites with the autonomy necessary "to be powerful and make authoritative 
decisions" (1989:343). 
In Western countries, the elites of 'old politics' - party and parliamentary 
leaders, pressure group heads and high parliamentary officials - are able to exert their 
power directly through the hierarchical chain of command. 35 Elite commands are the 
embodiment of legal-rational authority which rests upon "a belief in the "legality" of · 
patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules 
to issue commands" (Weber 1968:215). Elite members also have considerable 
indirect influence through social networks and via the mass media. Although they are 
constrained within organisational boundaries, this very constraint, somewhat 
paradoxically, allows elite members considerable autonomy in decision making. 
Elites are insulated from the demands of those they control by their strategic location at 
the top of organisational structures, and the legitimate authority this location affords. 
Elite members are therefore able to make decisions and issue directives with a high 
degree of certainty that these directives will be adhered to by subordinates. 
35 Weber (1947: 139) defines power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests". 
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Leadership under the new political configurations differs from the organisational 
elites of old politics. Decision making in new social movements is ideally achieved on 
a consensus basis and tends to lack structured authority lines (Gundelach 1984, 
Dalton 1988). Yet even though "decision making is collective" and "there are no 
bureaucratic leaders" (Gundelach 1984: 1065), social movements do have 
organisational cores (Holloway 1986, Doyle 1989) and 'leaders' do exist. These 
'leaders' often have significant input into decision making processes, as they are adept 
at setting the agenda for discussion and subtly influencing the consensus process 
(Tranter 1995:91). The authority of new social movement leaders often resembles 
charismatic or 'reputational' authority. Leaders have esteem based influence rather 
than authority over other participants. Influence stems from the personal prestige 
leaders gain as activists, expert advisers, spokespeople or organisers within the 
movement or new politics party. This influence may also be somewhat ephemeral, as 
it is dependent upon the continuing respect of other social movement participants 
(Tranter 1995). 
Left-libertarian or new politics parties also "display a strong preference for 
participatory party organisation" (Mtiller-Rommel 1990:217), and tend to be anti-
hierarchical and non rule bound. Similar to the new social move:rp.ents, decision 
making in new politics parties is decentralised, 
party activists hold formal leadership positions for brief periods at a 
time. Leaders engage in a continuous exchange of information with both 
rank-and-file militants and activists in left-libertarian movements and 
can be recalled at any time. The parties keep themselves open to new 
ideas and demands and base their decisions on discussions rather than on 
preferences of party elites (Kitschelt 1989:67). 
Organisational elite members have authority, but they are constrained within 
organisational boundaries. New politics 'leaders' lack organisational boundaries, but 
are constrained by a lack of authority. This lack of structured authority in new social 
movements means that in a sense they are "incapable of negotiating" ( Offe 1985: 830, 
Frankel 1987). Movements are unable to negotiate, firstly, because the 'leaders' can 
not guarantee that supporters will follow their advice and abide by agreements that are 
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made. Secondly, new social movements "do not have anything to offer in return for 
any concessions made to their demands" (Offe 1985:830). 
Values and issues 
The 'end of ideology' thesis (see Bell 1960, Waxman 1968), advances the 
notion that "the old ideologies of the right and the left had lost their relevance and 
force" (Abercrombie et al 1988:86). It also proposes that advanced Western societies 
are !'characterised by a consensus and by a pragmatic approach to the remaining 
problems of the distribution ofresources" (Abercrombie et al 1988:86). The values 
that typify old politics not surprisingly also reflect this instrumentalism and 
pragmatism. They include freedom, stability, economic growth and security, and also 
"noneconomic security ... the need to maintain a traditional social order and domestic 
tranquillity" (Balcer et al, 1981:141). Such values underlie the political issues and 
party platforms of old politics. 
Some political commentators claim that the value orientations of new politics 
supporters differ significantly from those of their old political counterparts. Dalton et 
al (1984:188), for example, suggest that "values have been changing in a number of 
advanced industrial societies and ... the new values are linked with new attitudes 
toward politics, new styles of participation, and changing issue and party 
preferences." In a study of the (West) German Greens, Veen ( 1989:42) notes that 
"they have no regard for traditional values; have a low esteem for law and order; and 
consider the fulfilment of duty, self-discipline, thrift and hard work to be less 
important virtues than do the rest of the population. On the whole, they reject 
achievement, wealth and career-mindedness". 
Others argue that what has changed is not values per se, but the way in which 
they are prioritised. Offe (1985:850) argues that a shift has occurred in the "selective 
emphasis" supporters of new politics place upon some values over others. lnglehart 
(1977, 1990a) is more specific; he notes a gradual change in value orientations and 
priorities, from what he terms a 'materialist' configuration, where the primary concern 
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is with "economic and physical security'', to a 'post-materialist' configuration, where 
priority is given to "self expression and the quality of life" (lnglehart 1990b:47).36 
Old political issues are predominantly related to economics and social welfare. 
Some economic examples include government intervention in business, job security, 
unemployment and inflation. High priority is also given to social welfare issues such 
as education and medical care (Barnes et al 1979:412, Baker et al 1981:293). By 
contrast, the new political issues include: 
Freedom of speech for minorities, access to the decision-making 
machinery of the state, the ability to participate in politics, and, if 
necessary, to resort to demonstrations and other forms of elite-
challenging political behaviour (Baker et al, 1981:141). 
Dalton (1988) suggests that new political issues are aligned with ideological 
orientation. He notes that the "New Politics dimension involves conflict over a new 
set of issues-environmental quality, alternative lifestyles, minority rights, 
participation, and social equality. This dimension represents the cleavage between 
proponents of these issues, the New Left, and citizens who feel threatened by these 
issues, the New Right" (1988: 133). New political issues may also stem from 
problems typical to modem Western societies, such as "the dangers of nuclear 
energy ... women's equality ... and the need for peaceful international coexistence" 
(Baker et al 1981:141). 
*** 
This overview of new politics highlights the novelty of the phenomenon and 
I 
helps to locate the central issue of this research - the social base question - in a broad 
theoretical context. The key point I wish to stress is that due to the publicity and 
interest generated by the 'new politics' debates, the notion of 'social base' has gained 
a new urgency. This is further examined in the final section here. 
36 Inglehart's thesis is outlined in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Social bases of new politics - the current debates 
Under the classical political sociology 'paradigm' popularised by Lipset ([1960] 
1981), and Lipset and Rokkan (1967), class struggles do not lead to revolutionary 
change. Rather, electoral contests are seen as "the expression of the democratic class 
struggle" (Lipset 1981:230).37 
More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes, 
and the most impressive single fact about political party support is that 
in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income 
groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher income 
groups vote mainly for parties of the right (Lipset 1981:234). 
This social base model has dominated in studies of Australian politics (for 
example Alford 1963, Aitkin and Kahan 1974). As McAllister (1992:152) points out, 
"whatever the electoral impact of social group loyalties such as religion, birthplace or 
place of residence, the traditional view of Australian politics is that class has formed 
the basis for party political divisions for most of the twentieth century". However, 
when applied to the analysis of new politics, especially environmental politics and 
green concerns, it proves less than useful. New political issues find support across a 
number of social groups, but it is difficult to link these issues with the interests of any 
particular social group, or socioeconomic category. 
One reason for this may be that the groups that represent these new issues reject 
the notion of 'sectional interests'. New politics cuts itself off from such sectional 
politics, be they related to class or any other socioeconomic category. Advocates of 
the new politics stress the universalism of their concerns, and this universalism seems 
to be reflected in the social profiles of supporters. Students of new social movements 
tend to agree that participants are "mainly younger, new middle class, urban, higI:tiy 
educated, with new value orientations, and a general left-wing orientation" (Mtiller-
Rommel 1990:217-18). They also tend to be 'social and cultural ~pecialists' (Kriesi 
1989: 1078), or "employed in human services (teaching, health care, social work)" 
37 Lipset (1981:230) adapted this phrase from the title of Anderson and Davidson's (1943) book, 
Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle. 
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(Kitschelt 1990: 10). Yet the (new) middle class background of supporters is not 
uniform (for example, it includes students), and it can not be seen as an indication that 
the issues they raise are class related. Offe (1985:833) argues that there are "relatively 
clear structural determinants of who is likely to support the causes and engage in the 
practices of "new politics" ... but the demands .... are highly class-unspecific". That is, 
while new politics supporters share similar (middle) class backgrounds, the politics of 
what has been termed the 'new middle class' is "typically a politics of a class but not 
on behalf of a class" (Offe 1985:833).38 
Numerous theoretical claims are advanced to explain the social base of new 
politics. Because social class accounts pervade sociological explanations of 
'conventional' politics, it is not surprising that 'new class' accounts emerge to explain 
the support base of new politics. For example, Gouldner ( 1979) and Eckersley 
(1989) maintain that entirely new classes form the support base of the new politics. 
Proponents of the new middle class accounts (for example, Parkin 1968, Offe 1985, 
Dalton 1988) suggest that support for new politics emerges from certain new sectors 
of the middle. class. The expansion of the public sector has also given rise to 'statist 
class' accounts (Mattausch 1989). 
However, these new class accounts of new politics are by no means universally 
accepted. Turner (1988:44), for example, maintains that "to understand contemporary 
social movements ... we need a theory of status groups and status politics, because the 
conventional Marxist emphasis on economic power and economic classes is 
inadequate". Alternative explanations are also found in value and generational based 
accounts. Inglehart (1977, 1990a) suggests that new politics emerged from a re-
prioritisation of values, where a shift in emphasis on value priorities occurred from a 
materialist to a postmaterialist configuration among younger generations. 
Postmaterialist values are said to underlie support for the new social movements, 
especially green movements. 
38 This raises the question, 'is social class an adequate or appropriate explanatory concept to apply 
to the study of social movements, and the new politics?' This question is explored in Chapter 2. 
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Another explanation suggests that change is occurring not only in terms of 
institutional and ideological decomposition, but also in the very nature of the social 
bases of politics. Politics seems to be entering a new stage, where the social bases 
are diverse and fluid. The most radical alternative to the social base accounts - the 
decoupling thesis - suggests that politics is no longer strongly linked to any social 
base (see Dalton 1988:175). 
It is not only the social bases but also the content of new politics that sparks 
controversies. Contrasted with old politics, the claims made by supporters of the new 
politics seem to be much more universalistic. The nature of these claims, involving 
issues such as environmentalism and peace, are not easily construed as serving the 
interests, especially the material interests of any social segments (Morrison and 
Dunlap 1986).39 New politics supporters seek to participate in, and have an influence 
upon state decision making in order to promote some 'ideal' interests. This may occur 
directly through public appeals and participation in new social movement protest 
activities, or indirectly through voting for the Left-Libertarian political parties and 
independents that represent new politics issues. In the latter instance, new politics 
voters seek politicians who are supportive of the new value-driven issues, as an 
alternative to the old political pragmatists who follow sectional interests and toe the 
party line. This may herald the entry of new values (or value priorities) into the 
political arena. Changes in value priorities lead to the emergence of new issues of a 
Wertrational nature, issues which are not easily assimilated into conventional political 
institutions. New political parties, and new social movements appear to be 'new' 
because they pursue new issues, and rely upon the non-sectional interest base of their 
supporters. Moreover, new social movements derive their 'newness' from their 
unconventional protest activities and from their heavy reliance upon the mass media 
(especially television) to mobilise mass publics. 
The study of environmental new politics gives rise to new controversies and 
also to a paradox. While there is wide recognition of the specificity of the new 
39 For example, it is difficult to sustain an argument that supporters of ecological movements seek 
sectional gain from their protest activities. 
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politics, and of the fact that it does not seem to fit the classical social base models, 
there are few critical reviews of these models and few systematic empirical attempts to 
test their utility. This calls for i) a review of the social base accounts of new politics, 
and ii) a systematic empirical evaluation of these accounts. 
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Chapter 2 
Class Explanations of Environmentalism 
Class interpretations and explanations of environmental concerns and 
activism are the focus of this chapter. Although firmly rooted in the Marxist 
(and to a lesser extent Weberian) tradition, these accounts owe more to the 
contemporary paradigm elaborated by Seymour Martin Lipset. Lipset' s now 
classic work, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, provides an 
introduction to interpretations of politics in advanced Western societies. After 
outlining the 'class paradigm', the discussion then moves on to more recent, 
'new class' attempts to explain environmental 'new politics'. While 
distinguishing between the various streams of new class theory used to explain 
environmental new politics, I also highlight the similarities between these 
streams, most notably in the manner in which the various 'new classes' are 
defined and delineated. The final section evaluates critically the new class 
accounts in terms of clarity and consistency. I conclude that the 'new class' is a 
stretched and blurred concept, and that new class accounts of environmentalism 
are vague and/or inconsistent. 
Lipset's class paradigm of politics 
Lipset ([1960] 1981) argued that the main political cleavages in Western 
democracies reflect social class, religious, regional, and to a lesser extent, ethnic 
and rural/urban divisions. Social class was by far the most important structural 
division underlying socio-political divisions in Western societies and the most 
important referent of the major 'milieu' parties and social movements. Lipset 
(1981:230) claimed that "In every modem democracy conflict among different 
groups is expressed through political parties which basically represent a 
'democratic transition of the class struggle' ". Voters supported political parties 
whose policies were aligned with their class interests, and party cleavages 
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mirrored social class divisions in their political-ideological polarisation. Parties 
that tended toward radicalism or conservatism, represented the ideological 'left' 
and 'right' respectively. The notion of a social base of politics served not only 
as a powerful explanator of voting behaviour, but also as predictor of political 
attitudes. 
More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes, 
and the most impressive single fact about political party support is that 
in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income 
groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher income 
groups vote mainly for parties of the right (Lipset 1981:234). 
Lipset (1981) also maintained that the major 'extremist social movements' 
were socially and ideologically aligned with the principle social classes. He 
claimed that the "left, right and centre (Communism and Peronism, traditional 
authoritarianism, and fascism) are based primarily on the working, upper, and 
middle classes, respectively" (1981:127). These classes formed the core social 
bases of different types of mass social movements {Table 2.i). 
Table 2.1: The ideological and social bases of 'extremist politics' and mass social 
movements. 
Ideology Social Base 
'Left' Working class 
'Centre' Middle class 
'Right' Upper class 












Lipset's ([1960], 1981) 'class paradigm' of politics survive~ as the 
dominant interpretive and explanatory framework for over 20 years. However, 
since the late 1970's, the popularity of Lipset's classic sociological model of 
\ 
politics has been declining. A number of theoretical debates have emerged 
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concerning the relevance of class analyses of politics, especially new politics 
(for example, see Baker et al 1981, Dalton et al 1984, Rose and McAllister 
1985, Hindess 1987, Dalton 1988, Dalton et al 1990, Franklin et al 1992, 
Pakulski 1993a, Pakulski and Waters 1996). Even Lipset himself (Clark and 
Lipset 1991, Clark et al 1993) began to question the utility of class as the central 
explanatory concept in political sociology, suggesting it had "declined in its 
ability to explain social and especially political processes" (Clark et al 
1993:293).1 Yet while Lipset and others pointed to the declining utility of class 
accounts, many were not so ready to abandon them. While doubts have 
emerged regarding their explanatory utility, class accounts still have numerous 
advocates among contemporary analysts of new politics. I begin by outlining 
the best known examples of these contemporary class interpretations. 
Contemporary class accounts of environmental ~ew politics 
Many theorists attempt to link the rise of new politics, environmental 
politics in particular, with the emergence of a new class. There are a plethora of 
'new class' theories.2 Pakulski (1993a) divides new class accounts into three 
general types: the occupational-economic 'new middle class' represented by 
authors such as Parkin (1968), Offe (1985), and Dalton (1988); the culturalist 
'new class' theories of Gouldner (1979), Eckersley (1989), and Inglehart 
(1977, 1990a); and the 'statist class' interpretations of authors such as 
Mattausch (1989). Whereas the 'old middle class' is often conceptualised as a 
heterogeneous category of small owners and non-manual workers, the 'new 
middle class' is a finer cut, comprised of more clearly circumscribed 
occupational groups. 3 On the ideological and political spectrum, the 'new 
1 Clark et al (1993:311) argue that "The new class both contributes to and helps explain the decline 
of old class politics ... By advancing a universalistic social agenda on issues such as peace and the 
environment, the new class helps displace specifically economic, class-relevant issues which are 
traditionally part of 'class politics' ". 
2 The term 'new class' is used here as an umbrella term that includes all types of new class accounts 
('new middle class', 'new class' and 'statist'). 
3 For example, Barbalet (1986:557) points out that the 'new middle class' are employed in 
"administrative, managerial, professional, and semi-professional jobs", while the 'old' middle class 
consists of "independent shop-keepers, self-employed trades workers, and liberal professionals". With 
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middle' class lies somewhere between the 'old middle' class and the working 
class, with a tendency to support new politics parties (Dalton 1988: 154).4 
While the new middle class is seen as derived historically from the major 
industrial classes, the 'new class' is seen as a novel category (Pakulski 
1993a:140). According to Pakulski (1993a:141), new class accounts arose 
"Partly in response to the problems experienced in linking the new movements 
with the major industrial classes". The 'statist' new class is a product of 
growing state intervention, with its members located in the 'state' or public 
employment sector (Pakulski 1993a:l42). In fact public sector employment is a 
common defining characteristic of both the new middle and new class accounts 
(for example, see Parkin 1968, Kristol 1978, Gouldner 1979, Offe 1985, 
McAdams 1987, Dalton 1988). 
Brint (1984), and Phelan and Phelan (1991) locate new class accounts on 
an ideological dimension, subdividing them into neo-conservative or centrist 
accounts (for example, Kristol 1972, 1975, 1978, Moynihan 1972, Ladd 1978) 
and neo-Marxist or new left accounts (for example, Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 
1977, Gouldner 1979, McAdams 1987). Phelan and Phelan (1991:181) claim 
that the 'neo-conservative' accounts "emphasise cultural and psychological 
sources of new-class thinking", while the 'neo-Marxist' accounts define the new 
class "in tenns of its economic interest in basing power and privil~ge on 
specialised knowledge and educational credentials rather than capital". 
A summary of the various new middle and new class accounts are 
presented in Table 2.2. It serves as an organisational framework for the 
regard to the former group, he suggests "It is generally accepted that a significant proportion of these 
occupational groups share a number of common characteristics which are sufficiently distinct from 
those of the traditionally conceived classes of capital and labour to allow them to be treated 
collectively as a new middle class" (1986:557). 
4 Issues that are of interest to some (Marxian) scholars, such as whether or not the new middle 
class(es) are actually part of the working class or upper class are not relevant to this discussion. For 
example, Parkin (1979:16) explains; "awkward questions were raised by the discovery that the social 
territory vacated by the old petty bourgeoisie was found to be occupied by a newcomer in the guise of 
the 'new middle class'. The problem posed by this new intermediate stratum arose from the fact that, 
unlike its predecessor, it was in no sense external to the capitalist productive system but an essential 
feature of it. Since it was not historically doomed it needed to be incorporated into the general class 
model" 
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sections that follow, and also highlights the defining characteristics of various 
new class accounts discussed below.5 It must be stressed that I focus only on 
new class accounts employed to explain environmentalism. 
It should be already apparent that these new class explanations of 
environmental new politics vary broadly in terms of their ideological and 
theoretical underpinnings. Some maintain that the new class is primarily defined 
by level of education (Eckersley 1989, Rootes 1995), others by employment in 
professional occupations (McAdams 1987) or even in terms of certain value 
priorities (Inglehart 1990a). The various new class accounts differ also in terms 
of the emphasis placed upon certain defining characteristics of class 
membership. I examine the various class definitions and new class explanations 
of environmental new politics, beginning with the 'new middle' class, and 
moving on to the 'new class' and 'statist' class accounts. 
5 It is not the aim here to construct an all inclusive review of new class theories, but to analyse , 
those accounts most relevant to this research. The class accounts shown in Table 2.2 are organised on 
the basis of Pakulski's (1993a) distinction between 'new middle class', 'new class' and 'statist class'. 
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Table 2.2: Typology of New Class Types by major Defining Characteristics. 
Author 



























professionals and scientists 
personal service 













mainly state sector 
public sector 
scientists, lawyers, journalists public, welfare sectors 
planners, criminologists, 
sociologists, doctors 
professionals state sector 
social and health professionals welfare state 
medical services, teachers, social and cultural areas 
social workers, arts and 
journalism 
'New middle class' accounts 
Contemporary versions of the 'new middle class' interpretations of new 
politics can be traced to Frank Parkin's (1968) study of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament. Parkin suggests that the CND is a class driven social 
movement, yet one with an unusual constituency. In contrast to 'old' social 
movements such as the labor movement, radical middle class participants are 
over represented among CND constituents. CND participants are highly 
educated, generally young, and tend to be employed in public sector education 
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and welfare organisations as professionals or scientists. 6 In an attempt to 
explain the link between occupational location and political radicalism, Parkin 
( 1968: 185) suggests 
the connection between these particular occupations and political 
radicalism is to be explained not in terms of the strains created by status 
inconsistency, nor as a result of individuals adopting the humanistic 
values generated within the professions, but rather as a result of the 
tendency for individuals who are already radical to enter these fields of 
employment rather than others.7 
Parkin (1968:187) argues that CND activists tend to avoid employment 
which conflicts with their value orientations, and instead choose " 'people 
oriented' work", or occupations which "avoid direct implication in the capitalist 
economic system".8 Parkin (1968: 145) maintains that the family is the primary 
socialisation agent for radicals, suggesting that "political outlooks and 
loyalties ... formed at a relatively early age, through childhood exposure to 
parental influences ... have a decisive effect on the individual's political outlook 
through his adult life". 9 
Such interpretations have been criticised by Cotgrove and Duff 
(1980:345), who argue that the "radicalism located in this particular fraction of 
the middle class is ... much more than an emotional satisfaction derived from the 
expression of personal values in action, as Parkin argued." They suggest that 
the "antagonistic values and beliefs within a fraction of the middle class ... are 
6 Byrne's (1986) cited in Kriesi (1989) replication of Parkin's study shows similar patterns of 
support among these groups. Cotgrove and Duff (1981: 102-3) suggest that I}ritish environmentalists 
are also employed in "non-productive" service, welfare, and creative occupations. 
7 Parkin (1968:182) rejects the status inconsistency argument as a potential explanation, which 
suggests that when the consistency of status ranking scores are inconsistent on important indicators 
(such as education, wealth, occupation, ethnicity), individuals tend to develop "left of centre political 
attitudes". Those with 'leftwing' attitudes are often over represented among 'radical' groups, or social 
movements. The status inconsistency argument is therefore potentially applicable to the CND, 
because many activists rank high on education, but lower on economic criteria. 
8 Parkin suggested "[T]he fields of commerce and private industrial enterprise are almost synonymous 
with capitalism in a way that teaching, medical and social work, and scientific research and the like are 
not" (1968:187). Capitalist oriented employers were also avoided by CND activists because they were 
thought to discriminate against those with left wing views. 
9 The parents of many activists were interested in politics, with many traditional supporters of left 
wing parties (Labor or Communist). The political values of CND activist's parents were reflected in 
the values of their children, and there were similarities between the political outlooks and voting 
behaviour of activists and their parents (Parkin 1968). 
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outside the capitalist mode of production and cannot be assimilated to one or the 
other of the two main contending classes" (Cotgrove and Duff 1980:345). Such 
groupings therefore "constitute a potentially radical opposition to industrial 
capitalism" (1980:345). 
Parkin's conceptualisation of a radical middle class is also problematic. 
By referring to the value orientations of activists, rather than participants' 
socioeconomic interests, Parkin transforms the new middle class into a 
sociocultural rather than a socioeconomic grouping. In fact Pakulski 
(1993a: 140) suggests that "if styles, norms and ethoses reflected in movement 
activism are products of specific socialisation patterns and life-styles, the 
concept of status group, rather than class, appears to be more appropriate for 
explaining their origins and persistence". 
Some attempt have been made to salvage the new middle class 
interpretations of new politics. Offe (1985:833) suggests that new social 
movements have a "new middle class core of activists and supporters". The 
new middle class is characterised by "high educational status, relative economic 
security (and, in particular, experience of such security in their "formative 
years") and employment in the personal-service occupations" (19?5:833). Yet 
for Offe, new social movements, especially the environmental and anti-nuclear 
movements are not only supported by new middle class participants. He argues 
that the social base of these social movements consists of three main groups. 
There are the core activists, who are predominantly drawn from the new middle 
class, "especially those elements of it which work in the human service 
professions and/or the public sector'' (1985:831). There are also "elements of 
the old middle class", including "independent and self employed" groups such 
as "farmers, shop owners and artisan-producers" (1985:834). Offe (1985:834) 
suggests that the "immediate economic interests" of these elements of the old 
middle class, "often coincide with (or least diverge from) the concerns voiced by 
the protest politics of new social movements". Finally, there is a "category of 
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the population consisting of people outside the labor market or in a peripheral 
position to it" (1985:832). This latter category Offe (1985:834) refers to as the 
'decommodified' groups: those who are "not defined directly in their social 
situation by the labor market and whose time budget, consequently, is more 
flexible" .1 o 
By extending the social base in such a manner, Offe's account is resistant 
to empirical rebuttal, as almost any mildly radical political activity in modern 
Western societies may be linked with the vague and broad social bases he 
identifies. Moreover, Offe (1985:833) contends that the politics of the new 
middle class are the politics 'of a class', but not 'for a class'; their political 
activities are not conducted in the material interests of that class. New social 
movements are therefore not driven by class interests. In fact it would be 
difficult to maintain that new social movements could act in the class interests of 
their participants, given both the universality of their concerns and the diversity 
of their constituency (Poguntke 1993:32). 
Other new middle class accounts, such as Dalton's (1988:154), explain 
that the expansion of the new middle class is due to postwar growth in 
government employment and the service industry, to the extent that it 
"constitutes the largest sector of the labor force in most Western democracies, 
even exceeding the size of the traditional working class" (1988:154). For 
Dalton (1988:154), the new middle class is aligned with neither the bourgeoisie 
nor the proletariat, but "consists primarily of civil servants and salaried white 
collar employees". He points out that while members of the new middle class 
have lifestyles that differ from those of the traditional working class, they are 
not large scale owners of capital. On a left/right scale, the 'new middle class' 
falls between the working class and the old middle class. Its members are more 
lO The decommodified group includes "students, middle class housewives, the unemployed" and 
retired people (Offe 1985:834). The temporal flexibility and autonomy enjoyed by members of this 
'decommodified' or 'peripheral' group, allows them to "spend considerable amounts of time on 
political activities, something that they share with the often flexible time schedules of middle class 
professionals" ( 1985:834). 
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closely aligned with new political issues, and less concerned in the economic 
issues of 'old politics' (Dalton 1988:154). 
Support for new political issues is also reflected in voting tendencies, as 
"the new middle class gives disproportionate support to parties that represent a 
New Politics ideology: the West German Greens, French Ecologists, and the 
SPD/Liberal Alliance in Britain" (1988:154).11 Dalton (1988:155) suggests that 
this support for new political issues (for example, environmental protection, 
women's rights, social issues, disarmament) and new politics parties, "is a key 
element in the changing political alignments of advanced industrial societies". 
Yet Dalton's (1988:157) findings "also indicate a narrowing of class voting over 
time". In agreement with Inglehart (1977, 1990a), Dalton (1988:172) suggests 
that "the long standing class cleavage is being challenged by a new values 
cleavage" that can not be clearly linked to the major industrial classes. 
'New class' accounts 
New class accounts depart more radically from the classic paradigm by 
suggesting the formation of an entirely new social class category. In a work 
devoted entirely to the new class theories, Bruce-Briggs (1979:1) claims that the 
usage of the term in America stems from Milovan Djilas' work The New Class, 
first published in English in 1957. Bruce-Briggs (1979:1-5) also _maintains that 
the American usage of the term gained popularity due to the influence of three 
influential authors; Moynihan (1972), Podhoretz (1972) and Kristol (1972). All 
three saw the new class as a threat to liberal democracy, as a radical social 
formation consisting mainly of critical intellectuals. 
I I However Dalton's (see 1988: 155 Table 8.1) own data seem to offer at best ambiguous support for 
his claims. According to Dalton's (1988: 155) figures, Green party support in West Germany is 
stronger among the old middle class than the new middle class, while in France, 'old' and 'new' 
middle class support for the Ecologists are identical. It is only in Great Britain that support for the 
Liberal/SPD alliance is strongest among the new middle class. However, his suggestion that the 
SPD/Liberal alliance actually represents a "new politics ideology" is certainly questionable 
(1988:155). 
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Szelenyi and Martin ( 1988) identify "three waves" of new class theory, i) 
the anarchist theories of the intellectual class (1870-1917) (for example, 
Bakunin 1966, Machajski 1937), ii) the technocratic-bureaucratic class theories 
formulated in 1930's, 1940's and 1950's (for example, Trotsky 1974, Veblen 
1963), and iii) the knowledge-class theories of the 1970's (for example 
Gouldner 1979, Bell 1979). The new 'knowledge-class' theories are of 
particular relevance here, as they are used to explain support for new political 
movements and concerns. Knowledge class theorists 
typically argue that a new type of knowledge (call it adversary culture, 
teleological knowledge, cultural capital etc.) is gaining ground and the 
possessors of this knowledge are in a radically new relationship to 
domination. It is assumed that the possessors of this new type of 
knowledge can now make an autonomous bid for power (Szelenyi and 
Martin 1988:657). 
Szelenyi and Martin (1988:656) also claim that Gouldner' s account offers 
the most comprehensive version of the new knowledge-class theories. 
Eckersley (1989) and Pakulski (1993a:140) similarly identify Go?ldner (1979) 
as the forerunner of the 'new class' accounts of 'Western eco-pax movements'. 
Because of this recognised centrality, I commence the discussion of new class 
accounts with a brief summary of Gouldner' s ( 1979) neo-Marxist theory. The 
explanations advanced by Eckersley (1989), lnglehart (1981, 1990a), and 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1977, 1979) are then critically reviewed. 
For Gouldner (1979: 21), the new class is a "new cultural bourgeoisie 
whose capital is not its money but its control over valuable cultures". The 
higher education system plays a central role in the emergence of the new class, 
as it provides "the institutional basis for the mass production of the New Class 
of intelligentsia and intellectuals" (1979:3). The higher education system 
through "the expansion of primary and secondary public school teachers greatly 
increases the jobs available to the New Class" (1979:3). According to Gouldner 
(1979:8), the new class does not own the means of production, although "there 
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are certain communalities in the New Class's relationship to the means of 
production and, in particular, to what l...call cultural capital or human capital". 
Gouldner's new class comprises both1humanistic intellectuals and 
technical intelligentsia, among whom professionalism is the "central 
occupational ideology" (1979:42). The new class is unified by a culture of 
critical discourse (CCD). The CCD unifies class members "in much the same 
way as ordinary languages, say French or German", in that it forms the 
"common bond between humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia" 
(1979:30).12 Macy (1988:328), explains that the CCD emphasises "reasoned 
argument, intellectual scepticism, and a critical orientation toward traditional 
social and economic arrangements". Szelenyi and Martin (1988:~56) note that 
the culture of critical discourse 
captures the common feature, the common quality of knowledge shared 
by Marxist radicals, professionals, the technical intelligentsia, and 
adversary or counter-cultural intellectuals. As the knowledge of the 
highly-edu~ated takes the form of a Culture of Critical Discourse, the 
cultural capital thus acquired, enables them to "usurp" from the position 
of power both "old line bureaucrats" of state socialism and private 
capitalists, owners of money capital. 
Gouldner (1979) endows the new class with anti-bourgeois radicalism and 
universal emancipatory potential. He suggests that "it is the most progressive 
force in modem society and is the centre of whatever human emancipation is 
possible in the foreseeable future" (1979:83). Moreover, the new class is 
important because its members possess "scientific knowledge and_ technical 
skills on which the future of modem forces of production depend" (1979:83). 
Of particular relevance for this research, members of the new class often support 
and take leading roles in new social movements such as the environment 
movement. 
12 "The culture of critical discourse (CCD) is an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of 
discourse, which (1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justification does not 
proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed 
solely on the basis of arguments adduced" (Gouldner 1979:28). 
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The new ecological ideology signifies that the older instrumental 
ideology of the New Class is giving way to one with keener concern for 
the goals of action and which refuses to surrender these to others and to 
limit itself to specifying the means of action (Gouldner 1979:42). 
More recent new class accounts such as that advanced in Australia by 
Robin Eckersley explore this link between environmentalism and class in more 
detail. Eckersley (1989:205) presents an explanation of the composition of the 
green movement "which focuses on the education of the new class and its 
relative structural autonomy from the production process". In doing so, she 
rejects the "class interest argument" that "green politics is a means of furthering 
either middle-class or new-class interests". She also rejects Inglehart's (1981) 
new class account, which suggests that the "development of the green 
movement is the result of the spread of postmaterial values, the main bearers of 
which are the new class" (Eckersley 1989:205). 
Eckersley (1989:221) emphasises the importance of advances in 
technological areas (nuclear, genetic, chemical), international communications 
(computers and television), and the growth in higher education. She suggests 
that such increases in the flow of information help "to shift social perceptions of 
old issues", a result of which is increased support for environmental issues 
(1989:221). The impetus for such support is found largely among the new class 
"conceived as an adversary culture in Gouldner' s sense), by virtue of its high 
education and relative autonomy from the production process". The new class 
comprises both technical intelligentsia and humanistic intellectuals, but it is the 
latter group that have greater autonomy from production processes, and a 
"relatively greater degree of alienation from the centres of wealth and power" 
(1989:222). The humanistic intellectuals are therefore more likely to become 
actively involved in new social movements.13 
13 Eckersley (1989:209) suggests a "further significant characteristic of adherents to the CCD is that 
they conceive of themselves as responsible for and representative of a society·as a whole, an attitude 
that Gouldner notes as being particularly prominent among teachers and academics". 
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Their relative independence from the vagaries of the market sector 
explains why the new class (especially public sector employees) are 
more inclined than the working class to be critical of the industrial 
system and actively involved in seeking reform (1989:222). 
However, it seems odd that the new class as state sector beneficiaries 
should, as Eckersley (1989:222) puts it, seek to "bite the hand that feeds them" 
in fighting for reforms that would lead to a diminished public sector. Nor does 
the adoption of a critical stance toward the industrial system necessary translate 
into socio-political activism by these professional groups. 
The neo-Marxists Barbara and John Ehrenreich (1977, 1979) identify the 
new class as professional-managerial workers (PMC). The PMC, they suggest, 
"is not part of some broader middle class, which includes both "old" and "new" 
strata, but rather is a distinct class, separate from the old middle class" 
(1977: 11). As such the PMC is an entirely new class. The Ehrenreichs employ 
a fairly standard Marxian definition of class, suggesting that it is "characterised 
by a common relation to the economic foundations of society - the means of 
production and the socially organised patterns of distribution and consumption" 
(1977:12). Class members share not only interests, but also "a common 
lifestyle, educational background, kinship networks, consumption patterns 
work habits, beliefs" (1977:12). The Ehrenreichs (1977:17) maintain that this 
new class of "professional-managerial workers exist, as a mass grouping in 
monopoly capitalist society, only by virtue of the expropriation of the skills and 
culture once indigenous to the working class". 
The Ehrenreichs' account is not without its problems. Their definition of 
the PMC as a class consisting of "salaried mental workers who do not own the 
means of production and whose major function in the social division of labor 
may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist 
class relations" (1977:13), poses a question of heterogeneity and unity. Indeed, 
the Ehrenreichs acknowledge that the PMC is divided into two groups. The first 
group consists of those employed by social control agencies, or concerned with 
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"the production and propagation of ideology" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 
1979: 12). As Marks et al (1989:412) point out, the first group is comprised of 
"teachers, social workers, doctors, police, members of the armed forces and 
artists. The second group, whose functions are generally concerned with 
reproducing capitalist relations of production, includes managers, 
administrators, engineers and other technical workers". 
Cast from the Marxian mould, the Ehrenreichs' PMC schema also 
includes a notion of objective antagonism. In fact, as the PMC is "antagonistic 
to both capital and organised labour" there are two class conflicts ·and two 
classes opposing it (Waters 1989:9). Both the PMC and the wo~king class 
"confront the capitalist class over the issue of ownership and control of the 
means of production. They confront each other over the issues of knowledge, 
skills, culture" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979:45). The class consciousness 
of the PMC is expressed as "scorn for the capitalist class and elitism toward the 
working class" ( 1979:31 ). The elements of this class consciousness are 
detectable, according to the Ehrenreichs in the attitudes of new social 
movements supporters. 
In fact the PMC are strong supporters of new social movements. The 
Ehrenreichs (1979:33) maintain that the class interests of the PMC are expressed 
"in the New Left, the anti-war movement, the ecology movement; the women's 
liberation movement - all of which defied "the system" but often with moralistic 
contempt for the working class". However, the Ehrenreichs' new class account 
is also problematic. There is no clear link between occupational location and 
alleged class interests. They also fail to clearly delineate classes, and as the 
PMC is internally divided into two sub-classes, its unity is questionable. 
Finally, the link with new social movements is vague, and ignores the 
possibility that elements of the PMC, particularly the 'managerial' component 
are more likely to be anti-green. 
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Better known for his work on value change, Inglehart (1981, 1990a) also 
makes reference to the 'new class' as a support base of new politics. Yet while 
he makes reference to the new class, he does not explicitly define it, claiming 
there "is no clear consensus on the criteria that define the new class" 
(1990a:331). Nevertheless he has no hesitation in stating "this group is 
distinctive not only in its occupational and educational characteristics, but also in 
its values" (1990a:332). Inglehart (1990a:332) maintains that "the rise of 
Postmaterialism and its subsequent penetration of technocratic and professional 
elites has been a major factor behind the emergence of the new class" claiming 
that "the ideology attributed to the new class reflects Postmaterialist values rather 
closely". 
Like Offe (1985), lnglehart does not claim that the new class acts out of 
class interests - it has no socioeconomic basis. However, he does attempt to 
locate the new class in sociohistorical processes. In particular, he links the 
ideology of the new class with postmaterialist value orientations, and suggests 
that the "distinctive values of the new class reflect an historical change that can 
not be attributed simply to a changing educational and occupational structure" 
(Inglehart 1981:895). To confuse matters further, lnglehart (1981, 1990a) links 
the new class with generational location, which is closely associated with his 
value change thesis.14 Thus, in his usage, new class becomes a vague (and 
confusing) descriptive label. It bears little relation to class theory of any 
consistent type. With his particular focus on values and ideology, Inglehart 
seems to ignore socioeconomic linkages. This point is not lost on Eckersley 
(1989:216), who maintains that Inglehart "appears to be defining the new 
class .. .in terms of its ideology or adversary culture, rather than as a 
socioeconomic stratum". In fact, he uses it as a 'rubbery' term that describes an 
historico-cultural grouping. 
14 See Chapter 3. 
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'Statist' classes 
What is referred to here as the 'statist class' forms a sub-stream of new 
class theory. Seemingly inspired by Dahrendorf (1959, 1988), authors such as 
Mattausch (1989) and Kriesi (1989) suggest the formation of new classes based 
upon public sector employment. The new class members are supportive of new 
social movements, including the 'eco-pax' movements. McAdams (1987), and 
conservative authors such as Moynihan (1972), Ladd (1978) and Kristol (1972, 
1975, 1978) also advocate 'statist' new class theorists. Although differing 
considerably on ideological grounds, Mattausch, McAdams and the three neo-
conservatives all give primacy to the public sector as the occupational basis and 
key defining characteristic of the new class. 
According to Mattausch (1989), Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) participants are members of a new class comprised of 'welfare state 
occupations'. He claims that such new class occupations include doctors, 
nurses, social workers, lecturers and teachers whose "views and opinions had 
been fostered or engendered by their experiences of higher education, 
postgraduate professional training (for example, social work or teacher training 
courses), and their welfare state employment" (1989:221). Through what he 
terms a 'state apprenticeship', or form of career socialisation, CND participants 
"naturally absorb the ethic of the welfare state, a specific sociopolitical 
orientation which finds expression in, and acts as a resource for, nuclear 
disarmament campaigning" (1989:221). 
Mattausch rejects Parkin's notion of middle class radicalism, which 
suggests that CND supporters opt for welfare and creative occupations because 
of family socialisation experiences prior to working. Instead, he argues that 
career training results in attitudes favourable to supporting new social 
movements. He suggests that rather than " 'middle class radicalism', CND 
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campaigning can be more profitably seen as 'state class radicalism' " 
(1989:221) . 
.Kriesi (1989) finds that new social movements in the Netherlands are 
supported by a new class. He locates the 'new class' within the 'new middle 
class' (1989:1080-1081). Kriesi (1989:1081) focuses upon divisions within the 
new middle class because "the new class is generally thought to b~ part of the 
new middle class and because it is here that we expect the mobilisation potential 
of the NSM' s to have its structural roots". He subdivides the middle class into 
five categories.15 Among these categories, Kriesi suggests it is only the 'social 
and cultural specialists' that constitute the 'new class'. The new class therefore 
includes professionals and semi-professionals who are employed in "medical 
services, teaching, social work, arts and journalism, and other social and 
cultural specialists" (1989:1082). 
In a manner similar to Gouldner, .Kriesi differentiates between 
'technocrats' and 'specialists' (intellectuals). He argues that "it is the specialists 
who form the new class, and it is the antagonism between technocrats and 
specialists that constitutes the structural basis for its formation" (1989: 1082-83). 
New social movements, according to Kriesi (1989: 1083), are "one of the arenas 
of confrontation between these two camps in the new middle class and the 
political struggles of the NSM' s can be thought of as contributing to the 
formation of the new class".16 
Yet as Pakulski (1995:64) points out, if "the 'new class' is the product of 
increasing state power and growing state intervention ('state class'), its interests 
15 Kriesi (1989:1080) follows Wright (1985) in basing his class divisions upon "effective control 
over productive assets", which include "assets in the means of production, organisational assets, and 
skill/credential assets". Kriesi' s class schema has 12 classes, comprised of the Bourgeoisie/old middle 
class of i) farmers, ii) large employers, iii) petit bourgeois, iv) traditional professions; the 'New 
Middle Class' of v) social and cultural specialists, vi) administrative and commercial personnel, vii) 
technical specialists, viii) craft specialists, ix) protective services; and the Working class of x) lower-
Jevel employees, xii) skilled workers, and xii) unskilled workers. 
16 As an element of the new middle class, the 'specialists' are in conflict with another element, the 
'technocrats'. Through the ensuing 'political struggles' played out on the battle ground of new social 
movements, these 'specialists' are transformed into a new class. However, this is not a new class at 
all, but merely part of the 'new middle class' (itself a contested notion) that has been renamed. 
51 
and its styles of political action should be pro-statist, that is, supportive of the 
state and state interventions. In fact, many aspects of new movements are 
distinctly anti-statist". 
In a somewhat similar vein, although exhibiting a strong neo-Marxist 
influence, McAdams (1987:23) suggests that the "post-industrial economic 
order gives rise to an elite which has a class interest in the expansion of 
government: the New Class" .17 Employing cluster analysis and utilising 
national survey data, McAdams claims to have identified three distinct class 
world views, which he attributes to the traditional middle, the traditional 
working class, and the new class. He employs the Marxian concepts of 
socioeconomic base and class ideology in his analysis, as his assumptions are 
based on the notion that "ideas come, not individually, but in socially 
determined packages"(1987:29). 
McAdams (1987:23) suggests that the new class may be identified by their 
"liberal policy preferences, and through a pattern of group identifications which 
distinguish it clearly from other traditional middle and working classes". For 
him the new class has "a comparative advantage in politics, as opposed to the 
market" (1987:24). It does not consist merely of experts, 'knowledge industry' 
workers or symbol manipulators, but rather of "one wing of the 'knowledge 
elite', that wing whose objective class interests are served by the expansion of 
government" (1987:25). Thus McAdams' (1987:27) new class is "based in the 
professions, in higher education, and in the state sector". New social 
movements, such as the environment movement, are based upon the new class. 
He notes that if conceptualised as new class movements, 
the rise of elite liberal and leftist political movements (consumerist, 
environmentalist, and "public interest") becomes explicable. People in 
such groups need not be viewed as moved by idiosyncratic and 
inexplicable factors, nor by a socially detached "enlightenment", but 
17 It is interesting to note that McAdams seems intent on further muddying the water, by attributing 
'class' interests to an 'elite' group. This conceptual sloppiness occurs on a number of occasions, as 
for example, when he suggests that "an additional class, an elite produced by advanced economic 
development, has become an important force" (1987:24). 
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rather as part of a social class with a particular world view and a 
particular relationship to the economy (1987:45). 
Such views attract some criticism. Rootes (1995:229) among others, 
points out that McAdams fails to consider "the values inculcated in the 
professions and developed by higher education, and the possibility that it is the 
values of professionals and the higher educated that are directly expressed in 
their attitudes and behaviour rather than that their attitudes and behaviour are the 
reflection of class interests". There are also problems with delineation between 
classes, and with a conflation of the economic and political foundations of the 
allegedly new class. 
A number of American neo-conservative writers identify a class that they 
see as threatening the democratic stability of advanced Western societies. 
Although extremely vague about the characteristics of new class members, 
Moynihan (1972:83) suggests that "social legislation of the middle third of the 
century created 'social space' for a new class whose privilege (or obligation) it 
is to dispense services to populations that are in various ways wards of the 
state". Moynihan is principally concerned with the increasing power of the 
public sector - specifically the increases in 'welfare state' practices and the 
corresponding decline in the influence of the free market due to increasing 
regulation. 
In common with Eckersley (1989), Ladd (1978:53) suggests that 
education has replaced occupation as "the key factor in detennining today's class 
divisions" (italics in original B.T.). He notes (in a manner similar to Inglehart) 
that the highly educated espouse qualitatively different attitudes on social issues, 
as 
the college trained, when compared to the high school and grade school 
educated, urge less emphasis on money, more on "self fulfilment", less on 
(making) "sacrifices for (one's) children, and the like (1978:52). 
Ladd (1978:51) views the 'intelligentsia' or 'new bourgeoisie', as he 
variously refers to the new class, as consisting of "college educated 
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professionals". This highly educated new class supports "environmental 
protection and reduced energy consumption, even at the expense of 
unemployment and inflation", and adopt the "more critical outlook of society 
which characterise the intellectual community" (Ladd 1978:52,53). 
Kristol (1975:135) argues that the new class emerged due to increases in 
mass higher education following the Second World War. He suggests it adopts 
the guise of "Reformist-liberal rhetoric" under which "more explicitly socialist 
and neo-socialist themes are beginning boldly to emerge".18 Kristol (1972:43) 
claims that the "professional classes of our modem bureaucratised societies are 
engaged in a class struggle with the business community for status and power". 
The new class therefore seeks radical economic and social change, including 
radical increases in environmental protection. 
Though they continue to speak the language of 'progressive reform', in 
actuality they are acting upon a hidden agenda: to propel the nation 
from that modified version of capitalism we call 'the welfare state' 
toward an economic system so stringently regulated in detail as to fulfil 
many of the traditional anti-capitalist aspirations of the Left (Kristol 
1978:15). 
In a similar vein to the conservatives, Szelenyi and Martin (1988:662) 
argue that as "the West is sliding-with some cyclical fluctuation-toward a statist 
future, away from competitive capitalism, the likelihood of a statist New Class 
domination is increasing". They suggest that "All new class theorists claim that 
post-capitalist society will be a new class society in which a new class, other 
than the proletarian, will rule. But beyond these two points there may be no 
common ground for New Class theorists" (1988:647). 
However, there are some problems with these arguments. Firstly, there is 
no consensus among new class theorists on the emancipatory potential of the 
new class. While some such as Gouldner ( 1979) see the possibility for 
emancipation through the new class, for other theorists, emancipation is not the 
18 Kristol (l 975: 134) suggests the new class consists of "scientists, lawyers, city planners, social 
workers, educators, criminologists, sociologists, public health doctors". In a later work he also adds 
"educational administrators, journalists and others in the communication industri~s" ( 1978:27). 
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key issue. Many theorists employ notions of new class to explain increases in 
new political attitudes; preferences, and forms of participation (for example, 
Parkin 1968, Dalton 1988, Eckersley 1989). 
Secondly, Szelenyi and Martin are mistaken in stating that new class 
theorists have little in common. While the specific definitions and ideological 
underpinnings of new class accounts vary widely, as noted by Brint (1984) and 
Phelan and Phelan (1991), in other ways new class accounts are very similar. 
Almost all new class theorists agree that the new class comprises tertiary 
educated categories. Most suggest that it includes professional occupations, 
while many also claim that new class members are predominantly employed in 
the public sector. The degree of definitional overlap among new class theorists 
is quite high. The new class approaches differ in the emphasis placed upon one 
or other of the three main defining characteristics of new class - education, 
occupation and employment sector. It is this variation in emphasis that results in 
broader or more narrow versions of the new class. The degree of variation 
depends on the definition of professionals (broad for McAdams 1987, as 
opposed to narrow for Kriesi 1989), and/or on whether all white collar workers 
regardless of employment sector are included (Dalton 1988), or only public 
sector workers (Mattausch 1989). On the third characteristic of new class - high 
education - there is the most agreement. 
Criticism of the new class 
I have already signalled some problems with the new class interpretations 
and explanations of environmental new politics. In this section these problems 
are discussed in a more systematic way and in the context of the most cogent 
critical responses to new class theorising. 
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Problems with class interests 
A number of authors argue that the new class acts out of sectional 
interests. For example, McAdams ( 1987) maintains that the interests of the new 
class lies in the expansion of the state or public sector. Burklin ( 1983) argues 
along similar lines. As Lowe and Rudig (1986:522) explain, Burklin links the 
"ecologi~al inclinations" of the new class "with their objective self-interest in the 
maintenance and extension of the welfare and regulatory states". Ward 
(1983: 190) also notes that as "the state sector would almost certainly expand 
with any environmental cleanup, one can see quite good reasons why public 
sector workers should support environmentalism". 
Sectional interests at the level of occupations are also attributed to 
supporters of environmental social movements. Gerritson (1990:56) for 
example, maintains that those whose employment has links to the ecology 
movement (for example zoologists, ecologists, environmental scientists, 
geographers) stand to directly benefit from increased preservation of wilderness 
areas.- He claims that "National Parks create managerial employment for, 
amongst others, people with scientific training in the broad area of ecological 
studies. So some occupations (and tertiary teachers and researchers in the 
relevant disciplines) are advantaged by increased wilderness preservation" 
(Gerritson 1990:53). Others, such as Frankel (1987), have little faith in the 
commitment of the new class to new political causes if this involves a threat to 
their personal livelihood. He suggests that new social movement supporters 
have concentrated their protests against "capitalist enterprises and state 
apparatuses ... which do not necessarily threaten jobs in the 'social wage' 
services of local and national state sectors" (1987:239-40). Frankel (1987:239-
240) stresses that he is not suggesting 
all 'new class' activists in social movements are self-interested 
protesters who campaign only on issues that allow them to maintain 
their comfortable lifestyles. But when post-industrial theorists hail 
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the new agents of social change, it is important not to have illusions 
about how far these professionals are prepared to struggle". 
Yet as signalled above, it is problematic to link environmental protest 
activities with new class or occupational interests. As Lowe and Rudig 
(1986:522) point out, there are 
problems in identifying the pro-environmental actions of the new class 
with its own well-understood interest. The demands of radical political 
ecology for fundamental changes in industrial society do not accord with 
this model. The financing of the welfare state is dependent on continued 
economic growth - why should it be in the interests of those who work 
within it to demand the end of economic growth and a halt to major 
technological projects? 
Nor does the over representation of certain occupations among 
environmental movements imply that these movements are driven by class 
interests. It is timely to recall Offe's (1985) contention that the supporters of 
new politics may be (new) middle class in origin, but their interests are not class 
interests. Although certain occupations may be over represented among 
environmental groups, the occupational constituency of new social movements 
is diverse. NSM' s encompass a wide range of occupational groups, and also 
include students, the unemployed and retired (Offe 1985). 
Rootes (1995) also rejects the idea that class or sectional interests propel 
the new social movements. He claims it is "doubtful that their more general 
social and political attitudes or their involvement in new social movements can 
be attributed to sectional self-interest, much less to class interest" (1995:230). 
Clark et al (1993:311) note that "even in rallying to a socially liberal agenda, 
new class members do not act as a self-conscious, united class but usually as 
voters and members of 'single-issue' groups". Pakulski and Waters (1994:12) 
go further to argue that "New movements mobilise non-class constituencies and 
publicise non-class issues. The relevance of class schemes for the analysis of 
composition and orientations of such movements, especially Western ones, is 
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very low". Finally, the class interest criticisms of Hindess (1987) are most 
relevant here. He argues that 
in so far as interests have an explanatory role, they are always 
dependent on definite discursive and other kinds of conditions, and their 
identification is always open to dispute. Interests are not fixed or given 
properties of individuals or groups, and they should not be regarded as 
structurally determined. The claim that class as a social force can be 
understood in terms of the representation of class interests must therefore 
collapse (Hindess 1987:112). 
There may be another reason that many theorists see new social 
movements as 'new class' movements. New social movement participants 
employed in 'new class' occupations tend to come to the fore as influential 
players in social movement organisations, and have a disproportionate influence 
over agenda setting.19 These key activists or 'leaders' also tend to be media 
spokespeople. As they present the movements' public image, an impression 
arises that new social movements are comprised of new class participants. 
Yet even if these so called 'new class' activists do effectively control the 
direction of new social movements, they are still not class movements. It may 
be more useful to explain new social movements as having a form of 'elite' 
control, where a small number of influential activists to a large extent set the 
agenda for the 'mass' of rank and file participants (Tranter 1995): 
Problems with composition and theoretical linkages 
There is some disagreement over the composition of the new class, and 
also as to whether it constitutes a real class, in the sense of generating interests, 
consciousness and solidarity (see Bruce-Briggs 1979).20 It is suggested by 
some authors that the new class is not in fact a class at all, but merely a 
conglomeration of occupational categories. Macy (1988:327) for example, 
l9 They are typically better educated, more articulate, and as professionals have greater occupational 
autonomy, which allows them to spend more time on extra-occupational activities. 
20 Although as mentioned above the differences in the composition of the new class are more a 
matter of the degree of emphasis placed upon the defining characteristics of the new class -
professional occupational location, employment sector, and level of education. 
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claims that "social-cultural specialists are not a structurally defined class, but an 
"aggregation" of occupations with no broadly unifying collective life or 
organisational affiliation". Bell (1979:22) is equally critical, argu~ng that "if 
there is any meaning to the idea of a 'new class' .. .it cannot be located in socio-
structural terms, it must be found in cultural attitudes. It is a mentality, not a 
class". If there are disagreements over the 'classness' of the new class, then it 
is difficult to attribute sectional interests to such a 'blurred' category. 
Some also claim that structural explanations have rather limited application 
to new political issues and activism. For example, Clark et al (1993) argue that 
such explanations "cannot specifically account for activism on problems such as 
environmental devastation ... to account for these trends, it is likely to be a more 
promising strategy not to stretch class analysis farther but to recognise that 
structural cleavage based explanations must be supplemented by others: that the 
new may indeed be quite new" (Clark et al 1993:313). Pakulski and Waters 
(1996) point out that the notion of the new class is theoretically flawed. 
New-class theories reverse the logic of class analysis. While class 
analysis explores the political articulation of the economic class 
structure, new-class theories see classes as sociocultural and 
sociopolitical categories. They locate the origins of class in education, 
political organisation, industrial-sectoral location, symbolic skills and 
cognitive capacities. The problem is not the argument that sociocultural 
factors can generate social groupings, but that such processes can be 
interpreted in class terms rather than in terms of say, elites or status. 
This undermines the identity and integrity of class theory, blurs the 
distinctions between class and non-class formations, and increases the 
conceptual stretch (Pakulski and Waters 1996:59). 
The utility of class interpretations, especially when applied to 
environmental new politics is questionable. As Rootes (1995:231) notes, "class 
is all very well in its place, but. . .its place in the analysis of the new politics and 
the new social movements is really very limited". 
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Problems with empirical 'testability' 
While there are a plethora of new class accounts, few theorists appear to 
have the inclination to 'test' their theories in an empirical sense. Possibly this 
reluctance is heightened by the fact that when such attempts are made, the results 
rarely support the theoretical claims. At best attempts to operationalise and 'test' 
new class accounts return somewhat ambiguous findings. 
Empirical evaluation of new class theories are also hampered by 
(deliberately?) vague definitions of new class. Class boundaries are seldom 
clearly delineated (for example Inglehart 1990a, Dalton 1988, Ehr-enreich and 
Ehrenreich 1979). In most instances, therefore, the new class(es) are difficult to 
operationalise in a manner consistent with the original theoretical account. 
Nevertheless, some empirical evidence suggests a link between new politics and 
new class. 
Studying the political scenario in Germany in the 1980's, Baker et al 
( 1981: 157) found that "New politics orientations are strongest among the new 
middle classes, reflecting the affluence of their middle-class upbringing and the 
later-life influence of occupational role". Kriesi (1989) also found support 
among "social and cultural specialists" in Dutch new social movements, 
although this support was limited to the core activists.21 
On the other hand, Rohrschneider (1990) found no empiric~ evidence to 
suggest that the new middle class supports environmental groups in Western 
Europe to a greater extent than other classes.22 Further, Inglehart and Rabier 
(1986) found little empirical support for the relationship between class and new 
politics in Western Europe. In fact they concluded "Despite its central role in 
21 He claims that "[I]f we compare the class composition of the outer circles of the different 
movements with that of the general population, we note that these outer circles resemble the 
composition of the Dutch population quite closely" (Kriesi 1989: 1101). 
22 Rohrschneider (1990:25) was surprised to find "that membership in the new middle class is largely 
unrelated to public support for environmental groups. Given the strength of the arguments made in 
support of this explanation, the empirical evidence is weak". 
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social theory, social class today has become an astonishingly weak empirical 
predictor not only of electoral behaviour, but of ideology as well" (1986:473). 
Part of the problem is that the new class is operationalised in many 
different ways. Sometimes it is seen as a very general social category and on 
other occasions as a much more narrow, exclusive occupational category. For 
example, Eder (1993) views the new middle class as a broad white collar and 
petit bourgeois category; Baker et al (1981:171), Dalton (1988:154) and 
Rohrschneider ( 1990:9) define the new middle class as "civil servants" and 
"salaried white collar workers"; while at the other end of the spectrum, Kriesi 
(1989:1081) defines the new class as 'social and cultural specialists'. Finally, 
Brint (1984:30) is most specific and includes "specialists in social science and 
arts-related occupations" in the new class. These different delineations lead to 
inconclusive and often incomparable findings. 
Yet even though there are a number of problems with new class accounts, 
they remain popular in political sociology. Perhaps this is due to a reluctance on 
the part of many social theorists to abandon the established class paradigm 
completely. Possibly this reluctance is exacerbated by the problematic nature of 
new and alternative explanations to class. Some theorists may also persist in 
using class accounts due to ideological allegiances, or because 'class' is thought 
to be a widely understood and familiar concept, even though it is not now used 
with any consistency of meaning. Whatever the reasons for their persistence, 
class accounts are likely to continue to be employed in political sociology, in 
spite of the growing empirical evidence that suggests new class support for new 
social movements in Europe and the USA, is, to say the least, problematic. 
While there is some empirical research on the relationship between class and 
environmental new politics in Australia, it tends to focus on green voting and 
does not engage the broad range of new class accounts produced in recent years. 
I attempt to fill this gap by empirically evaluating new class support for 
environmentalism in Chapters 5-7. 
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Chapter 3 
Generations and Environmentalism 
Some theorists suggest that support for environmental new politics is linked 
with specific generations or age groups. Because of their sophistication and recent 
revival in popularity, generational accounts are particularly important in this respect. 
Karl Mannheim's (1972) classic account of the generational origins of 
Weltenshauungen_provides a theoretical foundation to generational accounts, while 
Inglehart's (1990a) influential theory of postmaterialist value change, although lacking 
specific reference to Mannheim's work, forms a basis for contemporary generational 
accounts. Both are discussed here in detail. 
I also discuss accounts that interpret environmental support in terms of age 
groups and categories. The research literature on environmentalism indicates that 
environmental concerns and support for environmental groups is strongest among 
younger people (for example see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980, Watts and 
Wandesforde-Smith 1981, Inglehart 1990b, Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Abramson 
and Inglehart 1992, 1994). A correlate of support for environmentalism -
involvement in 'radical' political activities such as protests and demonstrations - is 
also stronger among the young (Bean 1991:265). Two main explanations of these 
regularities are advanced: the 'life cycle' and the 'generation' hypotheses. McAllister 
(1992:86) explains that the "political senescence (or life cycle) explanation suggests 
that as people grow older and become less flexible in their thinking, they become more 
conservative in their opinions". Some claim that younger people are more likely to 
support environmentalism because they are less well integrated into the 'dominant 
social order' (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). In a variant of the life cycle explanation, it 
is argued that as "solutions to environmental problems are often viewed as threatening 
to the existing social order, possibly requiring substantial changes in traditional 
values, habitual behaviours, and existing institutions .. .it is logical to expect youth to 
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support environmental reform and accept pro-environmental ideologies more readily 
than their elders" (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980:183, citing Malkis and Grasmick 1977, 
and Hornback 1974). Milbrath (1984:75), suggests a number of 'life cycle' related 
reasons why older people are less supportive of the environment: 
Simple self-interest helps to explain some of this relationship: 
undertaking several years of effort to clean up the environment can 
hardly be as important to someone who expects to live only another 
eight or ten years as it is to a person who is looking forward _to sixty or 
more years of continued life. Additionally, vigorous physical contact 
with the natural environment, such as hiking, is likely to be much more 
attractive to a young person than an older person. Furthermore, 
environmental topics are likely to have been part of the curriculum for 
persons passing through the schools in the past ten years whereas those 
topics were largely unknown to people who went to school forty or fifty 
years ago. 
Parkin (1968) advances an account of support for new political phenomena 
based upon early socialisation. He suggests that family socialisation may provide "an 
alternative mode of explanation to the generation concept in that its major postulate 
declares that political attitudes and loyalties are formed at a relatively early age, 
through childhood exposure to parental influences, direct and indirect. These 
influences ... have a decisive effect on the individual's political outlook throughout his 
life" (Parkin 1968:145). Following this line ofreasoning, younger people may be 
more likely to support new political phenomena such as environmental movements 
due to their 'radical' family backgrounds. 
It must be stressed that age/life cycle accounts are quite different from 
generational accounts. The latter focu~ on generationally structured predispositions, 
orientations, and values, that reflect shared formative experiences. People who share 
formative experiences may tend to respond similarly on political issues, such as 
environmentalism. The tendency for members of certain generations to be more 
sensitive to environmental issues and appeals are linked with specific formative 
events, such as wars and economic depressions that affect a large number of people in 
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a similar manner. Thus it is not age, or position in the life cycle, but belonging to a 
certain generation that is seen as the key explanatory factor. 
Of course the value of generational accounts depends upon the strength of such 
formative experiences, and the clarity of generational watersheds. The extent to which 
societies are generationally (that is socio-historically) structured differs, and the 
temporal boundaries between generations may vary widely. Generational boundaries 
differ between societies, even between neighbouring countries. For example, 
Pakulski (1991) points out that the generational divisions in Germany, Poland and the 
former Czechoslovakia are drawn quite differently. Australian society appears to 
share generational divisions with major developed Western nations, despite its Asian 
geography. The key generation-shaping events in Australia were the 'Great 
Depression', the Second World War (WWII), the post WWII 'long boom', and 
possibly the 'post-boom' period beginning with the oil crisis in the early 1970's.1 
Generational accounts state that people who share certain formative experiences 
tend to develop similar attitudes and behaviour. Jennings and Niemi (1981:331) claim 
that in a broad sense, 'generation' refers to an age group that shares the same temporal 
and social location. They argue that such groups "have an identity in terms of their 
historical-social location and thus have the potential of participating in a common 
destiny. But this is simply a potentiality brought about by the accident of biological 
and geographical commonality" (1981:331). But as Jennings and Niemi also stress, 
belonging to a generation only implies the potential for the emergence of a group 
capable of initiating social change. Generation members may have little in common 
unless they de~elop similar orientations. 
With specific relevance to environmentalism, Van Liere and Dunlap ( 1980) note 
the development of an 'ecology-minded generation' which has experienced exposure 
to environmental information via the mass media, and through educational institutions. 
1 However, it is important to note that events such as WWII and the post war boom period may have 
had a diminished impact upon Australia compared to West European countries. For example, 
Australia did not have to fight on home soil. Consequently, the post war reconstruction period and 
associated 'boom' was not as marked as in Western Europe. Therefore, generational differences in 
Australia may be less noticeable. 
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They stress the enduring nature of generational effects, and note that this generation's 
"commitment to environmental reform should not disappear as they move into 
adulthood" (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980:183). Alternatively, Gerritson (1990:5) 
argues that "the green movement could falter as the post-materialist "baby boom" 
generation ages and its direct consumption of wilderness inevitably declines". 
Mannheim on generations and politics 
Mannheim (1972:276-320) developed the notion of 'generation' as a key socio-
historical and socio-structural concept that could be used to explain aspects of politics 
and ideology.2 'Generation' emerged as a sociological attempt to address the 
argument from historicism. As Kecskemeti (1972:22) suggests in his introduction to 
Mannheim' s work, 
According to historicism, the most important thing about the works of 
the human mind is that they can be 'dated': we cannot understand them 
except by relating them to the period in which they originated. If we 
refine this analysis, we shall be faced with the problem of the 
generation as an historic unit. For it is not only possible to 'date' a 
certain work as belonging to a certain period; within one and the same 
period, one can distinguish the works of the older generations from those 
of the younger. Here, then, we see concrete groups which in a way 
determine styles of thought and action; and yet, it cannot be said that it 
is 'interests' or 'common socio-political aspirations' that give the 
members of the same generation a common orientation. 
Mannheim' s reformulation of generation occurred in the context of his sociology 
of knowledge - notably as a development of the idea that something "other than 
'sociological' factors ... seem to be responsible for certain characteristic modifications 
of thought" (Kecskemeti 1972:22). Generations originate not as concrete social 
groups but as socio-historical categories. For Mannheim (1972:289), 'concrete social 
groups' form through "the union of a number of individuals through naturally 
2 Pakulski (1991:71) suggests that 'generation' as employed by Mannheim is sociologically useful 
"because it links certain age-group characteristics, socialisation processes, and sociohistorical 
transfonnations. When used in this sense, 'generation' becomes a structurally rooted concept". 
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developed or consciously willed ties".3 Such socially articulated generations share a 
similar location in the social structure; "the unity of generations is constituted 
essentially by a similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole" 
(Mannheim 1972:290) . 
Mannheim makes a number of conceptual distinctions relating to generations. 
He distinguishes between generational locations, generations as 'social actualities', 
and gene~ation units. In relation to generation as a location, he suggests that "Any 
given location ... excludes a large number of possible modes of thought, experience, 
feeling and action, and restricts the range of self-expression open to the individual to 
certain circumscribed possibilities" (1972:291). Generations as social actualities 
imply more than simply shared location. Such generations involve, as Mannheim 
(1972:303) puts it, "a further concrete nexus" which "may be described as 
participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit." 
We shall therefore speak of a generation as an actuality only where a 
concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being 
exposed to the.social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic 
de-stabilisation (Mannheim 1972:303). 
Individuals only comprise an actual generation when they are united, when they 
participate in the "social and intellectual currents of their society and period", and have 
"an active or passive experience of the interaction of forces" comprising the new 
situation (1972:304). Whereas generation as location "means the same as the broadest 
sense of the term - to coexist or be located with others of the same age", generation as 
actuality "shares a community of experience and feeling" (O'Donnell 1985:2). 
The third concept developed by Mannheim is the 'generation unit', which 
represents a far more concrete social entity. Generation units "do not merely involve a 
loose participation by a number of individuals in a pattern of events shared by all 
alike ... but an identity of responses, a certain affinity in the way in which all move 
with and are formed by their common experiences" (1972:306). He also notes that at 
3 Examples of concrete groups are the family, tribes, and sects. Following Tonnies, Mannheim 
(1952:288) further distinguishes between community groups based on spatial proximity, and 
association groups based upon "the conscious application of the rational will". 
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any one point in time, a number of "differentiated, antagonistic" generation units may 
exist that as a whole form "an 'actual' generation" (1972:306).4 
It is difficult to overlook in Mannheim's distinction the analogy to Marx's 'class 
in itself' and 'class for itself', and Weber's distinction between 'class situation', class 
category and class community. However, the way in which these generational 
concepts are deployed remains highly original. As O'Donnell (1985:2) explains, 
Mannheim "introduced the concept of generation unit to provide more specific 
analysis. Generational units share an identity of responses and views about events. 
Thus there were various pro- and anti-war units within the 'Vietnam War generation' 
". Mannheim's notion of generations enriched the sociology of knowledge. He 
developed a conceptual framework where Weltanschauungen - global outlooks or 
world views - specific to certain cultures may be explained by linking them with 
socio-historical processes. 
Generations, value orientations and political change 
Although Inglehart (1981, 1990a) appears in Chapter 2 as a 'new class' theorist, 
he is better known for his work on value change and generational replacement. He is 
undoubtedly the most influential contemporary social theorist using the concept of 
generation to explain political outlooks and behaviour.s Inglehart (1990b:43) argues 
that the key to understanding political preferences and behaviour lies in childhood 
socialisation, as one's early experiences influence the formation of different value 
priorities. 6 People growing up in times of relative economic affluence and physical 
safety are more likely to develop postmaterialist values, and tend !O favour quality of 
life issues over economic - materialist issues. Those experiencing economic hardship, 
wars, or political upheavals, are more likely to develop materialist value priorities in 
4 As an example Mannheim (1972:307) suggests that "Those who were young about 1810 in 
Germany constituted one actual generation whether they adhered to the then current version of liberal 
or conservative ideas. But in so far as they were liberal or conservative, they belonged to different 
generation units of that actual generation". 
lnglehart (1977, 1981, 1990a, 1990b). Dalton (1977), and Abramson (Abramson and Inglehart 
1992, 1994, lnglehart and Abramson 1994), and Flanagan (1982a, 1987) among others have also 
made important contributions to the area. 
6 Dalton (1988:77) explains that "value priorities identify what are important to citizens - what are, 
or should be, the goals of society and the political system." 
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which materialist values (for example, economic and physical security) dominate 
(lnglehart 1990b:47). lnglehart links value priorities with generational change, by 
claiming that a shift in the value priorities of Western publics has occurred since the 
second World War. According to lnglehart (1977:3) the "values of Western publics 
have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and 
physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life". 
Inglehart' s explanation of generational value change rests upon two key 
hypotheses, known as the 'scarcity' and 'socialisation' hypotheses. The scarcity 
hypothesis contends that individuals place a greater emphasis upon needs that are in 
short supply. When a need is unfulfilled, its satisfaction becomes an important goal. 
However, when the needs in question are satisfied, they tend to become taken for 
granted, and attention shifts toward other 'higher order' needs - "given individuals 
pursue various goals in hierarchical order-giving maximum attention to the things they 
sense to be the most important unsatisfied needs at a given time" (1971:991). 
The 'scarcity' hypothesis is based upon the need hierarchy suggested by the 
psychologist Abraham Maslow (1970:59) who claims that human needs are ordered 
hierarchically in terms of their relative importance: 
the chief principle of organisation in human motivational life is the 
arrangement of basic needs in a hierarchy of less or greater priority or 
potency. The chief dynamic principle animating this organisation is the 
emergence in the healthy person of less potent needs upon gratification of 
the more potent ones. The physiological needs, when unsatisfied, 
dominate the organism, pressing all capacities into their service and 
organising these capacities so that they may be most efficient in this 
service. Relative gratification submerges them and allows the next 
higher set of needs in the hierarchy to emerge, dominate and organise 
the personality, so that instead of being e.g., hunger obsessed, itnow 
becomes safety obsessed. The principle is the same for the other sets of 
needs in the hierarchy, i.e., love, esteem, and self-actualisation. 
Following Maslow, Inglehart suggests that physiological needs are the most 
important, followed by safety needs (see Figure 3.1).7 When these 'material' needs 
7 Physiological needs sometimes override safety needs, for example when th~ desire for food 
outweighs the possible danger involved in it's procurement. 
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have been met, individuals pursue non-material needs, or 'goals' .s The need for love, 
belonging and esteem are next, and at the very top of the need-goi:µ hierarchy are the 
self actualisation needs, which are related "to intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction" 
(1977:22). Self actualisation needs are sought only when both material and belonging 
needs have been satisfied. Therefore, in Western societies, that have "for a number of 
years experienced exceptionally high levels of economic and physical security" (in 
other words most basic needs have been met) people "give increasing emphasis to 
other types of needs" (lnglehart 1977:22).9 
(Figure 3 .1 about here) 
Inglehart' s second basic hypothesis concerns socialisation. It states that "people 
tend to retain a given set of value priorities throughout adult life, once it has been 
established in their formative years" (1977:23). Combining the 'scarcity' and 
'socialisation' hypotheses produces the following proposition: value priorities are 
shaped by the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of hierarchically ordered needs, and 
once formed persist over time - as "people tend to retain a basic character throughout 
adult life once it has been formed in childhood and youth" (1977:23). Hence the link 
with generations. Generation effects persist because value orientations formed in 
childhood or early adolescence remain relatively stable over time.10 
From this theoretical platform Inglehart (1977:23) is able to claim that "we 
should find substantial differences in the values held by various age groups." 
Changes in value orientations in advanced societies occur largely as a result of two 
factors: the relative prosperity experienced by Western nations in the period following 
8 Inglehart tends to use the terms 'needs' and 'goals' interchangeably. 
9 Maslow's hierarchical ordering of needs is not without its detractors (for example, see Eckersley 
1989:216). In fact Inglehart (1981:881) concedes; "The rank ordering of human needs becomes less 
clear as we move beyond those needs directly related to survival. But it does seem clear that there is a 
basic distinction between the 'material' needs for physiological sustenance and safety, and 
nonphysiological needs such as those for esteem, self-expression and aesthetic satisfaction". 
10 In this sense values differ from attitudes. McAllister (1994:31) suggests that "While political 
attitudes are the result of experiences gained in later life and may change through the course of time, 
values usually remain embedded in the individual's personality and provide a guide to both political 
outlooks and action". 
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the Second World War ( l 950s-1970s), and the absence of local wars and conflicts in 
the West during that period. Older (Western) generations whose formative 
experiences occurred during times of economic hardship and physical danger (for 
example, before World War II) tend to hold materialist values. Younger people born 
and brought up in prosperous economic circumstances free from the threat of total war 
are more likely to exhibit post materialist values.11 The percentage of post materialists 
"should be smallest among the oldest cohorts, if, indeed, values tend to reflect the 
conditions prevailing within a society during a given cohort's pre-adult years" 
(1977:23). In the process of generational replacement, the proportion of 
postmaterialists in advanced Western countries should continue to increase, with 
older materialists gradually being replaced by younger postmaterialist generations 
(1990b:51).12 
lnglehart's empirical analyses of the materialist/postmaterialist value distinction 
are based upon responses to simple questionnaire items. The more widely employed 
short questionnaire has four responses.13 Respondents who choose both the first and 
third options are deemed 'materialists', while those choosing the second and fourth 
options are 'postmaterialists'. The remaining combinations (which in all surveys 
comprise a large majority) form the residual or 'mixed' category.14 
11 It is important to note that the majority of people in Western publics are neither materialist nor 
postmaterialist, but fall into the mixed category. Therefore, although younger generations may be 
more postmaterialist than their parents, the overall percentage ofpostmaterialists in Western countries 
is still rather small. In Australia in 1993, approximately 14% of the population were postmaterialists 
and 21 % materialists. The remainder, approximately 65% of the population held mixed value 
orientations (Source: AES 1993). 
12 Inglehart (1994:337) acknowledges that what he terms he calls 'period effects' also impact upon 
the formation of values. Period effects are usually brought about by economic phenomena, such as 
inflation or recession. 
13 If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to 
you? 1 Maintaining order in the nation. 
2 Giving the people more say in important political decisions. 
3 Fighting rising prices. 
4 Protecting freedom of speech. (Source: lnglehart 1977:28). 
Inglehart (1977) also uses a more elaborate 12 item questionnaire see Figure 3.1. However, the 
original is more well known and remains the most widely used measure of value orientations. 
It must also be said that Inglehart does not maintain that childhood socialisation completely 
determines one's value priorities. In fact he suggests "[l]t would be ridiculous to argue that no change 
in basic values occurs during adult life ... Our point is simply that the probability of such change 
diminishes substantially after one reaches adulthood" (1977:23). 
14 The 'mixed' value category is theoretically uninteresting, and largely ignored by lnglehart and his 
followers. 
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Inglehart (1981:898) claims that the "conflict between those seeking Materialist 
and Post-Materialist goals has become the basis of a major dimension of political 
cleavage, supplementing though not supplanting the familiar polarisation between 
labor and management". The distribution of post materialist and materialist value 
orientations also varies across national boundaries "in a predictable fashion", in that 
"the differences in values across a given nation's age groups tend to reflect that 
nation's history during the lifetime of the people in the sample" (1977:24). 
Generations, values and environmentalism 
Postmaterialist value orientations are often associated with increased 
involvement in new social movements, especially environmental movements 
(lnglehart 1990a, 1990b, Watts and Wandesforde-Smith 1981, Milbrath 1981). 
Inglehart (1990a:66) explains the rise of these new political phenomena by claiming 
that a "process of intergenerational value change is gradually transforming the politics 
and cultural norms of advanced societies. A shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist 
value priorities has brought new political issues to the centre of the stage and provided 
much of the impetus for new political movements". He suggests that there is a strong 
relationship "between Post-Materialist values and a predisposition for unconventional 
protest", and that "postmaterialist values underlie many of the new social movements" 
(1981:891;1990a:373). These new postmaterialist value priorities are also over 
represented among the supporters of "environmentalist movements and parties" 
(lnglehart and Abramson 1994:336). Postmaterialists make "an explicit reference to 
the quality of the physical environment; and ... with a concern for the quality of the 
social environment: they seek less hierarchical, more intimate and informal relations 
between people" (lnglehart 1990b:45). They are also strong opponents of nuclear 
energy, and nuclear weaponry: 
nuclear power tends to be rejected not only because of its potential 
dangers but because it is linked with big business, big science and big 
government-bureaucratic organisations that are evaluated negatively 
because they are inherently impersonal and hierarchical, minimising 
individual self-expression and human contact (1981:896). 
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Postmaterialists are more politically active than materialists, because while 
"Materialists tend to be preoccupied with satisfying immediate physiological needs; 
Post-Materialists feel relatively secure about them and have a greater amount of 
psychic energy to invest in more remote concerns such as politics" (1981:890). They 
are also "less supportive of the established social order, and subjectively, they have 
less to lose from unconventional political action than Materialists" (1981:890). 
However, changing value priorities are not the only important causes of new 
politics. lnglehart (1990b:44) also suggests that a high level of 'cognitive 
mobilisation' is an important determinant of new political preferences and 
involvement: 
. 
the impact of values on political behaviour tends to be greatest among 
those with relatively high levels of education, political information, 
political interest, and political skills: in short among those with high 
levels of cognitive mobilisation (1990b:44). 
The increase in levels of cognitive mobilisation among Western publics also 
leads to increased support for new political activities, as "the emergence of new social 
movements owes much to the gradually rising level of political skills among mass 
publics, as education has become more widespread and political information more 
pervasive" (1990b:44). 
However, while lnglehart's value change thesis remains an important and 
influential explanation of some aspects of political behaviour, it is not without its 
critics. A variety of criticisms are advanced, which may be divided into theoretical 
and methodological problems. 
Theoretical consistency and empirical fit 
Although lnglehart uses the concept of generation, it is not theoretically 
developed in his work. Rather he uses generation in order to explain how value 
priorities change over time. In doing so, he seems to place too much emphasis on the 
nature of values, and not enough upon the generational mechanisms of value-
acquisition. Mannheim's (1972) distinctions between 'generational locations', 
generations as 'social actualities' and 'generational units' are ignored by lnglehart. 
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Perhaps this is due to his method of empirical evaluation, and his propensity to use 
exclusively survey data.15 Whatever the reason, it seems that contemporary theorists 
using the concept of generation could make more of Mannheim' s conceptual 
distinctions. In particular, Mannheim's (1972:304) notion of generation units, 
defined as "groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of 
their common experiences in different specific ways" appear to have direct application 
to value change studies. Inglehart' s research shows that generations allegedly 
experiencing similar formative experiences produce both postmaterialists and 
materialists. Perhaps Mannheim' s concept of generational units could be employed to 
explain why this is the case. 
The basic hypotheses upon which lnglehart' s theory of value change rests have 
also been challenged. Boltken and Jagodzinski (1985:453-54) suggest that Inglehart 
specifies the relationship between the 'scarcity' and 'socialisation' hypotheses in an 
ambiguous manner, that he offers two different explanations of value change, and 
tends to alternate between them. They argue that Inglehart's first 'core model' 
stresses the socialisation hypothesis and underplays the scarcity hypothesis. The 
second 'soft model' emphasises the importance of the scarcity model for explaining 
adult behaviour. Boltken and Jagodzinski (1985) maintain that it is contradictory to 
hold the scarcity and socialisation hypotheses simultaneously. They suggest that 
If the responses to the value index reflect internalised value 
orientations, they should be fairly stable in adulthood. If on the other 
hand, respondent behaviour is affected to a larger extent by economic 
changes, usually no stability can be expected. But the same sequence of 
actions cannot be both stable and unstable (1985:454). 
Inglehart (1985) responds to these criticisms with the counter-claim that his 
thesis has been misinterpreted. He argues that "Boltken and Jagodzinski's 
assumption that I alternate between two different models is based on a simple 
conceptual error: the belief that period effects are incompatible with stable and 
15 For example, using survey data it would be difficult to identify generations as 'actualities' where a 
"concrete bond is created between members" (Mannheim 1972:304), or as 'generational units' that 
share a "community of experience and feeling" (O'Donnell 1985:2). 
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persisting cohort differences" (1985:497). Value orientations helcJ by certain age 
cohorts may change in response to 'period' effects (such as rises in inflation), while 
"stable and persisting cohort differences" still remain (1985:495-500). 
Duch and Taylor (1993) attack the link between economic conditions during the 
formative years and the formation of value priorities. They claim that "early economic 
conditions do not actually affect how respondents rank Inglehart' s postmaterialist 
items. Education and economic conditions at the time of the survey are much more 
important explanations for variations in the postmaterialist measure" (Duch and Taylor 
1993:747). However, Abramson and Inglehart (1994:798-799) are again able to 
rebuff their critics by claiming that Duch and Taylor (1993); i) truncate the variance on 
"variables crucial to testing the theory", ii) "misinterpret the role of education" in that 
they "discount the possibility that education is a powerful indicator of the respondent's 
economic security during their formative years", iii) "argue that the fluctuation of 
values with current inflation rates demonstrates that formative socialisation is 
unimportant. In fact, period effects are frequently found with long-term birth cohort 
effects and are perfectly compatible with them", iv) "conclude that economic security 
is not related with postmaterialism at the aggregate level" while Abramson and 
Inglehart "clearly demonstrate a strong relationship between economic prosperity and 
postmaterialism", and v) "confuse the effects of high levels of GNP/capita and the 
effects of economic growth". 
Eckersley (1989:219) suggests that Inglehart "inclines toward 'vulgar idealism' 
in focusing on the subjective values of individuals and ignoring the relation these 
values have to the objective changes that have taken place in the physical and social 
environment since 1945, other than rising levels of affluence". She recommends that 
"other important factors" need to be considered, such as "the degradation of the 
environment, the changing cultural milieux and the expansion and changing nature of 
higher education" (1989:219). Although, as noted above, in a later work Inglehart 
(1990b) does consider the impact of education and other factors, which he collectively 
refers to as 'cognitive mobilisation' potential. 
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Inglehart' s failure to adequately link postmaterial values with sociostructural 
categories is also seen as problematic. Alber (1989:196) argues that" 'Values' are 
certainly important, but as a tool for macro analysis the concept seems useful only, if 
values are conceived as stable orientations which may be linked to specific milieus in 
the social structure". For example, Inglehart does not adequately specify the 
relationship between values and class location. He states; "I suggest that the rise of 
Post-materialism and its subsequent penetration of technocratic and professional elites 
has been a major factor behind the emergence of the New Class" {1981:895), thus 
advocating the notion of a new class based upon values. Yet if this is the case, his 
new class is a socio-cultural rather than socio-economic phenomenon, and as such 
more closely resembles a status category. 
Inglehart's scarcity hypothesis based upon Maslow's need hierarchy is also the 
subject of criticism. In his assessment of values in Britain, Marsh ( 197 5) 
distinguishes 'public values' from 'private values'. He suggests that the two often 
diverge because the "values one deems to be desirable for the political community and 
for the conduct of national affairs need not be those one embraces for the conduct of 
one's own affairs" (1975:28). Marsh (1975:29) maintains that "the theory of 
motivation proposed by Maslow is a theory of individual thought and behaviour", 
which "points the way to self-actualisation, not national actualisa~ion". In his own 
research findings, Marsh (1975:29) finds that the British public "have 'higher-order' 
public values and 'lower-order' private values to an extent that is simply not consistent 
with Maslow' s theoretical framework nor with the use Inglehart made of it". 
There is also some disagreement among critics and supporters of Inglehart as to 
whether needs (at least beyond the level of physiological needs) are hierarchically 
ordered, and if so, as to how they are ordered. Eckersley (1989:216) notes that 
"Maslow himself has acknowledged that his theory of human motivation requires 
revision on the ground that it is not always the case that basic need gratification 
automatically leads individuals to explore their higher meta-needs." Anderson 
(1990: 105) also attacks Inglehart's usage of the Maslowian need hierarchy, by 
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suggesting that a "careful reading of Maslow will reveal that the need hierarchy scale 
that he describes is somewhat different from that implied in the post-materialism 
thesis". However, she suggests that even if Maslow is correctly interpreted his model 
is still problematic. 
Although we might concede that basic needs are primary, it seems 
probable that people might wish to make their own hierarchical 
arrangement of needs rather than adhering to Maslow's scale. Beyond 
the need for survival, human needs contain a subjective element best 
understood by listening to the motivations of the subjects themselves. 
This is particularly true if we are to use human needs and priorities to 
understand the motivation to political action (1990:106). 
Cotgrove and Duff (1981:97) further question "the view that needs underlie 
choices, and choices are the expression of values". 
It is this theory which attempts to derive values from need deprivation 
and satisfaction which we would wish to question as a complete account 
of both the generation and distribution of values. A theory which puts so 
much weight on needs seems to underplay the intentional or goal oriented 
character of human behaviour (1981:97). 
In an empirical evaluation of the relationship between the need hierarchy, values 
and micro- and macro-economic conditions in the USA and Germany, Trump (1991) 
also identifies a number of problems with Inglehart' s thesis.16 Trump suggests that 
his own research "refutes the theoretical contention that economic conditions, through 
their effect on the positions of individuals in the need hierarchy, are the primary cause 
of materialist and postmaterialist values" (1991:382). He also questions whether 
'materialist' and 'postmaterialist' values orientations are actually 'values', or whether 
they "may not be more transient social and political 'attitudes' "(1991:382). 
Abramson and Inglehart (1994:806-7) respond that Trump's sample is flawed, and 
16 Trump (1991:370) sampled secondary school students as the "psychologic"al development 
literature" suggests "the cognitive capacity that is necessary for abstract reasoning does not develop 
until adolescence". Trump also justified the use of secondary students due to the fact that "secondary 
schools are the last educational setting at which students from all social and economic backgrounds are 
present", and because it "allows the independent effects of higher education on value formation, which 
lnglehart (1977) has shown to be important to be controlled. Thus this design provides a means of 
isolating and assessing the impact of material well-being on value formation at the time of life at 
which it is supposed to be occurring" ( 1991 :370). 
See Trump (1991:370) for references on 'psychological development literature'. 
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that his study "provides an interesting case of truncated variance on the crucial 
variable". They note that Trump's results contrast with Dalton's (1977) findings, and 
their own studies, both of which are based upon much larger samples. 
However, in seemingly tacit recognition of the problems associated with the 
Maslowian model, Inglehart appears to have largely abandoned it in his later work 
(Flanagan 1987, Eckersley 1989). Instead, he employs the principle of diminishing 
marginal utility (DMU) to explain the shift from economic to non economic value 
priorities, claiming that it is similar to the scarcity hypothesis (1990b:47).17 
The recent economic history of advanced industrial societies ... are a 
remarkable exception to the prevailing historical pattern: the bulk of 
their population does not live under conditions of hunger and economic 
insecurity. This fact seems to have led to a gradual shift in which needs 
for belonging, esteem and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction become 
more prominent. We would expect prolonged periods of high prosperity 
to encourage the spread of postmaterialist values; economic decline 
would have the opposite effect (Inglehart 1990b:47). 
However, as Flanagan (1987:1310) remarks, "an estimation of the diminishing 
marginal utility of added increments of income is a rational-choice assessment based 
on the individual's current level of need and sense of relative deprivation. This 
assessment, then, is very much a context-dependent phenomenon". Inglehart has 
been able to use the DMU argument by changing the "relevant context from the 
individual level, a level at which we would expect considerable change across the life 
cycle, to the societal level" (Flanagan 1987: 1310). 
The DMU thesis is important in relation to levels of postmaterialism and 
materialism held by various generations or cohorts, and consequently support for new 
social movements. It opens the door to alternative value shifts, as it allows for the 
possibility of a shift back toward materialist value orientations if "serious economic 
problems arise" (Flanagan 1987:1310). This is especially applicable to the youngest 
17 The principle of diminishing marginal utility states that "economic factors tend to play a decisive 
role under conditions of economic scarcity; but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to 
an increasing degree" (lnglehart 1987: 1289). Flanagan (1987: 1309) also notes; "as the margin of 
surplus income increases, the citizen's expenditure of energy in support of economic issues will yield 
a diminishing marginal utility, and the non-materialist is born." 
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age cohorts (whose formative years encompassed the high inflation and economic 
recessions of the 1970's and 1980's).18 If the level of postmaterialist values held by 
younger cohorts decreases, then support for the environment movement should also 
decrease among these cohorts. In fact, lnglehart and Abramson (1994) acknowledge 
the existence of 'period effects', suggesting that continuous increases in the levels of 
postmaterialism are by no means certain. 
Although generational replacement is likely to push postmaterialism 
upward, our time series analyses demonstrate that economic forces 
(especially changing inflation rates) can effect value change. Thus, 
while a trend has been clearly documented and although young 
Europeans have remained more postmaterialist despite their own aging, 
economic forces can influence the pace, and even the direction, of future 
value change (Inglehart and Abramson 1994:351). 
However, postmaterialist support for environmental politics remains strong. In 
an analysis of the German Green party, Veen (1989:42) finds materialist values to be 
"practically non-existent among the Greens". He suggests that the core values of 
Green party supporters resemble Inglehart' s postmaterialist category, and include 
"unrestricted freedom of speech, individual freedom, personal development, equality 
for women, a willingness to accept new ideas and the right of co-determination at 
work" (Veen 1989:42). 
Methodological problems: values and generations 
There are a range of criticisms aimed at the validity of Inglehart' s value indices, 
and his claims regarding generational differences in value priorities. In particular 
critics stress that one can not be certain that Inglehart' s attitude scale actually taps 
underlying values.19 Papadakis ( 1993: 18) maintains the scale "reflects attitudes 
18 Flanagan's own explanation of value change is summarised by Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 
(1984:20). They suggest "Scott Flanagan has conceptualised the process of value change in 
somewhat different terms-as a decline in respect for authority, conformity, religiosity, and the work 
ethic .. .In place of these more traditional values, he finds a growing emphasis on values that are 
instrumental for securing the goal of self-actualisation-self-assertiveness, nonconformity, openness to 
new ideas, equality, the pursuit of leisure activities, a better quality of life, and a tolerance for a 
variety of life-sty Jes". . 
19 Flanagan (1982b: 110) suggests there is a "measurement-level problem" with Inglehart's scale, in 
that it "taps values in the public rather than the private domain". He maintains that respondents are 
asked to rank socio-political goals, which in many cases they may not be experienced with (Flanagan 
l 982b: 110). They may not give much prior thought to goals such as "the need for economic growth, 
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toward particular issues. Though attitudes often reflect values, tlrey should not be 
confused with them". Inglehart' s most commonly used measure of value orientations 
is the four item index which he administers to a wide variety of respondents across a 
number of countries (mainly via the Eurobarometer surveys). However, panel studies 
are rarely used.20 Without the utilisation of panel studies it is difficult to assert with a 
high degree of certainty that value priorities are in fact changing to become more 
postmaterialist with each successive generation. Lowe and Rudig (1986:517) suggest 
some authors "have reassessed Inglehart's findings on value change in Japan, arguing 
that ageing rather than generational change is wholly or partly responsible" (see 
Flanagan 1982a, Jagodzinski 1983). However, lnglehart (1981), and lnglehart and 
Abramson ( 1994) again respond to such criticisms by claiming that generational 
replacement rather than ageing effects lead to a change in value orientations. Although 
they maintain their empirical analysis "does not conclusively disprove a life-cycle 
interpretation", Inglehart and Abramson (1994:339) suggest 
it becomes clear that there is no overall tendency for birth cohorts to 
become more materialist as they age. That cohorts do not become more 
materialist as they age undermines a life-cycle interpretation for the 
relationship between age and materialism. 
Flanagan ( 1982b: 110) agrees with lnglehart that basic values are held in a 
relatively stable manner throughout life, yet suggests that 'needs' are subject to abrupt 
and dramatic change. Therefore, need priorities may change not with generations, but 
"along with environmental conditions and life circumstances" (1982b: 110). This 
problem "is not resolved by a shift in measurement level from the public to the private 
domain" ( 1982b: 110). He also criticises the 'priority ranking' approach adopted by 
lnglehart in his 4 item value index, where respondents are constrained by being forced 
to choose two out of four items. Seemingly difficult to please, Flanagan ( l 982b: 111) 
argues that if respondents are faced with too few choices missing data problems may 
or national defence", which can result in a scale that does not actually tap underlying values 
(1982b: 110). He suggests, "Where ill-considered attitudes or nonattitudes prevail, we will encounter 
instability and priority rankings will be detennined more by external factors independent of the 
individual's basic value preferences" (1982b: 110). 
20 Although Inglehart does present the findings of a panel study in Culture Shift (1990a:310), this 
method of analysis is uncommon in studies of value priorities. 
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arise, while if the number of choices are increased, "one runs into the problems of 
reliability",. 
In a later work, Flanagan maintains Inglehart' s scale is not a valid measure of 
the Materialist/Post-Materialist phenomenon, as only one response (Fighting Rising 
Prices) taps Materialist value orientations. He claims that "while Inglehart labels his 
scale post-materialist, 75% of the items used to operationalise the scale rather tap the 
authoritarian-libertarian dimension" (1987: 1311).21 
Similarly, Clarke and Dutt (1991:918) claim that lnglehart's four item index is 
"very sensitive to short-term changes in economic conditions that alter the public 
political issue agenda". Specifically, they maintain that rises in the unemployment rate 
can result in an overstatement of the percentage of postmaterialists as measured by 
Inglehart's 4 item scale, as the 'more say in government' item is strongly correlated 
with concerns about unemployment. As a consequence of this, 
Increases in the jobless rate have a large negative impact on the 
percentage of materialists, and a positive impact on the percentage of 
postmaterialists, measured both relative to the percentage of 
materialists and absolutely (Clarke and Dutt 1991:911).22 
Finally, Bean and Papadakis (1994) argue that the postmaterialist-materialist 
dimension identified by Inglehart is more appropriately conceptualised as two distinct 
dimensions. In an analysis that employs both Inglehart's "ranking method", and "an 
alternative rating method" of value measurement, they find that the 
two-dimensional solution provided by the rating method is ... a more 
theoretically appropriate way of understanding Materialist and 
Postmaterialist values than the notion of a single conflict dimension, 
since it allows a more flexible and realistic account of the choices made 
21 Flanagan's libertarian category approximates Inglehart's postrnaterialists. Flanagan (1987) again 
attacks Inglehart's 4 item index, noting that the values Inglehart attempts to tap include not only 
materialist and postrnaterialist orientations, but also what Flanagan terms 'authoritarian' values. He 
suggests that Inglehart's four response post-materialist question combines economic (materialist) 
values with authoritarian values, which are "concerns for security and order ... respect for authority, 
discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance for minorities, conformity to customs, and 
support for traditional religious and moral values" (1987:1305). 
22 Clarke and Dutt (1991:918) conclude that the "four item battery is defective because of its strong 
sensitivity to short-term changes in the salience of inflation and unemployment on the issue agenda". 
Inglehart and Abramson (1994) respond to Clarke and Dutt in their usual manner by presenting 
analyses of larger samples from a greater number of countries than their detractors. They suggest that 
"Although at certain times high rates of unemployment happened to coincide with a rise in 
postmaterialism, the apparent causal linkage is spurious" (1994:346). 
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by most social actors - choices which may represent both Materialism 
and Postmaterialism (Bean and Papadakis 1994:264). 
In response, Inglehart (1994:290) does not dispute the apprpach of Bean and 
Papadakis, but suggests 
it depends on what aspect of reality one wishes to understand. If one is 
asking the question, 'Do people want to attain all of these goals, or only 
some of them?' then the rating format is appropriate, and the answer is 
clear: most people want all of them. But if one is interested in the 
question: 'What priorities do given people have, when forced to choose 
between two desirable goals?', then the ranking method is appropriate 
(Inglehart 1994:291-292). 
Inglehart appears to underplay the extent to which different generations have an 
influence upon one another, even though their members may have experienced 
different formative experiences. As Mannheim (1972:301) suggests, "Generations are 
in a state of constant interaction", and "the younger generation tends to adapt itself to 
the older" while the "older generation becomes increasingly recep!ive to influences 
from the younger" (1972:302). 
Inglehart' s method of employing birth cohorts of fixed intervals to represent 
generations is also problematic, and even seems to contradict his basic hypotheses.23 
In his explanation of value change, Ingle hart appears to employ a demographic rather 
than sociological definition of 'generations'. The former refers to fixed interval 
cohorts, the later refers to groups of people with similar formative experiences. 
lnglehart claims that those experiencing more favourable economic and social 
conditions tend to be more postmaterialist. To evaluate empirically such an 
hypothesis, presumably one should first attempt to identify the important social and 
economic events that occurred during the lifetime of those in the sample. Generations 
would then consist of those who in their formative years experienced important socio-
economic events in a tangible way.24 Therefore, some generations would be larger 
than others, in response to variations in the scope and duration of periods of economic 
23 For example, Inglehart and Abramson (1994) use the following cohorts in their discussion of 
value change: 1966~75, 1956-65, 1946-55, 1936-45, 1926-35, 1916-25, 1906-15, 1886-1905. 
24 Nor does lnglehart specify exactly what he means by the 'formative years'. 
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and social upheaval. By operationalising fixed year birth cohorts to represent 
'generations', the different formative experiences of potential generation members are 
under emphasised. 
However, despite the range of criticism advanced against various elements of 
Inglehart' s generational value change theory, it remains one of the most important and 
widely used sociological accounts of transformations in political preferences and 
behaviour. While values are not strictly aspects of social location, Inglehart' s value 
orientations are operationalised in the empirical chapters that follow, along with a 
variety of age and generation measures. 
Generational explanations of concerns and activism are underdeveloped in 
sociology. While class accounts seem to be losing their popularity, generation 
accounts seem unlikely to take their place, in spite of the frequent use of the concept in 
popular and journalistic interpretations. There are also some lacunae in generational 
theorising, as signalled above. With their focus on explaining shifting values, 
contemporary generational accounts tend to downplay generational differences that 
exist between countries. Inglehart and others show that younger generations in 
Europe are more postmaterialist, and consequently more likely to support 
environmental movements and political parties than their older counterparts. Yet in 
Australian society, generational effects may be different and/or less pronounced. 
Although similar to Western European countries in many respects, Australia has been 
less affected than other societies by major social upheavals such as World War II. 
Fighting did not occur on Australian soiI.25 Consequently, the social and economic 
devastation that occurred in Europe had a lesser impact upon Australia. The 
subsequent postwar reconstruction also occurred on a much smaller scale in Australia 
than in Europe. While postwar generations in Australia are certainly more prosperous 
than prewar generations, economic events such as the post war 'boom' period were 
not as marked in Australia as in Europe. In Mannheim's terminology, conditions in 
25 The exception being the attacks on Darwin by the Japanese airforce. 
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Australia may have prevented the formation of generations as 'social actualities' and 
'generatio~al units'. 
If lnglehart' s thesis is correct, the differences in value priorities between 
generations should also be less marked in Australia, as the differences in formative 
experiences from one generation to the next are less pronounced. ·This has particular 
relevance to this research, given the alleged link between postmaterialist value 
priorities and environmentalism. If differences in the values held by successive 
generations are less apparent in Australia, then generational differences in support for 
environmentalism may also be less clear cut than in other countries. Generational 
theorising and the methodology of generational research needs further development. 
At present, it appears to be the least elaborated of the three main theoretical models of 
politics - class, generation and status. 
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Chapter 4 
Status, Lifestyle and Other Explanations of 
Environmentalism 
Some alternatives to the well known new class explanations of environmental 
concerns and activism are examined in this chapter. They are mainly derived from the 
Weberian tradition and utilise the concept of status. The chapter has three sections. 
Firstly, drawing upon the work of Weber, Turner and Bourdieu, status, status groups 
and status 'blocs' are discussed. I also examine the argument that support for 
environmental concerns and activism may be understood as an aspect of 'lifestyle'. In 
the second section, a number of other social base explanations of environmental 
support are examined. These stress the importance of gender, urban/rural residence, 
religiosity, and country of birth. In the final section, some alternatives to 'social 
location' accounts are considered, including political ideology (left-right), political 
partisanship and the 'end of the social' interpretations. 
Status groups, lifestyle and politics 
While Marx is acclaimed as the father of class explanations of politics, the 
origins of status accounts are to be found in the work of Max Weber. In contrast to 
Marx, Weber viewed politics as not solely or even principally based upon class 
interests and class conflicts. Class was important, but it did not occupy a privileged 
position in his theoretical schema of politics. Weber considered class politics mainly 
in relation to the market-based modem Western capitalism, and saw status groups as 
of equal importance to class in the distribution of power. 
Class is defined-by Weber (1988:69) in terms of ownership or non-ownership 
of property, and, more importantly, "the marketability of goods and services". 
Classes are "stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of 
goods", while status groups are "stratified according to the principles of their 
consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life" (1968:937). Status is 
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"an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges" based 
upon either "style of life ... formal education" or "hereditary or occ?pational prestige" 
(1968:305-6). Status groups or Stande consist of a "plurality of persons, who within 
a larger group, successfully claim ... a special social esteem" (1968:306). Thus 
conceptualised, status groups arise "by virtue of their own style of life, particularly in 
the type of vocation" (1968:306). Status groups may be closed, such as the hereditary 
Indian caste system, or open, such as modem occupational status groups (1961:405). 
Weber also distinguishes between 'status situations' and 'class situations'. Class 
situations exist when 
(1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of 
their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented 
exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and 
opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of 
the commodity or labour markets (Weber 1988:61).1 
On the other hand, status situations are a 
typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a 
specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor. This honor 
may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality .. .it can be knit 
to a class situation ... [but] ... need not necessarily be ... [O]n the contrary, it 
normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property 
(Weber 1988:65). 
The remaining element of the Weberian triad is 'party'. Parties "reside in the 
sphere of power. Their action is oriented toward the acquisition of social 
power ... toward influencing social action" (1968:938). In contrast to action related to 
classes and status groups, "party-oriented social action always involves association. 
For it is always directed toward a goal which is striven for in a planned manner'' 
(1968:938). Parties may represent the interests of classes or status groups, or 
combinations of both, and while the goal of parties is to attain power, the means of 
achieving these aims are many and varied. They range from "naked violence of any 
sort to canvassing for votes with coarse or subtle means: money, social influence, the 
1 The ideal typical concepts of status honour and market determined class are related to feudalist and 
capitalist societal types respectively (Therborn in Giddens and Held 1988:235-6). 
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force of speech, suggestion, clumsy hoax ... to the rougher or more artful tactics of 
obstruction in parliamentary bodies" (1961:194). 
The discussion here focuses upon Weberian status explanations of politics. 
They may be contrasted with class explanations based on material interests.2 Status 
accounts explain political behaviour in terms of the predominantly 'ideal' interests of 
distinct status groups (Pakulski 1993a:147). For example, Weber (1961:269) 
suggests that the work orientations and the "practical ethic" of many world religions 
are explicable in terms of the influence of certain status concerns and interests. He 
claims that "as a rule one may determine the strata whose styles of life have been at 
least predominantly decisive for certain religions" (1961:269). Bendix (1977:91-92) 
highlights this point well: 
Confucianism was the ethic of government officials in the Chinese 
dynasties, men with literary education who excluded from their 
privileged position those who lacked the cultural prerequisites ... Early 
Hinduism was also the product of cultured literati ... the Brahmans were 
a fully recognised religious status group that placed its stamp on the 
social order ... Buddhism [was a] movement of contemplative and 
mendicant monks ... Early Islam was a religion of disciplined, world-
conquering warriors, the highest stratum of Arab society ... Judaism since 
the Exile was the religion of pariah people ... despised by others and 
separated from them by ritual and legal barriers that limited social 
intercourse ... Christianity originated as a doctrine of itinerant artisans". 
Status groups are propelled by mainly 'ideal interests', and tend to act in a 
value-rational (Wertrational) manner. Value rational action is typically "determined by 
a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or 
other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of success" (Weber 1968 :24-
25). Some examples of value-rational action are 
the actions of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act 
to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required 
2 For example, Kristol (1972:43) claims that conflicting class interests give rise to conflict between 
the new class and the business community, while Gerritson (1990) argues that the environmental 
movement serves the economic interests of certain new class occupations (see chapter 2). In Weberian 
terms, the pursuit of class interests is an example of instrumentally rational action (zweckrational); it 
is a means by which to attain "rationally pursued and calculated ends" (Weber 1968:24). 
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by duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, 
or the importance of some "cause" no matter in what it consists (1968:25). 
Support for environmentalism, according to followers of Weber, is more closely 
aligned with such a value-rational type of action than the instrumentally-rational type 
(Pakulski 1991). Environmentalism is a 'cause' to which large numbers of supporters 
rally, but it is a cause that is not easily linked with the secti~nal material interests of 
any class or economically circumscribed stratum (Pakulski 1993a). It may be linked 
with status groups and categories. Followers of Weber extend the notion of 'status' 
and 'status group' to all sorts of characteristics and collectivities. They note the 
importance of 'formal education' as a defining criterion of status location, as well as 
'intellectual status', lifestyle and cultural consumption. I examine these (and some 
other) interpretations in the following sections. 
Intellectuals, education and environmentalism 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the highly educated are over 
represented among activists and supporters of environmental groups (Van Liere and 
Dunlap 1980, Milbrath 1984, Papadakis 1993, Crook an~ Pakulski 1995, Rootes 
1995). There are also a number of theoretical arguments linking environmental 
support with highly educated social and cultural and human services professionals 
(Parkin 1968, Kristol 1975, Gouldner 1979, Kriesi 1989, Eckersley 1989).3 Some 
of these accounts are discussed in the preceding chapters. I focus here upon those 
accounts that interpret environmentalism as a status related phenomenon. 
It may be argued that supporters with these social characteristics belong to a 
status group of 'intellectuals' rather than a new class. 4 In the broadest sense, Lipset 
and Dobson (1972: 137) suggest intellectuals are "tpose who are considered proficient 
in and are actively engaged in the creation, distribution, and application of culture". 
3 Highly educated people are also consumers of 'high culture' (Bourdieu 1984), and consumption of 
'high culture' is in turn linked with postmaterialist value orientations (Reimer 1989: 122). 
4 As a point of clarification, it is not being suggested here that all highly educated people, nor the 
majority of new social movement supporters are intellectuals. Nor is it being argued that 
environmentalists comprise a distinct status group. However, it is claimed that intellectuals are an 
important category within new social movements, and that they are members of a distinct status 
group. 
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Bullock and Stallybrass (1977:315) maintain that intellectuals are "the custodians of 
the tradition of creative and critical thinking about the normative problems of their 
society and the efforts of men to relate themselves to symbols of meaning outside their 
immediate self-interest and experience", while Brym (1980) defines intellectuals in a 
more inclusive manner. He claims they consist of "persons who, occupationally, are 
involved chiefly in the production of ideas (scholars, artists, reporters, performers in 
the arts, scientists, etc., as well as students in post secondary institutions, who are 
apprentices to these occupational roles)" (1980:12). 
To Weberian scholars, it is not surprising that support for new social 
movements should come from such a social category. Participation in environmental 
activities and groups is the logical extension of the political and intellectual idealism 
expressed through the 'culture of critical discourse' typical of radical intelligentsia. 
Such idealism may be expressed through support for environmentalism as a 'cause', 
as suggested in Weber's discussion of status politics and value-rationality. 
Yet there is some disagreement as to who these 'intellectuals' are, and what 
constitutes a 'radical' cause. Eyerman ( 1994: 1) claims that definitions of intellectuals 
fall into "two broad definitional categories: those attributing personal characteristics" 
such as "those 'who never seem satisfied with things as they are' ... on the one side, 
and those that look to social structure and function, on the other". Lipset's 
(1981 :333) definition of intellectuals as "those who create, distribute and apply 
culture ... including art, science, and religion" is an influential example of the latter 
approach. Konrad and Szelenyi ( 1979) use such a structural notion of intellectuals to 
explain political behaviour. 
Some scholars distinguish intellectuals from the intelligentsia. Lipset 
(1981:333) explains that there are three 'levels' of intellectuals. These consist of two 
main levels: i) the creators of culture, and ii) the distributors of culture, and iii) a 
peripheral group "composed of those who apply culture as part of their jobs" (Lipset 
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1981:333).5 According to Lipset (1981:333), the European 'intelligentsia' consists of 
all three types of intellectuals, while "in America .. .it is usual to include only the first 
two categories" when referring to 'intellectuals'. 
Eyerman ( 1994:20) defines intellectual labour as "the application of the human 
intellect to gain a livelihood or for material gain", and also makes the distinction 
between intellectuals and intelligentsia. 6 The intelligentsia first emerged among the 
Russian and Polish bourgeoisie during the reign of Peter the Great, but only formed a 
collective identity in the 1860s (1994:21). 
The cornerstone of this identity was an education in and an orientation 
towards European culture, especially its science and its technology ... it 
was an orientation which came to identify Europe with modernity, with 
'higher' education and 'intelligence'. The bearers of this modern culture 
" 
came to identify themselves as the 'intelligentsia' (Eyerman 1994:21). 
The term 'intellectual' originated in late nineteenth century France. It was first 
employed as a derogatory term aimed at the popular author Emile Zola, criticised for 
degrading cultural values by the academic establishment (Eyerman 1994:23). 
The 'intellectual' became a contested concept and a nom de guerre taken 
on to do battle with the e$tablishment. Thus the intellectual took on for 
a time the same connotations as the intelligentsia: an identifiable group 
with a self-proclaimed mission to defend 'culture', either by doing battle 
with all established authority or as the defenders of 'standards' against 
those who would denigrate them (Eyerman 1994:23). 
Intellectuals, (at least contemporary intellectuals) tend to be politically left of 
centre and radical (Lipset 1981:338-341). Economic insecurity, and "an 
overproduction of educated persons" are said to lead to the radicalism of intellectuals, 
"at least at moderate to high levels of unemployment" (Brym 1980: 15). 'Political 
extremists' are produced "by not giving intellectuals secure and responsible jobs 
commensurate with their training, and by restricting 'their freedom of expression and 
inquiry" (Brym 1980: 17-18) . On the other hand, intellectuals tend to be more 
5 The first group comprises "Scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors, and some 
journalists"; the second are made up of "performers in the various arts, most teachers, most reporters", 
and the peripheral group consist of "professionals like physicians and lawyers" (Lipset 1981 :333). 
6 He suggests "all three rest upon the human capacity for reason and intelligence, the ability both to 
conceptualise and to apply the mind to some practical end" (Eyerman 1994:21). 
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'moderate' if they are "employed in secure and responsible positions commensurate 
with the types and levels of education they have received, and ... tliey are relatively free 
to think and do as they will" (1980: 17). 
Radicalism is not a product of high education per se, it seems to reflect the type 
of education one receives. The humanities and social science disciplines in 
universities tend to "produce more radicals than disciplines generally identified as 
natural-scientific or professional" (Brym 1980:14). Rootes (1995:233) also notes that 
graduates from these disciplines are more likely to hold liberal social and political 
attitudes than other graduates. Given their radical heritage, it should come as no 
surprise that intellectuals are involved in environmental groups and movements as core 
activists and leaders. 
Intellectuals are important to new social movements, because they "are needed to 
formulate policies and programmes and to create inspirational symbols and appeals. 
Without an intellectual elite to offer leadership and a coherent set of goals, popular 
demands or general discontents are rarely able to translate themselves into effective 
political movements on a mass scale" (Parkin 1968:93). Movement intellectuals also 
"contribute to the formation of the movement's collective identity, to making the 
movement what it is" (Eyerman and Jamison 1991:94). 
Although using the term 'class', Gouldner (1979) argues along the Weberian 
lines of 'status politics' (Pakulski 1993a:140). In his discussion of the 'new class' 
(identified as 'radical intellectuals'), Gouldner distinguishes between 'humanistic 
intellectuals' and 'technical intelligentsia', groupings that have status rather than class 
characteristics. He suggests that they have ideological links with 'environmentalism-
ecology': 
. 
The new ecological ideology signifies that the older instrumental 
ideology of the New Class is giving way to one with keener concern for 
the goals of action, and which refuses to surrender these to others and to 
limit itself to specifying the means of action. Its multi-science character 
provides an ideological framework that can unite various types of 
technical intelligentsia. At the same time its rejection of the idea of 
domination over nature, its intimation of a husbanding role and indeed of 
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a return fo "nature", is also attractive to many humanistic intellectuals" 
(1979:42). 
Applying Gouldner's ideas to 'green politics', Eckersley (1989) suggests that 
the 'humanistic intellectuals' are more likely than the 'technical intelligentsia' to be 
involved in 'radical environmentalism'. She claims that the humanistic 'intellectuals' 
are more supportive of green politics because of "their greater relative autonomy from 
the production process (and hence greater alienation) and their closer adherence to the 
culture of critical discourse" (1989:221). In fact, Gouldner (1979:48) points out that 
while the interests of the intelligentsia are "fundamentally 'technical'", intellectuals' 
interests "are primarily critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often political". 
Critics, such as Bell (1979:20), argue that this Gouldnerian 'new class' has a socio-
cultural rather than socio-structural basis. Given their socio-cultural heritage, 
intellectuals are better understood as comprising a distinct status category (Pakulski 
1993a). As members of such a category, intellectuals may also exhibit similar styles 
of life. 
Lifestyle, cultural consumption and status politics 
There are also quite different streams of status theorising. In an important 
contemporary work on social status, Turner (1988) identifies two distinct forms of 
status - 'legal-political' and 'cultural'. Legal political status refers to "various 
entitlements within a nation-state; within this perspective the argument is that status 
has to be seen as the core element within the political notion of citizenship" (1988:65). 
Following Weber, Turner also distinguishes "a cultural dimension to social 
stratification in which we can conceptualise status not as political entitlement but as a 
lifestyle" (1988:66). The 'cultural' aspect of status is more relevant to this discussion. 
According to Turner, stratification in contemporary Western societies is best 
understood not in class terms, but in terms of status groups, communities and 'blocs' 
struggling for power and supremacy. Status communities are a "genuine form of 
enduring community" where a Gemeinschaft-type relationship exists, and where 
_individuals share characteristics such as "language, culture or ethnicity" (1988: 12). 
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Status 'blocs' or 'columns' are "more like associations or organisations (Gesellschaft 
relationship) in which individuals form organisational structures for specific 
purposes" (1988:12). Turner (1988:44) points out that 
Status politics emerges out of...struggles over different notiops of 
equality, individualism and socio-economic conditions, whereby social 
groups seek through government intervention some compensation for their 
defacto inequalities. 
In a somewhat similar vein, Waters (1994:298) argues that 'status communities' 
"form around differentiated patterns of value commitment, identity, belief, symbolic 
meaning, taste, opinion or consumption", and claims that these "strata are life-style 
and/or value-based status communities". Membership of such 'lifestyle groups' are 
distinguished not by their relations of production, but by their patterns of consumption 
and lifestyle. Pakulski and Waters' (1996) discussion of stratification in modem 
Western society also utilises such a model: 
Status-conventional society is primarily a cultural phenomenon. It is 
based upon subscription to lifestyles that form around consumption 
patterns, information flows, cognitive agreements, aesthetic preferences 
and value commitments (Pakulski and Waters 1996:155). 
Such conceptualisation of status/lifestyle divisions and stratification provide a 
point of departure for status based explanations of environmental new politics outlined 
by Turner (1979), and to a lesser extent by Pakulski (1991). 
Studies of lifestyle and consumption owe their origin not only to Weber, but 
also to Veblen (1970). In the Theory of the Leisure Class, first published in 1899, 
Veblen studied the taste, lifestyles and 'conspicuous consumption' patterns of the so 
called 'leisure class'. The pioneering studies of Veblen on lifestyle and taste were 
developed more recently by Gans (1974), and Bourdieu (1984). 
In a theoretical work on 'taste cultures' and 'taste publics' Gans (1974) links 
taste with what he terms 'class' location. He identifies five taste publics and cultures 
in American society: (high culture, upper-middle culture, lower-middle culture, low 
culture and quasi-folk low culture) that are differentiated according to "socioeconomic 
level or class" (1974:70). The relationship between education and cultural 
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consumption is also important, as "a person's educational achievement and the kind of 
school he or she attended will probably predict better than any other single index that 
person's cultural choices" (1974:75). 
A similar, although more theoretically elaborate argument relating to taste and 
cultural capital is advanced by Bourdieu. In an examination of the taste culture of the 
French public, he attempts to provide "a scientific answer to the old questions of 
Kant' s critique of judgement, by seeking in the structure of the social classes the basis 
of the systems of classification which structure perception of the social world and 
designate the objects of aesthetic enjoyment" (1984:xiii-xiv). His main study is based 
upon survey data collected in 1963 and 1967-68, and is an attempt "to determine how 
the cultivated disposition and cultural competence that are revealed in the nature of the 
cultural goods consumed, and the way they are consumed, vary according to the 
category of agents and the area to which they are applied" (1984: 13). Bourdieu 
( 1984) distinguishes cultural capital (such as knowledge of the fine arts and literature) 
from economic capital.7 He identifies "three zones of taste ... [which] ... roughly 
correspond to educational levels and social classes", and posits a three-tiered model of 
cultural tastes, where the components are; 'legitimate' taste, 'middle-brow' taste and 
'popular' taste (1984: 16). The three taste cultures are associated with the upper, 
middle and working classes respectively. Those with the highest levels of education 
according to Bourdieu (1984: 16), are more likely to exhibit 'legitimate taste'. 
Moreover, there is a "very close relationship linking cultural practices ... to educational 
capital (measured by qualifications) and ... to social origin (measured by father's 
occupation)" (1984: 13).8 
Yet the 'classes' to which Bourdieu and Gans attribute certain taste preferences 
and socio cultural and socio political dispositions resemble status groups. This is a 
point not missed by Turner (1988:66-7), who maintains that "While status is about 
1 De Graaf and De Graaf (1988) note a number of similarities between Bourdieu's and Inglehart's 
theoretical schemes. They suggest that "the resemblance between the so-called materialist dimension 
and Bourdieu's notion of an economic life style dimension is striking, whereas the postmaterialist 
dimension finds its place easily in Bourdieu's cultural dimension" (De Graaf and De Graaf 1988:53). 
8 As Jenkins ( 1992: 138) notes, for Bourdieu "people learn to consume culture, and this education is 
differentiated according to social class". 
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political entitlement and legal location within civil society, status also involves, and to 
a certain extent is style. The location of a group within the social system is expressed 
by their taste, which is as it were the practical aspect of lifestyle". In fact in a later 
work, Bourdieu (1992:237) acknowledges that the "social space, and the differences 
that 'spontaneously' emerge within it, tend to function symbolically as a space of life-
styles or as a set of Stande, of groups characterised by different life-styles". 
Lifestyle may also be expressed politically in the form of 'life politics' (Giddens 
1990, 1991, 1994). Giddens (1990:156) distinguishes such 'life politics' "which 
seek to further the possibility of a fulfilling and satisfying life for all", from 
'emancipatory politics' which are "radical engagements concerned with the liberation 
from inequality or servitude". He suggests that "While emancipatory politics is a 
politics of life chances, life politics is a politics of lifestyle" (1991 :214). Such 
life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-
actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where globalising influences 
intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely 
where processes of self-realisation influence global strategies (Giddens 
1991:214). 
Social movements play an important role in "bringing life-political issues to the 
fore, and forcing them on public attention" (1991:228). This is especially so for the 
ecology movement, because it is the "material expression of the limits of modernity" 
( 1994:227). Although Giddens does not explicitly link life politics with status 
groups, such a link appears obvious. If life politics is the politics of lifestyle as 
Giddens argues, and lifestyle is related to status groups, then life politics is 
synonymous with status politics. As an aspect of life politics, environmentalism is 
also the politics of lifestyle, and as such can be located in status groups or 'blocs'. 9 
In both the popular and academic literature on environmentalism, some 
supporters of green movements are also seen to adopt 'radical' or 'alternative' 
9 Gerritson ( 1990) alludes to this point. He argues that the 'consumption' ot wilderness is culture-
based, suggesting that "Wilderness conservation effects a distribution towards a high-income, high-
educational status group" (1990:5). 
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lifestyles.10 However, it is acknowledged that the environmenta~ supporters who 
adopt such lifestyles are more likely to be located on the fringe of green movements 
and groups (for example the radical 'feral' elements).11 Veen (1989:50) describes 
such a 'left/alternative milieu': he suggests that it 
ranges from so-called free schools practicing alternative reformist 
pedagogy and other educational institutions, to health food co-
operatives, self-help groups, alternative trade, agriculture and services, 
or from alternative cultural institutions (bookshops, newspapers, 
magazines) to lawyers' and doctors' collectives.12 
According to Poguntke (1993:32), an 'alternative subculture' in which some 
green supporters participate is "an independent source of political socialisation and 
education and hence capable, to a degree, of creating its own support". Those opting 
for 'alternative lifestyles' may also tend to support 'left-libertarian' political parties. 
However, it is not being implied that all or even the majority of environmentalists 
adopt radically different lifestyles, as Poguntke (1993:32) stresses, supporters of 
environmental new politics are "far from representing an homogeneous social group". 
All of these theoretical accounts have some empirical backing. The literature on 
environmentalism reveals that supporters of green politics are typically highly 
educated, cognitively skilled, and located in professional occupations, all indicators of 
an 'intellectual' status. As the creators of ideas and culture, intellectuals consume 
culture, notably in a form that Bourdieu (1984) calls 'legitimate taste' and Gans 
(1974) refers to as 'high culture'. If environmental issue concerns and activism are 
concentrated in such status groups, consumption of 'high culture' ·and lifestyle may 
prove to be important explanatory factors and empirical indicators of 
environmentalism. This hypothesis is explored in the empirical cbapters that follow. 
10 'Alternative lifestyles' encompass the type of food consumed, leisure activities, mode of dress and 
living arrangements (Metcalf and Vanclay 1987). 
11 The ferals or 'tribal folk' may comprise only a small percentage of forest protesters, but according 
to one environmental organiser they "are the ones that have the time and the energy to form a real 
basis and the core of the group. Without them it wouldn't be so effective" (Whittaker 1996:50). 
12 Poguntke (1993:32) also notes that in Germany there is "a vigorous subculture that ranges from 
biological food production, Third World shops and rural co-operatives to financial networks and 
international co-operation". 
'Alternative' forms of health care is another aspect of alternative lifestyles. For example, Giddens 
(1994:225) claims that "those associated with ecological groups frequently favour 'natural' therapies 
over scientific medicine". 
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Gender and environmentalism 
Gen~er differences in support for environmentalism are also apparent, and as 
gender is an ascribed status, such accounts may also be seen as 'status explanations'. 
A number of studies have shown that women are more likely than men to be 
environmentally concerned and involved in environmental activism (Hampel et al 
1995, Dalton 1994, Papadakis 1993, Milbrath 1984, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). 
For example, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980:186 citing Passino and Lounsbury 1976) 
suggest that "males are more likely than females to be concerned about jobs and 
economic growth, and thus are less concerned than females with protecting 
environmental quality". Similarly, Barnes and Kaase et al (1979: 110) note that direct 
action is more popular among (young) women than involvement in conventional 
forms of politics. 
Dalton (1994:115-116) argues that women are more likely than men to support 
environmental movements because they "are socialised into nurturing roles that lead 
them to be more sympathetic to environmental issues and the New Environmental 
Paradigm. The feminist movement contributes to the cultural transformation that 
ecologists seek, in forms described as eco-feminism or feminist environmentalism". 
Milbrath ( 1984) also maintains that gender differences in environmental support stem 
from different socialisation patterns. He claims that the "nurturing and protective 
posture of females shows up particularly strongly in their opposition to nuclear 
power" (Milbrath 1984:75). In Australia, the influence of early socialisation on 
gender differences in environmental support is also highlighted by Hampel et al 
(1995). Australian research shows that women are less conservative on new political 
issues (Hayes and Bean 1994), and more supportive of environmental issues than 
men (Papadakis 1993: 165). 
Like new class and generational interpretations of environmentalism, status 
explanations locate support for environmental concerns and activism in certain social 
categories. However, unlike the new class accounts, where support is based upon 
socioeconomic interests, and generational accounts where it can be traced to 
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sociohistorical events and formative socialisation experiences, status explanations are 
based upon sociocultural differences. Status interpretations suggest that green 
supporters are typically driven not by material interests, but by value charged 'ideal 
interests'. Status categories such as the 'radical intellectuals' are highly educated, 
autonomous professionals, who produce and consume high culture, and tend to 
pursue the political issues that Giddens (1990, 1991) refers to as 'life politics'. They 
also appear as core activists and leaders in environmental movements and groups. 
Problems with mainstream status accounts 
Status accounts are certainly not without their critics. Pakulski ( 1993a: 146) is 
critical of what he terms the 'status politics' explanations suggested by Parkin (1968), 
and the Gouldnerian inspired accounts of Eckersley (1989) and Rootes (1990). He 
criticises status interpretations on two grounds, arguing that 
by assuming that movements focus on sectional interests (of status 
categories), they have difficulties in handling the phenomenon of 
clearly universalistic concerns as articulated by most new ( e,g. Green) 
movements. These concerns cannot be linked with any sectional interests 
or specific status group claims ... Second, in their current version, the 
( 
status politics accounts lack the universality of generational accounts 
and cannot be extended to non-Western mass movements, such as the 
Eastern European ones (Pakulski 1993a:147). 
The status-based explanation of environmentalism outlined above largely avoid 
such criticism. Firstly, while support for environmentalism is linked to a distinct 
status group of intellectuals, it is not claimed that such support is based upon the 
material interests of this status group. Rather, environmental support from an 
intellectual status group is an example of Weber's value-rational action; it is an 
expression of ideal rather than material interests. This expression of idealism may, in 
tum, be linked with cognitive skills and an 'unattached position', or with 'the 
powerlessness' (in capitalist society) of intellectuals. Both hypotheses have at least 
some degree of plausibility. 
With regard to Pakulski' s second point, an explanation linking support for 
social movements with an intellectual status group may be more applicable to core 
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movement activists and leaders rather than to all supporters. Intellectuals have a 
history of participation as leaders and key activists in both old (labor) and new social 
movements, in the East and West. They have been involved not only in 'ecopax' 
movements as Parkin (1968), Gouldner (1979), and Eyerman (1994) suggest, but 
also in major revolutions (French Revolution, 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia), 
and in more contemporary non-green movements such as Solidarity in Poland 
(Pakulski 1991:129). 
Pakulski ( 1995 :77) is also critical of accounts that "point to the importance of 
(high) education and professional status", such as that advanced by Rootes (1995), on 
the grounds that they lack "explanatory efficacy". 
The error of such accounts is not in attributing high educational and 
certain types of professional status to movement supporters, but in 
attributing a distinctiveness - and therefore an explanatory potential -
to this fact. To put it bluntly, all political activism - new and old, Left 
and Right - attracts a disproportionately high proportion of educated 
people with professional status ... This is as true of Green movement 
activists as it is of Labour Party activists" (Pakulski 1995:77). 
However, one may argue that intellectuals who are environmental supporters 
differ from conventional party activists in a number of ways, and therefore form a 
distinctive social category. They tend to be more socially and occupationally marginal 
or peripheral than activists in conventional political parties. Moreover, many 
movement activists are volunteer workers. Their motivation therefore tends to be 
more idealistic than materialistic.13 Finally, their involvement sel_dom offers the high 
status similar to that available in conventional political hierarchies. 
13 As many conventional party activists are paid party functionaries, and some seek to gain 
endorsement to run for parliament, they have a material interest in participating in conventional 
politics. 
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Other explanations of environmentalism 
A large number of other accounts of environmental support and activism also 
appear in the literature. These stem partly from the classical social base accounts, 
such as those outlined by Lipset ( 1981) which also stress the importance of religion, 
ethnicity and residential location. 
Environmentalists and religiosity 
Environmental support is differentiated in terms of religious denomination and 
religiosity. Although the relationship between religion and environmentalism is under 
theorised, and few empirical studies examine the relationship between religion and 
environmentalism, the available evidence suggests that the non-religious are over 
represented among supporters of environmental groups and movements. Inglehart 
(1990a:177-186) explains such findings by linking religious beliefs to value 
orientation. He argues that materialists are more religious than postmaterialists, 
because they have closer links with the traditional order. The less religious 
postmaterialists are more supportive of the new political configurations, including 
environmentalism. Based upon an analysis of new social movements (NSM's) in the 
Netherlands, Kriesi's (1989: 1106) interpretation suggests that "the more one is 
integrated into church life, the less one is ready to participate in NSM' s". 
There is also some Australian evidence suggesting that the non-religious are 
more likely to support new political parties. In a recent study, Bean and Papadakis 
( 1995: 116) found that new political parties such as the pro-environmental Australian 
Democrats, and (to some extent) Green parties are more likely to be supported by the 
non-religious. One explanation is that green supporters are not non-religious, rather 
their religious beliefs are non-conventional. Easthope and Holloway (1989), for 
example, maintain that many environmentalists believe that the 'wilderness' itself is 
'sacred' ,14 
14 They claim that The Wilderness Society (formerly The Tasmanian Wilderness Society) sought to 
"create for its membership a valuation of wilderness as sacred" ( 1989: 195). The notion of the 
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Ethnicity and country of origin 
Support for environmentalism may also differ according to ethnicity, although 
once again, this area is lacking in theoretical development. Papadakis (1993: 165) 
suggests that support for environmentalism, "at least in the form of organised 
campaigns that influence the policy agenda" may be weaker among non-English 
speaking immigrants. The lower levels of support among migrants from non-English 
speaking backgrounds is not due to a lack of concern for the environment, but rather 
"their order of priorities, especially as economic migrants may be different" 
(1993: 165). McAllister and Studlar (1995: 11) also find that migrants from English 
speaking countries are over represented as environmental activists. They suggest two 
reasons for this. Firstly, they argue that "while the Australian boi:n take the quality of 
the environment for granted, immigrants do not", and secondly, "while non-English 
speaking immigrants tend to migrate for material reasons - to acquire a better standard 
of living - English speaking migrants, while also materially oriented, may also be 
concerned about their quality of life" ( 1995: 11 ). 
Urban versus rural residence 
Previous studies of environmentalism and new politics generally found support 
to be stronger among urban dwellers. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980:184; citing 
Trembley and Dunlap 1978) suggest that there are a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly, urban dwellers are "exposed to higher levels of pollution and other types of 
environmental deterioration" ( 1980: 184). Secondly, "rural residents are more likely 
than urbanites to have a utilitarian orientation toward the natural environment because 
of their involvement with 'extractive' occupations such as farming, logging and 
mining" (1980:184). However, if rural dwellers depend upon the environment for 
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their livelihood, it may be also be argued to the contrary that their interests are not 
served by its destruction.IS A third reason is also advanced. 
Because small towns need to maintain economic growth to survive, they 
are assumed to value growth over protection of environmental quality. 
Thus, the growth orientation of rural and small-town residents, not the 
utilitarian orientation of farmers and other rural residents, presumable 
accounts for the positive relationship between environmental concern and 
size of place of residence (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980:185, citing Murdock 
and Schriner 1977). 
So far in this chapter, the discussion has centred around status accounts of 
environmental new politics, and also examined some other social base accounts. The 
next section looks at some important non social base accounts of environmentalism. 
Non social base explanations of environmentalism 
Political ideology and partisanship 
The notion of social location is sometimes stretched to cover some aspects of 
ideological orientation. Although I exclude such accounts from 'social location' 
accounts proper, they are mentioned briefly in order to highlight their links with the 
mainstream 'social base' accounts, and because they are important indicators of 
environmental support in their own right. 
There is a debate as to the relevance of the left-right cleavage for explaining 
environmental new politics (for example, see Offe 1985, Poguntke 1993). Inglehart 
and Sidjanski (1976:269) found that "among European publics one's sense of 
belonging to the left or right reflects party affiliations more than issue preferences".16 
Milbrath (1984:89) notes that while "environmentalists are left-leaning", they are also 
"more likely than other elites to have no position on this dimension". By contrast, 
Poguntke (1993: 12) maintains that 
wilderness as 'sacred' also serves as a means of creating favourable public opinion toward the 
environment (1989:196). 
15 There is also a fine line here. For example, logging of old growth forests is seen by 
environmentalists as destruction of the natural environment, but may be viewed by many in rural 
communities as a sustainable use of a renewable resource. 
16 Nevertheless, they do not advocate abandoning measures such as left-right, or liberal-conservative 
ideology, suggesting "that they deserve high priority among the variables to be used for the study of 
long-term political change" (lnglehart and Sidjanski 1976:272). 
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"the New Politics is best understood as a left-wing addition to, and 
modification of, the traditional left-right dimension ... Although there 
may be fierce conflict between the Old Politics Left and the New Politics 
Left, they are logically and empirically not independent o{ each other". 
Support for such interpretations may be growing. In a recent study, Inglehart 
( 1990b) found that left-right self placement was an important predictor of participation 
in European ecology and peace movements. Some suggest that new political parties 
and social movements should be termed 'left-libertarian' (for example, Kitschelt 1990, 
Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). Kitschelt (1990:180) maintains that left-libertarian 
parties are " 'Left' because they share with traditional socialism a mistrust of the 
marketplace, of private investment, and of the achievement ethic, and a commitment to 
egalitarian redistribution. They are 'Libertarian' because they reject the authority of 
private or public bureaucracies to regulate individual and collective conduct." Miiller-
Rommel (1990:213) also found that "several small European left-wing parties 
developed programs that strongly emphasise new political issues, The supporters of 
the environmental, the anti-nuclear, and the peace movements are able to identify with 
these parties". In Germany, the new politics "is concerned with equal rights for all 
kinds of social minorities ... a general left-wing orientation", and is "situated on the left 
of the political spectrum" (Poguntke 1993:10-11). Finally, Dalton (1994:66) notes; 
"To an increasing extent, especially among the young, to be a leftist implies a 
commitment to environmentalism and green political values". 
Support for environmentalism in Australia is also related to identification with 
certain political parties (for example, see Papadakis 1993, 1994, Bean et al 1990). 
This is suggested by the 'Michigan model' of politics, where political attitudes and 
voting behaviour are linked to political party identification, or partisan self-image 
(Miller et al 1954, Campbell et al 1960, Miller 1976). The 'Michigan model' implies 
that politics in modem societies is a complex phenomena that "generates a tremendous 
amount of information", and that party identification has a "simplifying function" by 
presenting an alternative to sifting through such a "flood of information" (Miller 
1976:23). Party identification functions as a shortcut method of making decisions and 
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forming views on political issues. Political leaders "provide a ready cue to guide the 
political thought and action of the party identifier" (Miller 1976:23). Campbell et al 
(1960:133) also argue that party identification "raises a perceptual screen through 
which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan orientation". If 
such an explanation is correct, those who identify with a party whose policies are pro-
environmental should be more sympathetic toward the environment than those who 
identify with parties that are neutral, or hostile toward environmentalism. 
In Australia there are considerable differences among parties in respect of 
support for environmentalism.17 The Australian Labor Party (ALP) enjoys a 
'greener' image than the Coalition partners (Papadakis 1993: 174), and has a history of 
accomplishments on environmentally related issues throughout the 1980's (Papadakis 
1994:67). Labor's federal election win in 1990 is held to be at least partly attributable 
to support from the environmental movement (Bean et al 1990, Crook and Pakulski 
1995). Given the relationship between partisanship and political issues implied by the 
'Michigan Model', ALP partisans may be expected to be more supportive of green 
issues and groups than Coalition supporters. 
The Australian Democrats have also undergone a considerable 'greening' 
throughout the 1980's, and a variety of green parties and green independents have 
recently emerged in the political arena (Bean et al 1990). In fact, Papadakis 
( 1993: 17 4) suggests that "the closest connection is between environmentalism and 
new politics parties like the Democrats and various Green Independents". It may be 
expected therefore, that Australian Democrat and 'green' partisans should also express 
the strongest support for environmental groups and issue concerns. 
Civil society and the 'end of the social' 
Some theorists attempt to explain social movements by locating them within the 
sphere of civil society (for example, Keane 1988, Misztal 1985). Bryant (1993:399) 
suggests that this linkage is not surprising, given that in sociology civil society is seen 
17 Although these differences may be declining. The Coalition partners attempted to woo the green 
vote in the 1996 Federal Election by pledging to spend one billion dollars on 'the environment'. 
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as "a spac_e or arena between household and state, other than the market, which 
affords possibilities of concerted action and social self-organisation". Kumar 
(1993:383) also argues that civil society "is seen as the source of a new politics to 
revitalise a bankrupt tradition, especially on the Left". For Taylor (1990:96), civil 
society consists of "a web of autonomous associations, independent of the state" 
which have "an effect on public policy". Cohen and Arato (1992:ix) see civil society 
"as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of 
the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially 
voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication". 
Although they are fashionable, the civil society accounts share many problematic 
features, above all, vagueness. Pakulski (1995:71) argues that civil society is a vague 
term that "marks a predominantly West European perspective evolving out of critical 
re-evaluation of Marxist analysis". Bendix (1991: 143) appears to agree, suggesting 
that the "concept 'civil society' has become a polemical slogan opposed to Communist 
Party 'dictatorship'". Often labelled 'post-Marxist' due to their challenge to 
Marxism's "economism, class reductionism, and the anti-capitalist stance critical of all 
bourgeois institutions", civil society accounts "stress the novelty of the 'new social 
movements' and contrast them with 'old' social movements, mainly of the class-
socialist type" (Pakulski 1995:71). Civil society accounts also tend to exaggerate 
differences between 'old' and 'new' social movements. 
In their eagerness to present social movements as 'positive', 
democratising and emancipatory forces, they ignore those movements 
(e.g. Fascist) and forms of contemporary social activism (e.g. nationalist, 
fundamentalist) which do not fit the liberal-democratic sentiments 
underlying the civil society themes (Pakulski 1995:73-7~). 
Civil society accounts suffer from a conceptual stretch and vagueness which, as 
Pakulski (1995:73) notes, makes them "look more like ad hoe descriptions than 
theoretical explanations". Since almost any social position can be linked with 'civil 
society', these accounts make any empirical evaluation virtually impossible.18 
18 Given the vague nature of civil society accounts, they are excluded from the empirical analyses in 
Chapters 5-7. 
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Some theorists adhere to the so called 'radical decoupling' thesis, arguing that 
politics no longer has any stable social base. For example, Dalton et al (1990:12) 
suggests that new social movements "lack the narrow special interest appeal to any 
one social grouping". These new movements "signify a shift from group-based 
political cleavages to value-and issue-based cleavages that identify only communities 
of like minded people" (1990: 12). Others arguing from a postmodem perspective go 
even further by advocating the wholesale abandonment of sociostructural 
explanations. Such accounts suggest that 
We are moving towards a society without fixed status groups in which 
the adoption of styles of life ... which are fixed to specific groups have 
been surpassed. This apparent movement towards a post-modern 
consumer culture based upon a profusion of information and proliferation 
of images which cannot be ultimately stabilised, or hierarchised into a 
system which correlates to fixed social divisions, would further suggest 
the irrelevance of social divisions and ultimately the end of the social 
as a significant referent point (Featherstone 1987:55-6). 
Once again, it is difficult to evaluate such claims empirically, although the 
credibility of the 'decoupling' and 'end of the social' accounts would increase if social 
location effects are found to be weak or absent. Yet before we abandon them, social 
base explanations of politics should be given a fair trial. In the remaining (empirical) 
chapters, such a trial is conducted in a systematic way using nationally representative 




In this chapter I discuss the research aims, and the methodology employed in the 
empirical chapters. A number of aspects of environmentalism are operationalised in 
order to capture its diversity of meaning. The survey data is described, dependent 
variables, independent variables and predictor models are explained, and statistical 
techniques are discussed. Some preliminary analyses are also conducted for the 
development of the dependent variables, and in order to select appropriate class 
models for empirical analyses. 
However, some qualifications should be made at the outset. First, any empirical 
evaluation is based upon the specification of theory and the operationalisation of key 
concepts. This process is not always straightforward, and therefore empirical 'tests' -
including those below - may be accused of distortion. In order to address these 
potential problems, I examine and operationalise a number of models. Second, I 
assume that 'social base' is reflected in social composition - hence my use of survey 
data. This may seem an obvious approach, but may be questioned by some Marxist 
scholars. Third, the scope of this research is limited. I am mainly concerned with 
evaluating 'social base' explanations of environmentalism, in particular, class, status 
and generation accounts. 
There is a dearth ofresearch examining the relationship between (new) class(es) 
and new politics in Australia. Australian studies typically conceptualise class in terms 
of occupational status, or distinguish between the middle and working classes (for 
example, Papadakis 1993:153-169). Others employ subjective (self-identified) 
notions of social class (for example, Bean 1995). This research attempts to address 
this problem by operationalising a number of new class accounts. 
Generational explanations are also popular, in particular Inglehart' s ( 1977, 
1990a) generational/value change thesis, and the association between education and 
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environmentalism is well documented (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980, Milbrath 1984, 
Papadakis 1993, Bean 1995). Some suggest that education is perhaps the most 
important determinant of environmental support (for example, Eckersley 1989, Rootes 
1995). I argue in Chapter 4 that support for environmentalism may be strongest 
among highly educated, 'intellectuals'. If 'intellectuals' are associated with the 
production of culture and ideas, high cultural consumption may prove to be an 
important 'status' indicator of environmentalism. Gender, religion, ethnicity, and 
urban/rural residence are also linked with environmentalism (See Barnes et al 1979, 
Van Liere and Dunlap 1980, Milbrath 1984, Papadakis 1993, Bean and Papadakis 
1995). 
Leftwing political ideology (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Dalton 1994), and 
new politics partisanship (Australian Democrats, Greens) may also influence 
environmental support, and although these political ideology measures are not aspects 
of the 'social base', it is argued that they may have an important iinpact upon support 
for environmentalism in Australia. 
Models 
The various aspects of social location identified above, and the two political 
ideology measures are operationalised as predictor models (Table 5.1). The rationale 
employed here is to introduce blocks of explanatory variables in a logical and temporal 
order. The models employ independent variables that are causally prior to 
environmental support. They allow parental background and adolescent socialisation 
to be isolated from current social location effects. 
Four predictor models are employed for these purposes. Model 1 consists of 
social background effects. These include father's class location, father's education, 
and parent's cultural consumption. Model 2 adds respondents' attributes, which 
include age, gender, value orientations, cultural consumption at age fourteen, and 
education. Cultural consumption at age fourteen is used rather than current cultural 
consumption, as it is seen to be prior to the formation of environmental attitudes and 
behaviour. Model 3 adds respondents' present social location variables - class 
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location, government sector employment, urban/rural location, religious affiliation, 
and ethnicity. 
Finally, in Model 4, non social location variables - left-right political ideology 
and political partisanship - are added. It is recognised that these political ideoJogy 
variables are not clearly prior to the dependent variables. However, it is argued here 
that they are prior. Political ideology and party identification are formed during 
childhood and early adolescence (Graetz and McAllister 1994:365). Political party 
identification and voting behaviour are strongly associated with parental partisanship 
and voting (Graetz and McAllister 1994:365).1 Additionally, Baker et al (1981:195) 
note that party identification "is a very stable attitude that is often formed through the 
early-life learning of parental values". Given that political partisanship and ideological 
position are formed during childhood or early adolescence, it is argued that they are 
causally prior to behaviour related to environmentalism, such as joining environmental 
groups. 
1 An analysis of the Australian Electoral Survey found that 75% of respondents who identify as 
Coalition supporters indicated that both parents supported the Coalition parties when respondents were 
14 years of age. 72% of Labor party supporters suggested that their fathers supported the Labor party 
at age 14, while 74% said their mothers were Labor supporters (Source: 1993 AES). 
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Table 5.1: Four Predictor Models of Environmentalism 
Model 1 


























Aspects of environmentalism 
Model 4 















Having outlined the logic of the predictor models, it is necessary to discuss how 
environmentalism will be conceptualised. The discussion of environmentalism in 
Chapter 1 shows there is a diversity of meaning associated with terms such as 
environment, ecology, and conservation. As such, this diversity may not be captured 
in a single measure. I suggest that environmentalism may be conceptualised as two 
distinct aspects. 
The notion of environmentalism includes a variety of issue-concerns (McAllister 
1994, Crook and Pakulski 1995). Concern for environmental issues is understood 
here as an 'attitudinal' aspect. However, environmentalism also encompasses 
'behavioural' aspects, such as joining an environmental group, and participating in 
environmental protests. The major division is therefore between concerned 
(attitudinal), and active (behavioural) environmentalism. This distinction is similar to 
that employed by Inglehart (1990b). He suggests that "[l]n moving from the realm of 
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attitudes toward environmentalism to the realm of pro-environmentalist behaviour, we 
are moving from a relatively "soft" indicator that contains a large component of spur 
of the moment response to a relatively "hard" indicator that refers to specific activities 
one either has, or has not, done" (Inglehart 1990b:54-56). 
Environmentalism may also be conceptualised in terms of level of inclusiveness. 
Highly inclusive concepts denote a wide range of objects, such as environmental 
issues, groups, networks, green political parties, and activists, both local and 
national/global in scope. Less inclusive concepts denote a more narrow range of 
objects. For example, members of a Victorian branch of the Wilderness Society fall 
under the environmental rubric, yet the objects (members) denoted by such a 
description are much more specific. 
I classify environmentalism on two dimensions. Firstly, according to the aspect 
of environmentalism ('attitudinal' and 'behavioural'), and second, on level of 
inclusiveness as high or low. It is argued here that a range of measures are necessary 
to encompass 'attitudinal' and 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism, and their 
various levels of inclusiveness. 
Thus, six aspects of environmentalism are employed in this research: i) 
environmental issue concerns, ii) approval of environmental groups, iii) feelings 
toward environmentalists (activists), iv) potential membership of environmental 
groups, v) actual environmental group membership, and vi) participation in 
environmental protests and demonstrations (Table 5.2).2 
The environmental issues, approval of environmental groups, and 
environmentalist feelings are all 'attitudinal' aspects. They measure the respondent's 
attitudes toward certain aspects of environmentalism. Environmental issues are very 
general aspects of environmentalism, and highly inclusive. Approval of 
environmental groups is less inclusive than environmental issues, as it measures 
attitudes toward actual environmental groups. Feelings toward environmentalists is 
the least inclusive 'attitudinal aspect'. It measures attitudes toward 'environmentalists' 
2 Variable construction is discussed in detail below. 
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- a group respondents may associate with radical activism. Activists comprise a 
relatively small percentage of the population, and as such they are a less inclusive 
aspect of environmentalism than environmental groups. 
The 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism are also differentiated according 
to level of inclusiveness. Potential membership is an aspect of environmentalism with 
a relatively high level of inclusiveness. It is more closely related to the 'behavioural' 
than the 'attitudinal' type. It is related to an act, joining, as opposed to an attitudinal 
response such as 'how do you feel about...?', or 'do you approve or disapprove 
of... ?'3 Actual membership is a much more exclusive category than potential 
members (sympathisers). It requires little commitment to environmentalism to 
consider joining, but considerably more to actually join an environmental group. 
Joining environmental groups, and participating in environmental demonstrations are 
obviously 'behavioural' aspects. However, participation in demonstrations is a less 
inclusive form of environmentalism than joining an environmental group. 
Participation in environmental demonstrations is environmental activism, and as such 
differs from membership in two important ways. First, not all members of 
environmental groups are environmental activists, or have active roles in 
environmental groups (Milbrath 1984:73). The level of participation of many group 
members in Australia is limited to subscribing to environmental organisations such as 
the Wilderness Society or the Australian Conservation Foundation. Second, 
demonstrators are not necessarily members of environmental groups. Environmental 
activism is characterised by loose affiliations and networks of supporters and 
sympathisers. Many participants in such events are not formal members of 
environmental groups, but 'sleepers' whose level of participation changes in response 
to environmental 'crises'. 
3 The distinction between potential and actual members is made because there may be a substantial 
difference between the social characteristics of these two groups. lnglehart (1990b:54-59) makes a 
similar distinction between actual and potential membership of environmental groups. 
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Three sets of secondary data are analysed in this research. The first is the 1990 
Australian Electoral Study (n=2037), a systematic random samplt? drawn from the 
Australian electoral roll in February 1990, and collected between March and July of 
the same year (McAllister et al 1990). The second survey is the 1993 Australian 
Electoral Study (AES n=3023), a stratified systematic random sample drawn from the 
Australian electoral rolls in February 1993, and collected between March and May 
1993 (Jones et al 1993). The 1993 AES includes a weighting variable, that "adjusts 
the sample by Stateff erritory to reflect the distribution of enrolments in the 
population" (Jones et al 1993:1X). The number of weighted cases are n=2388. Both 
AES surveys are cross sectional. Some analyses also utilise the combined AES (1990 
and 1993) data (n= 5060), in order to maximise the number of environmental group 
members.4 
The third data source combines three National Social Science Surveys (NSSS) 
(n=l 779). These are the 1989-90 Family and Changing Sex Roles (SSDA 646), 
1990 Lifestyles (SSDA 647), 1993 National Social Science Survey (not yet released), 
4 The 1993 AES component of the combined AES data is unweighted and therefore not strictly 
representative of the Australian population. However, a comparison of the results of regression 
models fitted to weighted and unweighted 1993 AES data reveals minimal differences in the impact of 
social location on environmental group membership (See Appendix A Table VI). 
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and the 1993 International Social Survey Programme Environment (SSDA 825) 
(Kelley et al 1993a, Kelley et al 1993b, Kelley et al 1995, Kelley et al 1996).5 
Operationalisation of concepts 
Dependent variables 
Confronted with the conceptual diversity and stretch, and the range of meaning 
denoted by the term 'environmentalism', several aspects are oper~tionalised. The 
dependent variables as noted above, are of two types: 'attitudinal' and 'behavioural'. 
The six dependent variables operationalised in this research are shown by data source 
in Table 5.3. Three 'attitudinal' measures are used in this research as dependent 
variables: a) an environmental issues scale (NSSS only); b) a scale measuring the 
propensity to approve of environmental groups (AES only); c) an environmentalist 
feeling thermometer (NSSS only). 
Three behavioural variables are also operationalised. Environmental group 
membership is measured as: a) environmental group members; b) those who are not 
members but have considered joining environmental groups. 6 The questions relating 
to actual environmental group membership are available with all three data sets (AES 
1990 and 1993, and NSSS). The 'consider joining' variable is only available with 
AES data. 
(Table 5.3 about here) 
5 The principal investigators for all NSSS datasets are Jonathan Kelley, Clive Bean, and Mariah 
Evans. Krzysztof Zagorski is also a principal investigator with the 1993 NSSS and International 
surveys. 
6 The AES question asks 'How likely are you to join a group campaigning to protect the 
environment?' Responses: a) I am already a member; b) Not a member, but have considered joining; 
c) Not a member and have not considered joining; d) Would never consider joining. The NSSS 
question asks; 'Are you a member of any group whose main aim is to preserve or protect the 
environment?' The responses are yes/no. 
In this research, the 'consider joining' category is used as a proxy for 'potential members'. In 
regression models where the consider joining variable is dependent, actual environmental group 
members are excluded from the analysis. 
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The environmental issue-concern dependent variable is developed as a general 
measure of concerns over possible threats to the environment. The scale is 
constructed from questions measuring the level of concern over various types of 
pollution.7 The results of a factor analysis show that the six environmental issues all 
load oh a single factor (Table 5.4). A scale variable was constructed from the six 
issue concerns, and is highly reliable (Cronbach's alpha= 0.81). The resulting scale 
is the issue concern dependent variable. 
(Table 5.4 about here) 
A second 'attitudinal' measure is used to gauge the level of approval for 
environmental groups among the public. 8 The environmental group approval measure 
is less inclusive than the issues scale, as it gauges the level of approval for actual 
environmental groups.9 The third measure is based on attitudes toward 
environmentalists. It is derived from the 1993 NSSS environmentalist feeling 
thermometer question. Respondents are asked to indicate their feelings toward 
environmentalists on a scale ranging from very cold or unfavourable, to very warm or 
favourable.10 The feeling thermometer question is a less inclusive measure of 
7 The scale is constructed from six questions. The first four questions are: 'In general, do you think 
a) air pollution caused by cars; b) air pollution caused by industry; c) nuclear power stations; d) 
pesticides and chemicals used in farming ... are extremely dangerous to the environment; very 
dangerous; somewhat dangerous; not very dangerous; not dangerous at all to the environment. The 
remaining questions asked: a) 'In general, do you think that pollution of Australia's rivers, lakes and 
streams is dangerous to the environment?'; b) 'In general, do you think that a rise in the world's 
temperature caused by the 'greenhouse effect' is dangerous to the environment?' Response ciitegories: 
Definitely true; probably true; probably not true; definitely not true. 
8 It is important to note that the notion of what constitutes an environmental group is not clearly 
defined in either the AES or NSSS. Environmental groups may vary from large organisations (eg. 
Greenpeace or The Wilderness Society), to small informal groups that emerge in response to localised 
environmental issues (eg. local residents protesting over the logging of forests or against the 
construction of woodchip mills). 
9 The approval question in the AES surveys asks, 'There are a number of groups and movements 
seeking public support. For each of the following groups, please say whether you approve or 
disapprove of them. Groups campaigning to protect the environment'. 
The responses were: Strongly approve; Approve; Neither; Disapprove; Strongly Disapprove. The 
approval dependent variable is recoded as five steps: O=strongly disapprove !=strongly approve. 
10 The feeling thermometer question asks: 'We would like to know your feelings about some of the 
people you hear about in the news today. You'll probably feel favourable about some people or 
groups and unfavourable about others. We would like you to show your feelings using this 'feeling 
thermometer'. You may use any number from 0 to 100 for a rating. 100 is the highest rating, for 
people you feel very warm of favourable about, and 0 is the lowest rating, for people you feel very 
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environmentalism than the approval scale, as it relates to environmentalists rather than 
environmental groups. The environmentalist feeling thermometer variable refers to a 
less inclusive and more clearly defined category of environmental 'activists'. 
The percentage of environmental group members differs between the three 
surveys (Table 5.5). It is much higher for the National Social Science Survey than the 
either Electoral Study. Given that all surveys are large samples, the explanation for 
the differences appears to lie in question construction. The NSSS question asks about 
'groups whose main aim is to preserve or protect the environment'. It is much 
broader in scope than the AES question, which asks about 'groups campaigning to 
protect the environment'. Campaigning is the key word here as it implies political 
action. Many groups, such as localised soil conservation groups and loosely affiliated 
networks of environmental supporters, are not necessarily involved in campaigning, 
and therefore may not be captured by the more narrowly defined question in the AES 
questionnaire. 
(Table 5.5 about here) 
The third 'behavioural' dependent variable measures participation in protests and 
demonstrations relating to the environment (1993 NSSS only). It is derived from the 
NSSS question; 'In the last five years, have you taken part in a protest or 
demonstration about an environmental issue?' 11 
The six dependent variables discussed above encompass a broad range of 
meanings associated with the term 'environmentalism'. The environmentalist issues 
scale, environmentalists feelings thermometer, and participation in demonstrations 
variables are operationalised using National Social Science Survey data, while the 
environmental group approval scale, and potential environmental group members are 
strongly against. If you are neutral about particular people, neither for them nor against, you would 
five a rating of 50.' 
1 4.5% (n=80) of the 1993 NSSS respondents indicated they had participated in a protest or 
demonstration. 
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operationalised using Australian Electoral Study data. The environmental group 
membership variable is available in all three sets of survey data (see Table 5.3). 
Independent variables 
A number of independent variables are operationalised in an attempt to locate the 
social bases of environmentalism in Australia. The theoretical constructs these 
variables represent are discussed in Chapters 2 to 4. In this section, I operationalise 
the key social base concepts - class, generation, and status - as well as other 'minor' 
social base variables - religion, urban-rural location, and ethnicity. Inglehart's (1981, 
1990a, 1990b) value change hypothesis is included, because of its salience as an 
explanation of support for new political movements, and its links with generational 
explanations. Cultural consumption is operationalised as an indication of lifestyle (a 
status variable), while political ideology (left vs right) and partisanship are also seen to 
be important predictors of political behaviour and attitudes. 
New class 
There are no serious attempts to link environmentalism with the 'old' industrial 
classes. The best known class accounts focus on either a 'new middle class' or an 
altogether 'new class' as bases of environmental concerns and activism. Of particular 
interest here is the alleged over representation of the new class among supporters of 
environmental new politics. In this section, class models are empirically examined 
with the aim of choosing the most appropriate model to explain support for 
environmentalism in Australia. I begin by briefly restating some important theoretical 
debates on new class (see chapter 2). 
According to 'new class' theorists, support for new politics, including 
environmental activism, is disproportionately drawn either from an altogether 'new' 
class.12 Yet it is by no means universally accepted that these 'new classes' constitute 
12 I will use 'new class' as a generic term to encompass both 'new class' and 'new middle class' 
accounts. 
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social groupings in any sociological sense.13 Moreover, the new class is often 
defined principally in occupational terms, although some theorists also specify social 
status (for example, radical intellectuals), and public sector employment as important 
defining characteristics (for example, Parkin 1968: 180, Kristol 1975: 134, Cotgrove 
and Duff 1981: 102-3, Mattausch 1989:221 ). Adding to the confusion, most new 
class theorists agree that tertiary education is a necessary criterion for new class 
membership (for example, Ladd 1978:53, McAdams 1987 :27, Kriesi 1989: 1086-87, 
Gouldner 1979:3-4, Eckersley 1989:213, Rootes 1995:225).14 
I suggest that the main differences between versions of the new class is in the 
level of inclusiveness (Figure 5.1).15 Highly inclusive formulations, such as those 
proposed by Dalton (1988:154), define the new (middle) class as consisting of civil 
servants and white collar workers. Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich's (1977, 1979) PMC is 
also very broad. They define the new class largely in terms of membership of 
'professional and managerial' occupational categories. Gouldner (1979) paints with a 
relatively broad brush, as his conceptualisation of the 'new class' comprises 'technical 
intelligentsia', and 'humanistic intellectuals' - both defined in a rather loose and 
inclusive way. Parkin's (1968) 'new middle class' is more narrow, although 
Kristol's (1972, 1975, 1978) version is perhaps the most exclusive. He suggests that 
the new class consists of 'social and cultural' professionals. 
13 Narrowly defined occupational categories, such as the 'social and cultural professionals' are clearly 
not classes, using either a Marxian or Weberian definition of the term (see Brint 1987: 1507). The 
social articulation and political impact of these 'new' classes is critically examined in Chapter 2. 
14 The Ehrenreichs are an exception here, as they define the new class as professionals and managers 
of all education levels (Brint 1984:34). 
15 On the level of inclusiveness, see Brint (1984:34). I am not concerned here with ideological 
differences among class theorists, for example as is evident between Marxist new class accounts (for 
example, McAdams), and neo-conservative accounts (for example, Kristol, Ladd). 
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Level of Inclusiveness of New Class Models 










'New Middle Class' 
Parkin's 
'New Middle Class' 
Low (Exclusive) 
New class theorists seldom clearly circumscribe 'new class'. For example, 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979:13) suggest that the boundaries separating it from 
other classes are 'fuzzy'. Inglehart (1990a:331) also acknowledges that "there is no 
clear consensus on the criteria that define the New Class". It seems that few new 
class theorists have any intention of empirically evaluating their class models. Some 
also fail to specify the relationship between the new class and other classes. For 
example, neither Kristol (1975), nor Ladd (1978) attempt to present a comprehensive 
class schema. It is therefore difficult to specify and operationalise new class models. 
In order to choose a class model for analyses in the subsequent empirical 
chapters (6 and 7), three new class models, one 'old' class model, and a group of 
occupational categories are evaluated. The first new class model is based upon 
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreichs' (1979) 'professional and managerial' class, and is used 
as an example of an inclusive new class account. The original Ehrenreichs' ( 1979: 14) 
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model has four classes (ruling class, old middle class, professional/managerial class, 
and working class).16 The model operationalised here also includes a 'middle class' 
dummy variable, comprising non self-employed clerical and sales occupations.17 
The second model is based upon Kriesi's (1989) scheme. Kriesi defines five 
'new middle classes': social and cultural specialists, administrative and commercial 
personnel, technical specialists, craft specialists and protective services. Somewhat 
confusingly, he suggests the social and cultural specialists also comprise the 'new 
class'. Kriesi (1989:1081) examines "subdivisions within the new middle class, 
because the new class is generally thought to be part of the new middle class and 
because it is here that we expect the mobilisation potential of NSMs [new social 
movements, B.T.] to have its structural roots". His class scheme also includes large 
employers, farmers, and the old middle classes: petite bourgeois and traditional 
professionals. The working class are skilled workers and unskilled workers. 
I break with Kriesi by placing clerical and sales employees into a separate 
middle class, rather than working class, again in order to maintain comparability 
between class models.18 All manual workers (trades, semi skilled and unskilled) are 
coded as the working class reference category. Kriesi's 'new class' of social and 
cultural specialists are of particular interest as they correspond with Parkin' s ( 1968) 
'welfare and creative' occupations (Kriesi 1989: 1083). 
The third new class model is based upon Brint's (1984) model, and includes 
four new classes: managerial, technical professionals, social and cultural specialists 
and human services professionals. Brint's 'social and cultural specialists' 
16 I divide the Professional-Managerial class into two categories on the basis of the division outlined 
by Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1979:28). 
17 This is primarily for reasons of consistency and comparability, as trades people, semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers comprise the reference category for class all models. The inclusion of the middle 
class variable has only minimal impact on the magnitude of the regression coefficients. 
18 I operationalise his five new middle classes, and his traditional professionals (medical practitioners 
and lawyers) but omit large employers, and the petty bourgeoisie. Due to the large number of classes 
specified by Kriesi (12), the number of cases in some categories (traditional professionals, protective 
group) is very low. The inclusion of owner classes requires the use of additional variables 
(employment sector, and number of employees), which further reduces the number of cases in each 
class category. As the interest here centred on support for environmentalism among new classes, and 
as the Ehrenreichs' model shows support among 'owner classes', it was decided to omit the 'owner' 
classes from the 'Kriesi model'. This also allows for a closer comparison to be made between the two 
less inclusive class models ('Brint' and 'Kriesi' models), as classes in these models are operationalised 
using occupational location only. 
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approximate Kristol's (1975) new class, which is the most exclusive new class 
category operationalised here. The 'technical professionals' and 'social and cultural 
specialists' approximate Gouldner' s 'technical intelligentsia' and 'humanistic 
intellectuals' (see Brint 1984:36 Figure 2).19 A middle class consisting of clerical and 
sales occupations is also included in the Brint model, with the working class (ie. 
trades, semi and unskilled workers) again used as the reference category. The 
operationalisation of these three models allows for an evaluation of arguably the most 
popular conceptualisations of the new class. 
While the aim in this section is to choose a class model to be used in the 
an_alyses in the empirical chapters below, I also examine an occup~tional category 
model. Occupational groups are classified according to the Australian Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ASCO) major groups (Castles 1990).20 The ASCO 
categories may be seen as proxy measures for some new classes. For example, Baker 
et al (1981:171), Dalton (1988:154), and Rohrschneider (1990:9) define the new 
middle class as white collar workers, while McAdams (1987:45) argues that support 
for environmental groups stems from a new class of 'professionals'. 
However, as many theorists point out, classes and occupational categories are 
not the same. Class theorists maintain that classes may be occupationally 
heterogeneous but they share objective structural location and interests (the Marxian 
approach), or marketable skills and credentials (the Weberian approach). Yet some 
theorists, such as Brint (1987), suggest that the new class is little more than an 
occupational grouping - an additional reason for operationalising the ASCO 
occupational groups.21 
Finally, in order to contrast new class accounts with an 'old class' model, 
' 
Goldthorpe's (1982) seven class model is used. Goldthorpe's class model is 
operationalised for 1993 only, due to the data limitations. Although it is not a new 
19 It is important to note that the social and cultural specialists identified by Brint and Kriesi differ 
somewhat. Brint's model is less inclusive. 
20 ASCO groups are "defined in terms of skill level and skill specialisation" (Castles 1990:preface). 
21 Brint (1987:1507), suggests the use of the term 'occsectorals' "to describe social structural 
locations that are narrower than 'classes' but relevant to the formation of political interests and ideals 
in advanced societies". 
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class account, and not employed in studies of environmentalism, it is included in the 
empirical analyses because it is an important and commonly employed model of 
class.22 
Evaluation of class models 
In this evaluation of new class models, I operationalised the_ ASCO occupation 
model, the Kriesi and Brint new class models, a Marxian derived new class account 
(Ehrenreichs), and a neo-Weberian 'old' class model (Goldthorpe). A number of 
points are considered in relation to model selection. Firstly, a comparison is made 
between the likelihood ratio (L-square, and appropriate degrees of freedom) statistics 
for each class model regressed on i) the membership, and ii) the potential membership 
dependent variables. The L square statistics for each of the dependent variables are 
used to measure the respective 'goodness of fit' of each logistic regression model with 
the data. 
The second criterion is the representativeness of the models. If a class model 
represents a range of theoretical classes, then it is preferable to a model that is more 
esoteric. Thirdly, it is important not to ignore Ockam's razor, which states; "Entities 
are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" (Flew 1984:253). In other words, a more 
parsimonious class model that provides essentially the same information as a complex 
one is always ~referable. Finally, the predictive impact of the categories in each class 
model is evaluated by regressing the environmental group membership and potential 
membership dependent variables on each class model. 
Tables 5.6 to 5.9 show the goodness of fit statistics for the Brint, Kriesi, 
Ehrenreichs', and Goldthorpe class models, and the ASCO occupation categories. 
The models are compared using three data sets; the 1990 and 1993 AES, and the 1993 
22 Classes I and II are known collectively as the 'service class' (see Goldthorpe 1982, Goldthorpe and 
Payne 1986, Marshall et al 1988). The separation of classes I and II reflects the division between 
higher and lower grade professionals, administrators and managers. The intermediate class III includes 
routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce, and personal service workers; class 
IV comprises small proprietors with and without employees, and farmers, V are lower grade 
technicians and supervisors of manual workers; VI are skilled manual workers and VII comprises 
semi-skilled manual workers and agricultural workers. Class VII is used as the reference category for 
regression. 
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NSSS. The results in Table 5.6 suggest that the Brint and Kriesi.models for 1990 
show a very similar fit. Although the Kriesi model shows a larger likelihood ratio (L-
square) than the Brint model, the difference is not significant (L-square 5.56 for 2 
degrees of freedom, p>0.05). On the other hand, the ASCO, Brint and Goldthorpe 
models clearly show a better fit with the 1993 data than the Ehrenreich model. Table 
5.7 also indicates the similarity between the Brint and K.riesi models with the NSSS 
data.23 The Kriesi model shows a marginally better fit than the ASCO model (L-
square 7 .41 for 2 degrees of freedom; p<0.05), but is not significantly better than the 
Brint model (L-square 5.87 for 2 degrees of freedom; p>0.05). 
The results for potential membership show that the K.riesi model is not superior 
to the ASCO or Brint models at the ninety five per cent significance level (Table 5.8). 
For three extra degrees of freedom it only increases the fit by 5.76 likelihood ratio 
units (p<O.l). The ASCO and Brint models are clearly superior to the Ehrenreich and 
Goldthorpe models with the 1993 AES data. The results for the demonstration 
dependent variable (Table 5.9) show that neither the Brint, Kriesi nor ASCO models 
show a significant fit with the data. 
The Brint and Kriesi show a virtually identical fit on all dependent variables 
adjusting for degrees of freedom. They are marginally better than the ASCO model 
with the NSSS data, although the ASCO model returns better goodness of fit statistics 
for the 1993 AES data than all class models, and is comparable to the Brint and Kriesi 
models for the analyses of the 1990 AES. 
(Tables 5.6 to 5.9 about here) 
On the 'representativeness' criterion, the Brint model is preferred as it is an 
approximation of Gouldner's (1979) 'technical intelligentsia' and 'humanistic 
intellectuals' (represented by Brint's technical and human services professionals 
respectively), and Kristol's (1975) new class (Brint's social and cultural 
23 Data limitations prevent the operationalisation of the Ehrenreich and Goldthorpe class models for 
the NSSS data. 
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professionals). Kriesi's social and cultural professionals category is much broader 
than Brint's. Kriesi (1989: 1083) suggests his 'social and cultural specialists', 
"roughly correspond to Brint's 'human services professionals' and 'social and cultural 
specialists'". The Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich class model differs from both the Brint 
and Kriesi models in an important respect. Where the latter are derived from the 
accounts of Gouldner, Parkin and Kristol, and as such represent more than one new 
class account, the Ehrenreich' s model is derived from an original theoretical 
formulation and is therefore less representative. Goldthorpe's (1982) class model 
does not represent a new class. 
The Brint and Ehrenreich models with six categories are more parsimonious 
than the nine category Kriesi model (twelve categories in its original form), and the 
seven (or in its expanded form, twelve) category Goldthorpe modeI.24 
Analyses of all class models as predictors of environmental group membership 
and potential membership (see Appendix A Tables I-V), show that new class 
categories return stronger effects than other class categories for all new class 
models. 25 The results for the ASCO models lend weight to the notion that support for 
environmentalism is stronger among professionals than other occupational groups. 
Similarly, the Ehrenreichs' 'professional-managerial class(es)', and Goldthorpe's 
'service class' (which includes professionals) also produce relativ.ely strong predictive 
effects in their respective models. However, the most narrowly defined new class, 
the 'social and cultural professionals' (the Brint model), returns the strongest effects 
on membership and potential membership. On the basis of these preliminary findings, 
the Brint model is considered the best predictive new class model, on both dependent 
variables. 
24 The number of categories mentioned includes the reference category of workers for each model. 
The Kriesi model as operationalised here has nine class, although for the membership dependent 
variables for the 1990 AES and 1993 NSSS, only eight categories are operationalised (see Tables 5.6 
and 5.7). The protective group is omitted for membership, as there were no protective category 
respondents among members for the 1990 AES or NSSS. 
25 The exception was the traditional professionals for the Kriesi model. The traditional professionals 
returned the strongest effects of any class as a predictor of environmental group membership in 1990 
(odds ratio statistics: forty-two times more likely to join an environmental group than workers). 
However, the very low number of traditional professionals who were also members of environmental 
groups (n=3), casts doubt upon this finding. 
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Finally, it must be remembered that data limitations impact upon model 
selection. 26 Differences in the method of classifying occupations between the surveys 
influences the operationalisation of new class models. As seen a1;>0ve, some 'classes' 
are very narrowly defined (for example social and cultural specialists, traditional 
professionals), requiring selection to the level of occupations, or ASCO unit groups. 
However, it is not possible to operationalise classes at the unit group level using the 
1993 AES data. The models constructed using the 1993 AES data therefore group 
together some occupations that are separate in the original class theories upon which 
they are based. 
Because the Kriesi model requires finer distinctions to be made between 
occupations (necessitating coding at the ASCO unit group level), it is operationalised 
using 1990 AES data and 1993 NSSS data only. On the other hand, the Ehrenreich 
model is operationalised using only 1993 AES data, due to difficulties with 
operationalising 'owner' classes.27 The Brint model may be operationalised for all 
three samples, and is therefore favoured on this count.28 
On balance, the Brint model is preferred over other the models evaluated here. 
It is superior, or comparable to the other models on almost all criteria. It produces 
approximately similar likelihood ratio statistics to the Kriesi model on the membership 
dependent variable, uses less degrees of freedom, and is superior to the other class 
models on all dependent variables. The Brint model approximates a larger number of 
new class constructs, yet is also the most parsimonious of all models. It may also be 
26 Occupations are classified in the Australian Electoral Studies (AES) and National Social Science 
Surveys (NSSS) according to the Australian Standard Coding of Occupations (ASCO), but they are 
classified in different ways for the two AES surveys. In the 1990 AES and the NSSS, occupations 
are classified at the ASCO 'unit group' level. An example is medical practitioners. However, in the 
1993 AES, occupations are classified at the more general 'minor group' level. In this instance, 
medical practitioners are grouped under the ASCO minor group, 'Health Diagnosis and Treatment 
Professionals', along with dentists, pharmacists, occupational therapists, optometrists, 
physiotherapists, chiropractors, veterinarians, and so on. 
27 Where the operationalisation of class models requires that owners be distinguished from non-
owners (for example with the Ehrenreichs' model and Goldthorpe's 'old' class model) proxy indicators 
of ownership are used. The AES surveys lack data on the net worth of businesses, so self 
employment, and the number of employees employed by the self employed are used to distinguish 
'owner' classes from non-owners. The 1990 AES does not contain a question on the number of 
employees employed by the self employed, which prevents large owners being distinguished from 
small owners. Class models that include 'owner' classes are therefore operationalised for 1993 only. 
28 The Brint classes are coded to the unit group level using the 1990 AES data, and 1993 NSSS data, 
while they are classified at the minor group level with the 1993 AES data. 
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operationalised using both Australian Electoral Study and National Social Science 
Survey data for 1990 and 1993. The Brint model is therefore chosen as the new class 
model for the empirical chapters that follow. 
Public sector employment 
Some theorists suggest that public sector employment is an important aspect of 
new class location (for example Parkin 1968:180, Cotgrove and Duff 1981:102-3, 
Mattausch 1989:221). Milbrath (1984:77) suggests that "persons in the production 
sector tend to value material goods more highly whereas persons in the service sector 
tend to value a clean environmental more highly". Cotgrove (1982:95) also maintains 
that "environmentalism is an expression of the interests of those whose class position 
in the 'non-productive' sector locates them at the periphery of the institutions and 
processes of industrial capitalist societies .. .It is a protest against alienation from the 
processes of decision making, and the depoliticisation of issues through the 
usurpation of policy decisions by the experts, operating within the dominant economic 
values". As public sector location is associated with new class location, and has been 
found to be a predictor of environmental support, it is operationalised as a 
dichotomous variable in the analysis below.29 
Generations, cohorts, and age models 
The problematic nature of attempts to separate generational and life cycle effects 
using cross sectional data is widely recognised.30 However, in this context it may be 
possible to distinguish between them. A gradual decline in support for 
environmentalism with age tends to suggest the presence of a life cycle effect. As 
people age they become slightly less supportive of environmentalism. On the other 
hand, generational or cohort effects should show more abrupt changes in patterns of 
support from one generation (or cohort) to the next. 
29 Public sector employment comprises federal, state, and local government employees. The 
reference category for regression analysis consists of privately employed, family business or farm, and 
self employed. 
30 The use of longitudinal survey data analysis is perhaps the only reliable method of evaluating 
generational versus life cycle effects. 
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In order to measure age effects, five age models comprising one generational, 
three cohort models, and a continuous age variable are used as predictors of 
environmentalism.31 The generation model should show differences in support for 
environmentalism between pre war and post war generations. It is based upon 
popular notions of the postwar 'baby-boomers' (1946-1959), and. the later generation 
known as 'generation X' ( 1960+ ). 32 The third generation consists of those born 
before the end of World War II (1945 or earlier). 
Two further cohort models are derived from recent studies of environmentalism. 
The frrst model consists of ten year cohorts, a procedure commonly employed in 
empirical analyses of environmentalism (for example, Inglehart 1981:886; Burklin 
1985:472; Papadakis 1993:159; McAllister 1994:32). The second model uses the 
fifteen year cohorts employed by Inglehart (1990b:61). These two cohort models are 
termed 'ten year cohorts' and 'Inglehart's 15 year cohorts' respectively. 
Finally, a 'decade' model is used. This is not a cohort model, but measures age 
in decades. Therefore, when comparisons are made between 'decade' groups with the 
AES data, the birth years of these 'decade' groups are not the same, but refer to 
respondents belonging to a certain age group at the time of the survey. 33 It is 
suggested here that if support for environmentalism is related to age, it may be better 
encapsulated by a model that measures age in decades. Measuring age in this way 
may more effectively highlight the changes that occur over the course of the life cycle. 
Attaining a certain age is often associated with life cycle changes (for example, 
increased responsibilities during the twenties after the more carefree teenage years, the 
onset of middle age during the forties), and crossing the threshold of a new decade in 
31 The four models are operationalised using the following age groupings: Model 1: three 
generations (pre WWII; baby boomers 1946-1959; generation X 1960-1972175); Model 2: 15 year 
cohorts (birth years: 1900-1920, 1921-35, 1936-50, 1951-65, 1966-72): Model 3: 10 year cohorts 
(1900-1925, 1926-35, 1936-45, 1946-55, 1956-65, 1966-72); Model 4: 'decade' groups (aged 18-19, 
20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70+). -
32 Such popular conceptions of the notion of generations are often found in the mass media. An 
example may be found in The Australian Magazine, February, 26-27, 1994. 
33 By 'cohort', I mean a group whose birth years are fixed, for example, those born in the years 
1961-1970. This group would be aged 20 to 29 years at the time of the 1990 AES survey. They 
would also comprise a 'decade' group for the 1990 survey. However, a similar 'decade' group for the 
1993 survey (aged 20-29), would have been born between 1964-1973, and belong to a different, 
although cross cutting cohort. 
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age is sometimes accompanied by behavioural changes (for example, retiring at sixty). 
If age based support for environmentalism reflects life cycle changes rather than 
generational effects, 'decade cohorts' may more effectively capture these effects. 
Results of a preliminary evaluation of the cohort models suggest that the 
'Inglehart fifteen year cohorts' and the generational model tend to mask differences in 
age effects. This is perhaps due to the fact that by combining groups of respondents 
whose birth years span relatively large periods of time, some generational and/or 
period effects are subsumed. The 'Inglehart fifteen year cohorts' and the generation 
model tend to show a decline in support with age, whereas the 'decade' and 'ten year 
cohort' models operationalised for the same dependent variables, more clearly 
highlight age based differences in support for environmentalism. 
In the empirical chapters below, age is initially operationalised in regression 
models as a continuous measure in years. A significant linear effect suggests a life 
cycle effect. In addition, generational and cohort models are used in an attempt to 
determine the pattern of age based support. 
Status 
Previous research into the social characteristics of environmental supporters 
shows an over-representation of 'radical intellectuals' and generally tertiary educated 
people among members and supporters of environmental groups (Parkin 1968, Van 
Liere and Dunlap 1980, Milbrath 1984, Porrit and Winner 1988, Rootes 1995). It is 
suggested in Chapter 4 that 'intellectuals' form a distinct status group, and that 
members of such status groups are highly likely to join environmental groups in 
Australia.34 Post secondary education serves as a proxy indicator of this 'intellectual' 
social status.35 
34 As a point of clarification, it is not being argued here that environmentalists comprise a distinct 
status group, but that support for environmental issues and groups is stronger among members a 
certain status group - the intellectuals. 
35 Tertiary education is operationalised as degree (bachelor degree, postgraduate diploma and higher 
degree), and diploma (under graduate and associate diploma) with the AES data. Degrees are also sub-
divided into higher degree (PhD and Master), postgraduate diploma and bachelor degree with AES data. 
The reference group comprises professional and trade qualifications, and those with no post secondary 
qualifications. For the NSSS, post secondary education is categorised from the years of education 
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Lifestyle and consumption 
Weber's (1968:305-6) notion of status group based on distinctive lifestyle is a 
useful concept for an examination of support for environmentalism. 36 Weber 
(1968:937) argues that status groups are "stratified according to the principles of their 
consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life". 37 It is suggested that 
members of different lifestyle groups exhibit differential levels of _cultural 
consumption. This notion of cultural consumption is also linked to Bourdieu's (1984) 
analysis of taste. Bourdieu (1984:16) maintains that tastes cultures are associated with 
level of education and cultural capital.38 Turner (1988:66) contends that lifestyle is 
conceptually more closely related to status groups, as style of life is based upon 
consumption patterns rather than production-related class position. Cultural 
consumption is also an indicator of an 'intellectual' status group (see Chapter 4). 
Lifestyle is operationalised as two scales that measure parent's cultural 
consumption when respondent's were aged fourteen, and respondents' cultural 
consumption at age fourteen. Using maximum likelihood factoring with oblique 
(Harris-Kaiser) rotation, I found that cultural consumption questions load on two 
factors (Tables 5.10 and 5.11), similar to the two dimensions of cultural consumption 
('beaux arts' and 'scholastic literature') identified by Crook (1996). However, due to 
the fact that the 'arts' and 'literature' dimensions are highly correlated (parents' 
cultural consumption inter-factor correlation= 0.60; adolescent's =0.49) they are 
combined in order to avoid high multicollinearity in the regression models.39 The 
question as degree (15 or more years); some tertiary (13-14 years); no tertiary (the reference category of 
those with 12 years or less). 
36 Weber's notion of Stande is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
37 In fact, in a later work, Bourdieu (1992:237) also acknowledges the link between lifestyle and 
Weber's Stand. See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of status and lifestyle. 
38 Although Bourdieu (1984: 16) links 'legitimate', 'middle brow', and 'popular' tastes to the upper, 
middle, and working classes respectively, these types of cultural capital are more closely related to 
status groups than classes. 
39 The parent's cultural consumption scale comprises the following items: Attendance at art 
museums and galleries, history museums, classical concerts, theatre, ballet, read serious novels or 
poetry, science mathematics or technical books, histories or biographies, and the number of serious 
books and practical books owned. The scale is highly reliable, Cronbach's Alpha= 0.82. The 
adolescent cultural consumption scale items are: attendance at art museums and galleries, classical 
concerts, theatre, ballet, read serious novels or poetry, read science, mathematics or technical books, 
read history or biographies. Cronbach's Alpha coefficient= 0.74. As a rule qf thumb for scale 
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combined scales were tested for reliability using Cronbach's Alpha coefficients and 
found to be highly reliable (parents cultural consumption Alpha= 0.82; adolescents 
cultural consumption Alpha= 0.74). 
(Tables 5.10 and 5.11 about here) 
Other 'social structural' variables 
In addition to the predictor variables discussed above, a number of other 'social 
base' variables are included. These include gender, religion, ethnicity, and urban-
rural residence. Dalton (1994: 155-116) suggests that "Women are socialised into 
nurturing roles that lead them to be more sympathetic to environmental issues and the 
New Environmental Paradigm". There is also empirical evidence to suggest that 
women are more likely to support environmental movements than men (see Milbrath 
1984:75; for Australian results see McAllister 1994:30-31), although earlier studies 
returned mixed results (see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980:185-186). 
Religious cleavages may impact upon support for environmentalism (Inglehart 
1990a). It is hypothesised that those without any religious ties are more likely to 
support environmental groups than the religiously affiliated. A 'No religion/religion' 
dichotomous variable is included.40 It is also possible that there are ethnic differences 
in the support base of environmentalism. A dichotomous variable distinguishing 
those born in English speaking countries other than Australia is therefore included.41 
Finally, as previous studies find support for new social movements is higher in large 
construction, variables with factor loadings of less than 0.45 are excluded. As the parental and 
adolescent cultural consumption scales are highly correlated (Pearson's r=0.44), parental cultural 
consumption is removed from predictor Models 2-4, (see Table 5.1) 
40 The dummy variable represents those with no ties to a religious denomination or organisation. 
All other religious groups comprise the reference category. 
41 The English speaking countries are England, Scotland, the Republic or Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
Canada, Malta and the United States of America. New Zealand is not included in this group, as it has 
close links with Australia. 
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cities (Kriesi 1989:1108, Papadakis 1989:85, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980:184, 
Dunleavy 1980), the urban/rural distinction is operationalised.42 
Other non-structural variables 
Value orientations 
As mentioned above and in chapter 4, value orientations have been linked to 
generational change. Researchers such as lnglehart (1981, 1990a), and lnglehart and 
Abramson (1992, 1994), maintain that differences in political preferences and 
behaviour are due to shifting value priorities linked with generational replacement.43 
lnglehart suggests that younger generations tend to be more postmaterialist, and 
concerned with quality of life issues such as environmentalism. Older generations 
tend to hold materialist values, and are more concerned with issues. such as economic 
and national security. Inglehart (1981, 1990a) suggests that support for 
environmentalism is particularly strong among younger people who hold 
postmaterialist value orientations, while older materialists are under-represented 
among environmental group members and supporters. 
In order to account for the impact of value orientations, Inglehart's (1977, 
1990a) four item value orientation battery is operationalised (see Chapter 4). 
Inglehart' s values index is operationalised both as a scale variable, and as dummy 
variables representing postmaterialists and materialists respectively.44 
Political orientation 
Given the salience of the left-right dimension in political sociology and political 
science, and the fact that previous research suggests that environmental supporters are 
42 Variables are included for urban and suburban location. Urban location represents those living in 
'inner metropolitan' areas (1993 AES) and 'big cities' (1993 NSSS). Rural residents comprise the 
reference category. 
43 Although, even Inglehart (1990b:62), in his study of support for new social movements, 
tentatively concluded that the differential support by generations which remained after controlling for 
the impact of value orientations, political orientations, religiosity, and cognitive mobilisation, may 
have been due to life cycle effects. 
44 The value orientation scale is coded O=materialists; 0.5=mixed; l=postmaterialists. 
Dummy variables are also constructed for some regression analyses as a) materialists, b) 
postmaterialists (those with mixed value orientations comprise the reference category). 
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over represented among the politically 'left' (lnglehart 1990b, K.itschelt and 
Hellemans 1990), the left-right political ideology dimension is also included in the 
following analyses.45 There is also evidence of a linkage between environmentalism 
and political party support in Australia (Doyle 1989, Marks and Bean 1992, 
McAllister and Studlar 1993, Papadakis 1993, 1994, McAllister and Vowles 1994, 
Bean and Papadakis 1995, McAllister and Studlar 1995), and as the 'Michigan Model' 
implies that party identification influences partisan's political attitudes (Campbell et al 
1960, Miller 1976), political party identification variables are included.46 However, 
while it is argued above that the formation of political partisanship is prior to joining 
environmental groups, this may not apply to 'Other party' partisans. Given that these 
'new politics' parties (Australian Democrats and Greens) are recent arrivals on the 
political stage, the development of a new party identification is not clearly prior to 
environmental participation or sympathy. The causal relationship between 
environmental support and new party partisanship is therefore less clear than for ALP 
and Coalition partisans. 
Methods 
Bivariate and multivariate results are reported. Bivariate analyses are used to 
provide an initial understanding of the relationship between two variables. 
Percentages derived from crosstabulations, mean scores, and the results of correlation 
analysis are reported.47 However, in order to more rigorously examine the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables, multivariate analyses are 
conducted. 
Regression analysis is the main multivariate technique used in this research. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is an appropriate technique for the 
analysis of the 'attitudinal' continuous scale dependent variables (Lewis-Beck 1980). 
45 A scale variable measures the self identified left-right dimension (ten steps: far right=O; far left=l) 
for AES 1990 and 1993 only. 
46 Partisanship is operationalised as Other party (Australian Democrat, Greens, and other), Australian 
Labor Party, and Coalition (reference group for regression analyses consisting of Liberal and National 
farties). 
7 Pearson's correlations for the dependent variables and all variables in Models 1-4 are reported in 
Appendix D. 
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Regression estimates (b's), standardise regression estimates (betas) and significance 
levels are reported for the OLS models. Sheaf coefficients are also reported for OLS 
regression. They provide a means of summarising the effects of a number of 
independent variables in a single measure (Riese 1972, Kelley and McAllister 1985, 
Whitt 1986, Bean 1991, Graetz and McAllister 1994).48 The size of the sheaf 
coefficient for a conceptual 'block' of independent variables may be compared with 
other sheaf coefficients or variable estimates.49 Sheaf coefficients are reported in 
standardised form, as they have no natural metric (Bean 1991 :280). Therefore, for 
comparative purposes, sheaf coefficients may only be compared with the standardised 
regression estimates of other independent variables. 
Unlike the 'attitudinal' dependent variables, the 'membership', and 
'demonstrators' dependent variables are dichotomous, while the 'consider' joining 
variable is treated as a dichotomous variable for the purposes of this research. The 
analysis of dichotomous dependent variables with OLS regression is inappropriate 
(Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Therefore, logistic regression is employed for the 
analysis of 'behavioural' dependent variables. Parameter estimates, odds ratios, and 
L-squared statistics, are reported for logistic regression. 50 Percentage effects at the 
grand mean of the dependent variable are also reported for some logistic models. 
Percentages at the grand mean may be interpreted in a similar manner to OLS 
regression estimates (see Petersen 1984, Jones and McAllister 1989). 'Percentage of 
48 Sheaf coefficients are calculated "by multiplying the unstandardised regression coefficient for each 
variable in the group by the variable's value for each individual case, summing the results for each 
case, and then re-estimating the equation with the new variable. The resulting standardised regression 
coefficient is the sheaf coefficient. The sheaf variable can be thought of as an "average" score for the 
set of variables, taking account of each variable's impact on the dependent variable" (Bean 1991:280). 
49 For example, a sheaf estimate for a block of class categories may be compared with (beta) 
estimates for an age scale variable. Such a comparison provides an indication of the relative strength 
of class versus age effects. 
50 Odds ratios are likelihood ratios calculated by taking the exponential of the logistic regression 
coefficient. For example, in a logistic regression model, a dummy variable representing women 
produces a logistic coefficient of 1 as a predictor of joining an environmental group. The odds ratio 
for the logistic coefficient of 1 is: exp(estimate)=2.72. The interpretation of the results are as 
follows; women are approximately three times more likely than men (the reference category) to join 
an environmental group. 
The likelihood ratio (L2) is the value of -2*log likelihood difference between the null model (with no 
predictor variables) and the full model (including all predictor variables). L2 is a statistic with a chi 
square distribution when the sample size is large. It provides a means to gauge the fit of the model. 
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the null model fitted' statistics are also reported. These approximate R-squared 
statistics in OLS regression (see Marks and Bean 1992).51 
Factor analysis is also used in this research, primarily for the purpose of 
identifying dimensionality in a number of measures, and the construction of scale 
variables (see above). Maximum likelihood factoring with varimax or Harris-Kaiser 
oblique rotation is used to estimate factor loadings (see Kim and Mueller 1978). The 
reliability of scales is tested using Cronbach's Alpha coefficients (see Cronbach 
1951). 
Missing values are coded to their respective mean score, in the case of 
continuous variables, and to the mode for dummy variables. For ease of interpretation 
and comparison, all continuous variables (including the dependent variables) are 
scaled to range from zero to one with the exception of age (years), and father's 
education in years (NSSS only).52 
In this chapter, the selection and construction of dependent variables measuring 
various aspects of environmentalism is explained, and some preliminary analyses are 
conducted. The approach of adding 'blocks' of independent variables in a temporal 
order to represent social location and other explanatory accounts are also discussed. 
In the following chapters the dependent variables are regressed upon the predictor 
models in order to explain the social bases of 'attitudinal' (Chapter 6) and 
'behavioural' (Chapter 7) aspects of environmentalism in Australia. 
51 The 'percentage of the null model fitted' are calculated: L2/ -2* Log Likelihood for the null 
model. 
52 See Appendix C for variable scoring, means and standard deviations. 
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Table 5.3 'Attitudinal' and 'Behavioural' Dependent Variables by Survey Source 
AES 1990 AES 1993 NSSS 1993 
'Attitudinal' Dependent Variables 
I Environmental Issue-concern (Scale) 
2 Approval of Environmental Groups (Scale) 
3 Environmentalist Feeling Thermometer 
'Behavioural' Dependent Variables 
4 Potential Environmental Group Membership ..J ..J 
5 Environmental Group Membership ..J ..J ..J 
6 Participation in Environmental Demonstrations ..J 
Table 5.4: Factor Estimates for Environmental Issue Concerns. 
Issue Concern 
Air pollution caused by cars 
Nuclear Power Stations 
Air pollution caused by industry 
Pesticides used in farming 
Pollution of rivers, lakes, and streams 











Factor estimates were calculated using Maximum Likelihood method. 
Percentage of variance explained by one factor 0.44 
Source: Combined National Social Science Surveys 1993 
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Cronbach's Alpha 








Table 5.5: Percentages of Respondents Indicating they are Environmental Group 
Members in AES and NSSS. 
AES 1990 AES 1993 NSSS 1993 
Members of 
Environmental Groups 2.9 4.5 9.7 
(58) (135) (170) 
Have Considered Joining 21.5 18.1 
(428) (541) 
Not Considered Joining 59.9 51.5 
(1195) (1544) 
Would Never Join 15.7 25.9 
(314) (776) 
Not a Member 90.3 
(1590) 
Missing (42) (27) (19) 
N (2037) (3023) (1779) 
Sources: 1990 & 1993 Australian Electoral Studies; Combined National Social Science Surveys 1993. 
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Table 5.6: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Class Models for Membership of 
Environmental Groups (AES). 
ASCO Brint Kriesi ASCO Brint Ehrenreichs 
1990 1990 1990 1993 1993 1993 
Null Model 527 15 527 15 527 15 872.99 872 99 872.99 
Full Model 500.93 497 72 492.16 814 10 817.60 833.95 
L-square 26.21 29.42 34 98 58 89 55.39 39 04 
df 5 5 7 5 5 5 
Dependent (58) (58) (58) (135) (135) (135) 
VanableN 
Total N (2037) (2037) (2037) (2388) (2388) (2388) 
Sources: 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies. 
Table 5.7: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Class Models for Membership of 
Environmental Groups (NSSS). 
ASCO Brint Kriesi 
Null Model 1121.53 1121.53 1121.53 
Full Model 1100.98 1099.44 1093 56 
L-square 20 55 22 09 27.96 
df 5 5 7 
Dependent Var N (170) (170) (170) 
Total N (1779) (1779) (1779) 
Source: Combmed National Social Science Surveys 1993 . 
Table 5.8: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Class Models for Potential Environmental 
Group Members (AES). 
ASCO Brint Knes1 ASCO Brint Ehrenre1chs 
1990 1990 1990 1993 1993 1993 
Null Model 2066.65 2066.65 2066.65 2260.69 2260.69 2260 69 
Full Model 2019 81 2018.76 2013 00 2215 77 2217.87 2233 13 
L-square 47.47 47 89 53.65 44.91 42 82 27 56 
df 5 5 8 5 5 5 
Dependent (428) (428) (428) (541) (541) (541) 
Variable N 
Total N (1979) (1979) (1979) (2888) (2888) (2888) 
Notes: Dependent variables a) Members of environmental groups; b) Not members but have considered ioming environmental 
groups. Members are excluded from the analysis of b. 


















Table 5.9: Goodness of Fit Statistics for Class Models for Environmental 
Demonstrators (NSSS). 
ASCO Bnnt Kriesi 
Null Model 652 63 652.63 652.63 
Full Model 646.40 643 89 644.37 
L-square 6.22 8.73 8 25 
df 5 5 7 
p ns ns ns 
Dependent Var N (170) (170) (170) 
Total N (1779) (1779) (1779) 
Source: Combined National Social Science Surveys 1993. 
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Table 5.10: Factor Estimates for Parents Cultural Consumption 
Factor I Factor 2 
Attendrng Art Museums 0 68 0.04 
Attending History Museums 0.63 0.06 
Attending Classical Concerts 0 69 -0 00 
Attendrng Theatre 0 64 -0.03 
Attendrng Ballet 0.68 -0.09 
Attendrng Library 0.28 0.37 
Read Pracncal Books -0.09 0 61 
Read Senous Novel or Poetry 0 03 0.70 
Read Science, Mathematics, Techmcal Books -0 06 0.79 
Read History or Biographies -0 00 0.84 
Number of senous and practical books owned 0.16 0.54 
N=l779. 
Notes: Factor estimates are calculated using Maximum Likelihood factoring with Oblique (Harris-Kaiser) rotation. 
Variance explained by Factor one 0.37; Factor two 0.09. 
Kaiser's Sampling Adequacy 0.87 
Correlation between two factors 0.60 
Table 5.11: Factor Estimates for Adolescent Cultural Consumption 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Attendmg Art Museums 0 60 0 06 
Attendmg Classical Concerts 0.65 -0 05 
Attendmg Theatre 0.61 -001 
Attendrng Ballet 0 66 -0.10 
Attendmg History Museums 0.44 0.20 
Read History or Biographies -0.02 0 84 
Read Science, Mathemabcs, Techmcal Books -0 14 o:84 
Read Senous Novel or Poetry Books 0 18 0 59 
Read Pracbcal Books 0 05 0.43 
Number of senous and practical books owned 0 18 0.40 
Attendrng Library 0.26 0.42 
N=l779 
Notes: Factor estimates are calculated using Maximum Likelihood factonng with Obhque (Harris-Kaiser) rotation. 
Vanance explained by Factor one 0.31, Factor two 0 09. 
Kaiser's Sampling Adequacy 0.84. 
Correlation between factors 0.49. 
Source: National Social Science Survey 1993 
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Chapter 6 
'Attitudinal' Aspects of Environmentalism 
The social bases of the 'attitudinal' aspects of environmentalism are examined 
empirically in this chapter. In order to achieve this, three 'attitudinal' measures are 
employed,'an environmental issues scale, a variable measuring feelings toward 
environmentalists, and an approval of environmental groups measure. The aims of 
this chapter are threefold: first, to assess empirically the theoretical claims relating to 
the social location of environmentalism in Australia; second, to evaluate the relative 
explanatory power of competing social base explanations; and finally, to discuss the 
relative impact of social location explanations on different dependent variables. I 
begin with a brief discussion of the relevant dependent and independent variables, and 
the models and analytical techniques that are used. 
The issues and feelings dependent variables are operationalised using 1993 
National Social Science Survey (NSSS) data, while the environmental groups 
approval scales are derived from the 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
(AES). The dependent variables used in this chapter are all ordinal level variables,, 
and as such Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is an appropriate 
multivariate technique (Lewis-Beck 1980). 
The dependent variables are regressed on 'blocks' of independent variables that 
are introduced into the regression equation in a temporal order to measure the impact 
of a) social background, b) adolescent socialisation, c) present social location, and d) 
political orientation on environmentalism. I The social background model variables 
(Model 1) include respondents' fathers social class location when respondents were 
aged 14 (using the Brint class model), father's education in years (NSSS only), and 
parent's cultural consumption at respondent's age 14 (NSSS only). Model 2 adds 
1 The dependent and independent variables are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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respondent's age in years,2 gender, value orientations (lnglehart 4 item battery scale), 
post secondary education, and respondent's cultural consumption at age 14 (NSSS 
only), to the variables in Model 1. Model 3 adds respondent's present social location 
variables, consisting of class location (Brint class model), employment sector, 
residential location (1993 AES and 1993 NSSS only), religious denomination, and 
country of birth (English speaking countries other than Australia) to Model 2. The 
fourth and final model adds political orientation variables: political ideology measured 
on a self identified left-right scale (10 steps: 0-10 for AES only), and political party 
identification variables. 
The relative explanatory strength of the predictor variables may be understood 
by comparing the regression coefficients (b's), sensitive to differences in the metric of 
measurement, and the standardised regression coefficients (betas) for each variable. 
Sheaf coefficients are also calculated, and are used to gauge the impact of a group of 
independent variables on the dependent variable. They provide a means of comparing 
the relative effect of blocks of predictor variables with the effects of other predictor 
variables. Sheaf coefficients are reported in standardised form, as they have no 
natural metric, and can only be meaningfully compared with the standardised 
coefficients of other independent variables (Bean 1991). The percentage of variance 
in the dependent variable explained by the predictor variables (R-square) is also 
reported for each regression model. The R-square statistics provide a measure of how 
much variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variables. 
In other words, they gauge how well the predictor models 'explain' the dependent 
variable. 




Before analysing the social bases of environmentalism using multivariate 
techniques, bivariate analyses are conducted. Mean scores are reported for the 
independent variables on each dependent variables (Table 6.1). The dependent and 
independent variables range between zero and one. The results show that 
respondent's class location is an important indicator of environmentalism. Social and 
cultural professionals and human services professionals, in particular, show higher 
mean scores for all dependent variables. Respondents whose fathers were social and 
cultural or human services professionals also exhibit higher environmentalism scores. 
Another new class indicator - public sector employment - also leads to higher levels of 
environmental support. 
The 'decade' age group results show that respondents older than the 40-49 
group tend to produce mean scores below the sample means. Younger groups 
produce higher mean scores, with teenagers producing by far the ·highest. The 
magnitude of the mean scores tends to decrease with age, although the 20-29 group 
for the 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies (AES) are both marginally lower 
than the 30-39 group. 
Higher education leads to increased support for environmentalism. There is also 
a gender effect, with women returning higher mean scores on all dependent variables 
than men. Postmaterialists are consistently more sympathetic to environmentalism, as 
are those indicating a left political stance, or an 'other' or ALP party affiliation. The 
secular are more environmentally sympathetic than the religious, and those living in 
urban locations score higher on environmental dependent variables than rural 
dwellers. Respondents born in English speaking countries other than Australia also 
score slightly higher on the approval of environmental groups var_iable. 
Overall, the pattern emerging from the bivariate analysis is consistent with the 
findings of previous research. There is a tendency for environmental support to be 
higher among younger, ~ell educated, urban, postmaterialist, leftwing people 
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employed in new class professions. In the following sections, multivariate analysis is 
employed in order to establish the net impact of each of the independent variables on 
the dependent variables. Multivariate analysis provides a means of ascertaining the 
relative importance of each of predictor of environmentalism. 
(Table 6.1 about here) 
Environmental issues 
In this analysis of environmental issues, 'blocks' of independent variables are 
added in a temporal order to represent social background, adolescent socialisation, 
present social location, and political orientation effects (Models 1~4 respectively). The 
results presented in Table 6.2 indicate that the impact of social background effects on 
the environmental issue scale is minimal. The percentage of variance explained in the 
dependent variable is very low (R2=0.005). Father's education, and parent's cultural 
consumption are not significant, while father's class location only produces three 
weak negative effects. Children of technical professionals are three per cent less likely 
than manual workers to support environmental issues. The children of managers and 
those from middle class locations return similar results. 
The percentage of variance explained improves considerably with the addition of 
adolescent socialisation variables (Model 2: R2=0.05).3 The weak effects for father's 
class location remain. In addition, age in years, gender, cultural consumption at age 
14, and years of education all produce statistically significant results. 
The analyses show that younger people are slightly more likely than older 
people to be concerned about environmental issues. The effect of age is modest, 
(0.03 units change for a thirty year age difference), but highly significant (p< 0.001). 
The effect for gender is moderately strong (beta= 0.15). Women score approximately 
five units higher on the environmental issues scale. Respondents who were 
consumers of high culture during adolescence are significantly more likely than non-
3 The parent's and adolescent's cultural consumption variables are highly correlated (r=0.47). In 
order to avoid problems of high multicollinearity the parent's cultural consumption variable is 
removed from the analysis for Models 2-4. 
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consumers to be concerned about environmental issues (b= 0.06). Yet surprisingly, 
education shows no significant results.4 
The third predictive model adds respondents' present social location variables 
(class location, government sector employment, religious affiliation, and country of 
birth), and allows an evaluation to be made of the relative impact of the 'social base' 
explanations of environmentalism. 
Once again, the increased R-square statistic (R2= 0.06) indicates an improved 
model fit, although the magnitude of the regression coefficients for social location 
variables are very modest. New class location is not a significant predictor of 
environmental issue support, with the exception of technical professionals, who are 
slightly less concerned about the environment than manual workers (b= -0.02). 
Managers are also four per cent less likely than manual workers to be concerned about 
the environment. Employment in government sector occupations is not a significant 
predictor. On the other hand, the non-religious are slightly more likely to be 
concerned about the environment than those indicating a religious affiliation (b= 
0.02). 
The fourth model adds political party identification. This variable is an 
important predictor as indicated by a four percentage points increase in the R-square 
statistics (R2= 0.10). 
Support for environmental issues is found among those identifying with 'other' 
political parties (b= 0.09). Australian Labor Party (ALP) partisans are also more 
likely to support environmental issues than supporters of the Coalition (b= 0.06). In 
fact, when the relative magnitude of the standardised regression coefficients and sheaf 
coefficients for all predictor variables are compared, party identification shows the 
largest effect (sheaf= 0.20). The next largest estimates are produced for gender (beta= 
0.15), age (beta= -0.09), and father's and respondent's class location (sheaf= 0.07). 
[Table 6.2 about here] 
4 The weakness of the education effects are not due to the inclusion of cultural consumption at age 
14. When the cultural consumption variable is removed from the regression equation, the estimates 
for the education variables are almost unchanged (see Appendix B Tables XII and XIII). 
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Environmentalist feeling thermometer 
The environmentalist feeling thermometer dependent variable is now regressed 
on the four predictor models (Table 6.3). Although parent's cultural consumption 
does not produce significant results, there are some social background effects present 
in Model 1, namely, father's education and class location which emerge as significant 
although modest predictors of favourable feelings towards environmentalists. Each 
additional year of father's education gives a small increase in the likelihood of 
respondents having favourable attitudes toward environmentalists (b= 0.004). 
Children of fathers from new class locations are more likely than manual workers to 
look favourably upon environmentalists, although the impact of father's class location 
as a whole is modest (sheaf= 0.08). 
When the adolescent socialisation model variables are added (Model 2), the 
social background variables no longer return significant results, with the exception of 
manager fathers (p>0.05). Yet all of the variables added in Model 2 show significant 
effects for environmental feelings, with the exception of respondent's holding 
degrees. The percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the model 
also improves (Model 1: R2= 0.01; Model 2; R2= 0.04). 
A moderate to strong gender effect is apparent. Women score approximately 
five percentage points higher than men on the feelings thermometer measure (beta= 
0.12). The effect of adolescent cultural consumption (beta= 0.08), age (beta= -0.07), 
and value orientations (beta= 0.04) are weaker. 
With the addition of respondent's social location variables in Model 3, a number 
of variables show significant results. Respondent's class location has a significant 
impact upon feelings toward environmentalists. Social and cultural (b= 0.09) and 
human services professionals (b= 0.07) are more likely to have favourable feelings 
toward environmentalists than manual workers. Managers on the other hand are less 
supportive (b= -0.04). Religion is also a significant predictor, with the secular more 
likely than the religious to have positive feelings toward environmentalists (b= 0.05), 
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while people living in large cities and their suburbs are more likely than those in rural 
locations to feel warmly about environmentalists. A comparison of the beta 
coefficients for Model 3 suggest that respondent's class location (sheaf= 0.13) and 
gender (beta= 0.10) produce the largest coefficients, controlling for the impact of all 
other predictor variables. 
The addition of the political party identification variables in Model 4 have a 
minimal impact on the magnitude of other predictor variables. However, the party 
identification variables show strong effects on the environmentalist feeling 
thermometer. With a sheaf coefficient of 0.25, party identification is a far stronger 
predictor of pro-environmentalist feelings than class location (sheaf= 0.12), gender 
(beta= 0.11), religiosity (beta= 0.06) and adolescent cultural consumption (beta= 
0.06). A substantial increase of six percentage points for the R-square statistics from 
0.06 for Model 3, to 0.12 for Model 4, confirms the importance of political party 
identification as a predictor of pro-environmentalist attitudes. 
[Table 6.3 about here] 
Approval of environmental groups 
In this section the social bases of environmentalism are examined using a 
dependent variable that measures the propensity to approve of environmental groups 
(Tables 6.4 to 6.5). The approval question is included in both the 1990 and 1993 
Australian Electoral Studies (AES), allowing comparisons to be made between the 
results of the two surveys. The models are slightly different to those used in the 
analysis of the National Social Science Survey (NSSS), as the cultural consumption 
and father's education questions are not available for the AES. However, the self 
identified political ideology scale is available with the AES so that both political 
ideology and partisanship are included in Model 4. The models also differ slightly 
between the AES surveys, because residential location is unavailable in 1990. 5 
5 Occupations were also coded in a different manner in the Electoral Studies of 1990 and 1993, 
resulting in a slightly different operationalisation of classes (see Chapter 5 for details). 
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The results show that father's class location has little impact on environmental 
group approval in 1990, as only the manager group are significantly less approving 
than respondents whose fathers were manual workers (b= -0.03). In 1993 the effect 
of father's class location is stronger, with the human services and technical 
professionals more approving of environmental groups. Once again managerial 
background shows a similar result, although the magnitude of the effects are small. 
The impact of social background on approval of environmental groups is very weak, 
as it explains only a very low percentage of the variance (1990: R2=0.002; 1993: 
R2=0.007). 
The addition of age, gender, value orientation, and education in Model 2 
increases the percentage of variance explained substantially for both surveys ( 1990: 
R2=0.04; 1993: R2=0.04). Age and value orientations both have a moderate 
influence, with younger, postmaterialists more likely to approve of environmental 
groups. Women score two to three percentage points higher than men on the approval 
measure, and respondents with degrees are more likely than those without a tertiary 
education to approve of environmental groups. On the other hand, diplomates do not 
show a significant difference in support from the non-tertiary educated. 
The addition of the adolescent socialisation variables in Model 2 renders the 
effect of father's new class insignificant for 1993, although a weak effect for fathers 
who were managers is apparent in both surveys. Age has the strongest impact of all 
Model 2 variables for 1990 (beta= -0.16), followed by value orientations (beta= 
0.08), while for 1993 the relative predictive effect of age and value orientation is 
similar (age: beta= -0.11; value orientation: beta= 0.12). The impact of age seems to 
have declined from 1990 to 1993, while the value orientations effect has strengthened. 
It is also interesting to note that moderate sized estimates exist for both age and value 
orientations. 6 
All of the present social location variables introduced in Model 3 return 
significant results on environmental group approval. Class effects are evident, and 
6 The relationship between age and value orientations is discussed in detail below. 
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while the results for the new class differs somewhat between the AES surveys, the 
total impact of class measured by the sheaf coefficients is similar (1990: 0.08; 1993: 
0.09).7 Social and cultural professionals are seven per cent more likely than manual 
workers to approve of environmental groups in 1990. However, in 1993 these 
differences are not apparent, while human services professionals are on average five 
percentage points higher on the approval scale than manual workers. Managers 
exhibit slightly lower levels of approval in both 1990 and 1993. 
As is the case with the issues and feeling thermometer dependent variables 
discussed above, government sector employment produces no statistically significant 
results for approval of environmental groups. However, the no-religion variable is a 
significant correlate of approval for environmental groups (1990: b= 0.05; 1993: b= 
0.03). In 1993 respondents living in urban (b= 0.04) and suburban (b= 0.03) areas 
are also slightly more likely to approve of environmental groups than rural 
respondents, and those born in English speaking countries are slightly more likely to 
approve than those born in Australia or other countries (p>0.05). Country of birth 
has no significant effect in 1990. 
The introduction of the political ideology variables in Model 4 comprises the full 
model. 8 The percentage of variance explained rises quite dramatically with the 
addition of the political ideology and political party identification vari_ables ( 1990: 
R2=0.09; 1993: R2=0.09). It is also important to note that the effects of adolescent 
socialisation and present social location variables remain relatively stable with the 
inclusion of the two political variables. 
Respondents who identify themselves as ideologically 'left', are more likely to 
approve of environmental groups than 'right' identifiers. This result holds for both 
surveys, although the effect of political ideology is slightly weaker in 1993 (1990: 
b=0.08; 1993: b=0.06). Party identification also proves to be an important predictor 
7 The differences in the level of new class support for 1990 and 1993 may to some extent reflect the 
slightly different manner in which classes are coded (see Chapter 5). 
8 Self-identified political orientation and political party identification are not highly correlated (AES 
1990: r= 0.29; AES 1993: r= 0.31), so high multicollinearity is not a problem when these variables 
are both included as predictors in regression models. 
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of environmental group approval for both surveys, with 'other' party (1990: b=0.12; 
1993 b=0.11) and ALP supporters (1990: b=0.08; 1993 b=0.08) significantly more 
likely to approve of environmental groups than supporters of the Coalition parties. It 
is interesting that the impact of some social location variables - age, gender, value 
orientations - decrease with the addition of the political ideology variables in Model 4, 
while new class effects increase slightly. 
A comparison of the standardised regression coefficients for each predictor 
variable or group of variables provides a method of ascertaining their relative 
explanatory power. The strongest influence on environmental group approval for 
both surveys is political party identification (1990: sheaf= 0.19; 1993: sheaf= 0.18). 
Age is the next most important effect in 1990 (beta= -0.11), while respondent's class 
location (sheaf= 0.08) is stronger than political ideology (beta= 0.07), and value 
orientation (beta= 0.07). In 1993 value orientation (beta= 0.10) and age (beta= -0.09) 
rank next to party identification in magnitude, followed by social class location 
(sheaf= 0.08). 
[Tables 6.4 and 6.5 about here] 
The analyses so far show that most social base variables are relatively poor 
predictors of environmental support, especially when compared with non-social base 
effects such as political partisanship. There are also some surprises when the relative 
impact of social base variables are considered. The impact of class location is weaker 
than both gender and age for the issues variable. It is also less important than age as 
an indicator of environmental group approval. Only on the feeling thermometer does 
class emerge as marginally more important than age, a somewhat surprising result in 
view of the plethora of theories advocating that environmental support stems from the 
new class. Given the importance of age, at least its relative importance in relation to 
other social base effects, its impact on environmental support is examined in greater 
detail in the next section. 
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Generation and cohort effects 
Age, generations and cohorts figure prominently in discussions of 
environmentalism. As discussed in Chapter 3, support for environmentalism is often 
higher among young people. These claims find some support in the analyses above, 
with age proving to be a relatively important predictor of environmental issues and 
approval compared with other social location variables. 
In this section I employ a number of generation and cohort models to explore the 
age base further. Estimates for 'attitudinal' measures of environmentalism regressed 
upon the generation, cohort and age models are shown in Table 6.6. The models 
control for the impact of all other 'social base' variables (ie. Model 3: 
background+adolescent socialisation+social location).9 
It is apparent that the two postwar generations ('generation X' and 'baby 
boomers') are more likely to be concerned about environmental issues and to approve 
of environmental groups than the generation born before World War II. However, the 
differences between the estimates for the two postwar generations are minimal. This 
suggests that the major differences in age based environmental support is between not 
three, but two generations - pre and postwar.10 
The same dependent variables regressed upon the 'fifteen year' cohorts show a 
somewhat different picture of environmental support. Again there is little difference in 
the size of the regression coefficients. However, with the exception of cohorts 2 and 
3 that produce similar estimates, the results show a steady decline in support with age 
on the issues and approval scales. I I 
The 'ten year' cohort model illustrates the nature of age based support for these 
two dependent variables in more detail. It shows that environmental support is high 
9 The age effect was much weaker for the environmentalist feeling thermometer dependent variable. 
Therefore, further analysis of this dependent variable with generation and cohort models was not 
conducted. 
IO This possibility is examined further in Chapter 7. 
11 The '15 year' cohorts are based upon those who were: I8-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-69, and 70 plus in 
1990. The same birth years are carried through to 1993, so that the cohorts are comparable. Cohort I 
represents those who were 18-20 (born 1973-75) in 1993, and therefore too young to be included in 
the 1990 electoral studies. The same logic applies to Cohort 1 for the '10 year' cohort model. 
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for Cohort 1, steady for Cohorts 2 and 3, and then declines for Cohort 4 (born after 
the end of World War II). A slight decline in the strength of the age effects is also 
evident across the samples for approval of environmental groups, among Cohorts 2-3 
for the '15 year' model, and for Cohorts 2-4 with the '10 year' model. This may 
indicate that environmental support declines as people age. However, the changes in 
the magnitude of the estimates are very slight, and for Cohort 5, for both cohort 
models, the age effect actually increases from 1990 to 1993. Further, there are only 
three years separating the two AES surveys. An extended series of survey data is 
necessary to establish the existence of a clear trend. 
The 'decade' model uses age groups (groups with the same age range for each 
survey) rather than cohorts (those with the same birth years across the surveys). It 
includes teenage respondents as a separate category, and provides for a somewhat 
different operationalisation of age for the two Australian Electoral Studies. Teenagers 
return by far the largest regression coefficients for approval of environmental 
groups.12 Age based support then drops dramatically, but remains stable for the 20-
29 and 30-39 groups (although it is slightly stronger among the 30-39 group in 1990). 
Support then decreases again suddenly among the 40-49 and older categories. The 
issues variable regressed upon the 'decade' groups shows a more.steady decline in 
age based support. 
Apart from modest differences between the pre and postwar generations, the 
results tend to suggest that support for environmentalism declines with age (in line 
with a life cycle interpretation), rather than changes abruptly from one generation (or 
cohort) to the next. Nevertheless, these are tentative conclusions. A definitive answer 
to the life cycle versus generational controversy requires longitudinal research. 
[Table 6.6 about here] 
12 There were no teenage respondents in ihe 1993 NSSS, the youngest respondents were aged 22 
years. It should also be noted that there are very few teenagers in either AES survey (1990 n=l9; 
1993 n=26) so the reliability of the results for the teenage cohorts are questionable. 
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Discussion 
I now specifically address the questions posed at the beginn_ing of the chapter: 
What are the social bases of environmentalism? What is the relative explanatory 
impact of 'social base' explanations on environmentalism? Does the explanatory 
power of social base explanations differ according to different aspects of 
environmentalism? 
In order to address these questions, the impact of the independent variables o~ 
the three dependent variables are rank ordered, and summarised in Table 6.7.13 The 
strength of the effects of independent variables in regression equations involving 
different dependent variables are not directly comparable. However, it is possible to 
discuss the relative strength of predictor effects by comparing the rank order of the 
standardised regression coefficients and sheaf coefficients on each dependent variable. 
[Table 6~ 7 about here] 
It is perhaps appropriate to begin this discussion by examining the impact of 
class location. Although there is some variation across the dependent variables, 
respondent's class location ranks consistently high as a predictor of environmentalism 
compared to other 'social base' variables. It ranks second on the environmentalist 
feeling thermometer, third on the approval scale for 1990 and fourth for the 1993 
approval and environmental issues scales. Father's class location has a rather 
moderate impact upon the feeling thermometer and environmental issues scale, 
although it does have an indirect effect upon environmental support as seen above. 
However, it must be stressed at the outset that class is only important relative to other 
social location effects. In general, the impact of (new) class location is very weak. 
Some suggest that the political impact of social class in advanced Western 
societies is low. The results presented above support this contention, although they 
indicate that class location has some impact upon support for environmental new 
13 Rank ordering is conducted by comparing the magnitude of the standardised regression coefficients 
and sheaf coefficients for each independent variable (or group of variables) on the dependent variables. 
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politics. Location in the so called 'new class', especially among the social and cultural 
and human services categories produces the largest class effects on environmental 
dependent variables, lending some support to the hypotheses of a number of new 
class theorists (for example, Parkin 1968, Gouldner 1979, Kristol 1975, 1978). 
Other versions of new class theory are not supported by the results. 
Government sector employment - another element of new class location - is a very 
poor predictor of environmentalism. It does not have a significant impact on any 
dependent variable. This suggests that there is little support in the Australian case for 
theories that link new class membership with public sector employment (for example, 
Parkin 1968, Kristol 1975, 1978, Offe 1985, McAdams 1987, Mattausch 1989). 
The rank order results suggest that respondent's age is approximately equal in 
magnitude to class location as an explanator of the 'attitudinal' dependent variables. 
Age ranks second and third as a predictor of the environmental group approval scales, 
and third on the environmental issues scale, although it is a relatively less important 
predictor for the feeling thermometer. Overall, however, the impact of age as a 
predictor of environmental support is only moderate. There is also little evidence to 
suggest that environmental support is strongly differentiated according to generations. 
However, some generational effects are detected. The post World War II generation, 
for example, is more supportive of environmentalism than the pre war generation. 
Although the impact of age is only moderate, it is interestin~ for another reason. 
Age results persist, even controlling for the impact of social background, adolescent 
socialisation, social location and political ideology. Younger people are more likely to 
support environmentalism for reasons other than that they are more postmaterialist, 
leftwing and more highly educated than their older counterparts. One possible 
explanation for this is the recent increase in environmental coverage in the media and 
education curricula. These changes may affect lifestyle choices, as young people are 
socialised to place greater value on the environment than their predecessors. Another 
possibility is that some type of life cycle effect is occurring. Due to increased apathy 
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or cynicism, people may become less concerned about idealistic issues such as the 
environment as they age. 
Value orientation has a moderate effect on approval for environmental groups, 
especially in 1993, but has little impact of the environmentalist feeling thermometer 
and environmental issues scales. In general, Inglehart' s claims regarding 
postmaterialist support for environmentalism are supported, but the impact of value 
orientations are weaker than might be expected. 
Gender has a relatively strong effect on the environmental issues scale and 
environmentalist feeling thermometer, although it is weaker for the approval variables. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of these results, women are consistently more supportive 
of environmentalism than men. The remaining 'social base' variables produce weaker 
and/or inconsistent effects on all dependent variables. The impact of education is 
notably weak. The lack of strong educational effects suggest that (achieved) status is 
not an important predictor of environmentalism. Further, the education results do not 
confirm the prime position attributed to higher education by theorists such as 
Eckersley (1989) and Rootes (1995). To ari extent the effect of education is controlled 
for by other social location effects, such as class and age. Yet the bivariate results 
show that level of education does not differentiate environmental support to a large 
extent. A more sensitive measure of education might reveal greater differences, 
although perhaps the weak education results reflect an increased awareness and 
appreciation of environmental concerns across the social spectrum. 
Partisanship exerts the strongest effect on environmental support. It shows by 
far the largest (sheaf) effects for all dependent variables. The partisanship effects are 
also stable for both 1990 and 1993, which does not support the contention that 'the 
environment' was a more highly politicised issue during the 1990 federal election. It 
seems that attitudes relating to the environment are more closely linked with the 
'political' than the 'social'. On the other hand, political orientation is a relatively poor 
indicator of environmental support, and its impact decreases slightly from 1990 to 
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1993. This may reflect a decline in the utility of the left-right cleavage for explaining 
'attitudinal' aspects of environmentalism, at least in the Australian case. 
Perhaps the most important and consistent finding is that social location explains 
only a small percentage of the variance on all three 'attitudinal' dependent variables. 
The weak social location effects indicate that environmentalism may have become a 
'mainstream' political issue. Indeed, recent surveys and public opinion polls seem to 
confirm this. Yet while attitudes toward the environment are weakly located socially 
due to their 'mainstream' nature, it does not necessarily follow that the social base of 
environmental activism should exhibit a similar pattern. In order to examine the 
pattern of support for 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism, I analyse 
environmental group membership, potenti~ membership, and participation in 
environmental demonstrations in the next chapter. 
155 
Table 6.1: Mean Scores for Independent Variables by Dependent Variables 
Environmental Environment N Environmental N Environmental N 
lst Issues Scale -allst Feeling Group Group 
Thermometer Approval Approval 
1993 1993 1990 1993 
(NSSS) (NSSS) (AES) (AES) 
Father's Class 
Social and Cultural .67 .63 (42) .75 (55) 78 (42) 
Human Services 68 .51 (38) .74 (43) .77 (128) 
Technical .67 .58 (150) .74 (96) .78 (168) 
Managers .66 .51 (432) 70 (492) .70 (664) 
Middle Class .67 .53 (279) 75 (226) .74 (286) 
Workers 69 .54 (686) . 73 (985) • .73 (1314) 
Respondents Class 
Social and Cultural .71 .63 (65) 80 (60) .82 (62) 
Human Services .71 63 (181) .75 (156) .80 (278) 
Techmcal .66 54 (171) .75 (148) 75 (202) 
Managers .63 .47 (187) .67 (230) 68 (341) 
Middle Class .69 .55 (470) .74 (583) .73 (816) 
Workers .68 .52 (380) .71 (597) .72 (844) 
'Decades' 
18-19 .84 (19) .86 (26) 
20-29 .71 .59 (168) .76 (330) .76 (297) 
30-39 .70 .57 (349) .77 (463) .78 (518) 
40-49 69 .54 (421) .73 (410) .74 (638) 
50-59 .66 .51 (313) 69 (286) .72 (521) 
60-69 .66 .52 (282) .67 (296) 70 (513) 
70 plus .65 .52 (213) .66 (191) .67 (396) 
Post Secondary Education 
Degree .68 .57 (309) .78 (207) 78 (381) 
Diploma .69 .58 (141) .74 (201) 75 (245) 
Other 72 (575) .74 (982) 
None .68 .53 (1304) .71 (961) 71 (1281) 
Gender 
Male 66 .51 (909) 71 (984) 72 (1451) 
Female .71 57 (866) .74 (1034) .74 (1515) 
Value Orientations 
Postmatenalist .70 .59 (229) 79 (258) .80 (419) 
Materiahst .67 53 (260) .70 (508) .69 (629) 
Mixed .68 .53 (955) 73 (1213) .72 (1959) 
Employment Sector 
Public .69 56 (450) 74 (509) .74 (800) 
Other .66 51 (707) 72 (1279) .72 (1709) 
Residential Location 
Urban .70 56 (203) 75 (996) 
Suburban .68 55 (1236) 74 (797) 
Rural .68 .50 (324) .70 (1213) 
Religious Denomination 
No Religion .70 59 (412) .79 (259) .77 (428) 
Rehg1on .67 52 (1125) 71 (1723) .72 (2521) 
Country of Birth 
Eng!Jsh Speaking Countries .74 (194) 75 (341) 
Australia, NZ and Others 72 (1818) .73 (2633) 
Political Ideology 
Left .82 (281) 79 (448) 
Centre .73 (893) .73 (1265) 
Right 69 (613) 69 (803) 
Political Party Identification 
Coaht1on .64 .47 (733) 66 (818) 67 (1250) 
Other .75 .65 (89) 83 (145) .82 (89) 
ALP .71 60 (778) .77 (914) .78 (1301) 
Dependent Means .68 .54 (1779) .72 (2037) .73 (2388) 
Notes: For NSSS, Diploma category represents some tertiary education, while other post secondary education, country of birth and 
political ideology are not av81lable The youngest respondents in the NSSS are aged 22. Residential location 1s not available for the 
1990 AES 1993 AES mean scores are calculated usmg weighted data (n=2388). Weighted 'N's are not reported as they are not 
produced by the SAS proc means procedure. Political ideology 1s coded· Left= 1-4, Centre = 5-6, Right= 7-10. 
Sources: 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies; 1993 National Social Science Survey 
156 
Table 6.2: OLS Regression Estimates for Predictors of Environmental Issues Scale 
(NSSS 1993). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.67 0.70 0.70 0 66 
Social Background 
Father's Education 0 001 0.001 0.00 0.00 
(0.04) (0.02) (001) (0.01) 
Father's Class (Sheaf) 0.09 0 09 0.09 0.07 
Social -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Human Sernces -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
Technical -0.03* -0.03** -0 03** -0.03** 
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Manager -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.02* 
(-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.05) 
Middle Class -0.03** -0.03** -0.02** -0.02** 
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.05) 
Parents Culture 0.01 
(0.01) 
Adolescent Socialisation 
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.09) 
Female o.o5••• 0.04*** o.o5•*• 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Value Orientation 0.03 0.02 0.02 
(0.04) (004) (0.04) 
Culture (at age 14) 0.'06** 0.06** 0.05** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Education (Sheaf) 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Degree -0.01 -0.02* -0.02* 
(-0.03) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Some Ternary 0.01 0.00 0.00 
(0 01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Present Social Location 
Class (sheaf) 0.10 0.07 
Social & Cultural 0 02 0.02 
(0 03) (0 03) 
Human Sernces 0 01 0.01 
(0.02) (0 03) 





Middle Class -0 01 
-0 01 
(-0 04) (-0.02) 
Government Sector 0.01 0.00 
(0.04) (0.01) 
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No Rehg1on 0 02•• 
(0 06) 
0 01 * 
(0 04) 
Party ID (SheaO 0.20 




R2 (adjusted for df) 0.005 0.05 0.06 0.10 
n 
Notes: 
(1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) 
• <0.1 •• P<0.05 ••• P<0.001. Regression coefficients (b's) are reported with standardised coefficients (betas) shown in 
parenthesis. Dependent Variable 1s environmental issues scale (see research design chapter) 
Class: Technical Professionals: Na111ral scientists, engmeers, surveyors, compuung professionals, miscellaneous 
professionals (excluding libranans) mathematicians, statisticians and actuaries, other professionals, econo1D1sts, accountants, 
public relations officers, other business professionals, technical officers (medical science, engmeering, and air and sea 
transport), Social & Cul111ral Professionals. Medical practitioners and lawyers, university and CAE teachers, Artists and related 
professionals, educauon researchers, other social scienusts, architects, mm1sters of religion; Human Services Professionals: 
Health Diagnosis and Treatment (excludmg medical pracutioners), teachers, social workers, hbranans, counsellors, nurses, 
psychologists; Middle Class: Clerks, Sales & Personal Service Workers, Police, Miscellaneous para-professionals; Workmg 
class (reference category): Trades, Plant and Machine Operators, and Drivers; Labourers and Related Workers 
Value Orientation· O=matenalist; 0.5=mixed, l=postmaterialist. Scale for Cultural Consumption at age 14 (see Chapter 5). 
Party ldenufication dummy vanables: Liberal + Nabonal parties=CoahtJon (reference group), Australian Democrat, Green, 
Other=Other parties; Australian Labor Party=ALP. 
Source: 1993 National Social Science Survey 
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Table 6.3: OLS Regression Estimates for Predictors of Environmentalist Feeling 









































































Model 3 Model 4 
0.46 0.39 
0.001 • 0 00 
(002) (0 02) 
0 07 0 06 
0.03 0.04 
(0 02) (0.02) 
-0.07* -0 05 
(-0 04) (-0.03) 
0.02 -0 03 
(003) (-0.04) 
-0.02 -0 00 




(-0 06) (-0.04) 





(0.07) (0 06) 
0.04 0.04 
-0 01 -0.01 
(-0 02) (-0 02) 
0 03 0.03 
(0 03) (0 03) 
0.13 0 12 
0.09** 0 09•• 
(0 07) (007) 
0 01•• 0·08**• 
(0.09) (0 I I) 
0 OJ 0 02 
(0 01) (0 03) 
-0 04•• 
-0 OJ 
(-0 05) (-0 02) 
0 00 0 02 
(000) (0 03) 
0 00 -0 02 
(0 00) (-0.03) 





Party ID (Sheaf) 
Other Parties 
ALP 
R2 (Adjusted for df) 0.01 0 04 
























Notes: * <0.1 ** P<O 05 *** P<0.001. Regression coefficients (b's) are reponed with standardised coefficients (betas) shown in 
parenthesis. Dependent Variable is Environmentalist Feehng Thermometer, recoded to range .0-1. 
For details of independent variables see Table 6.2 and Chapter 5. 
Source: 1993 National Social Science Survey 
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Table 6.4: OLS Regression Estimates for Predictors of Environmental Group Approval 
(AES 1990). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.72 0.78 0 77 0 66 
Social Background 
Father's Class (Sheaf) 0.07 0 05 0.05 0.03 
Social 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
(002) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.00) 
Human Services 0.01 -0.01 -0 00 0.02 
(0.01) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.01) 
Technical 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (-0.00) (-0 00) (-0.01) 
Manager -0 03** -0.03** -0.02* -0.00 
(-005) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.01) 
Middle Class 0.02 0.01 0 01 0 01 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0 02) 
Adolescent Socialisation 
Age -0.002••• -0.002••• -0.002••• 
(-0.16) (-0 15) (-0 11) 
Female 0.02•• 0.02** 0.02 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Value Orientation 0.01••• 0.06*** 0.05•• 
(0.08) (0 08) (0.07) 
Education (Sheaf) 0.06 0.03 0 03 
Degree 0.06** 0.02 0.02 
(0.06) (0 03) (0 02) 
Diploma 0 02 0.01 0 02 
(002) (0 01) (0.02) 
Present Social Location 
Class (Sheaf) 0.08 0.08 
Social 0 01•• 0.07* 
(0.05) (0 05) 
Human 0 02 0.03 
(0 02) (0 03) 
Technical 0 02 - 0 04* 
(0.02) (0.04) 
Manager -0.03* -0.01 
(-0.04) (-0.01) 
Middle Class 0.02 0 03* 
(0 04) (0.05) 
Government Sector 0 00 -0 01 
(0 00) (-0 02) 
No Rehgion o 05••• 0 04** 
(0.07) (0 05) 
ESC 0 03 0 02 
(0 03) (0 02) 
Political Orientation 
Poht1cal Ideology o 03•• 
(0 07) 
Party ID (Sheaf) 0.19 
Other Party 0 12*** 
(0 13) 
Labor o 03••• 
(0.17) 
R 2 (Adjusted for df) 0 002 0.04 0 05 0 09 
n (2037) (2037) (2037) (2037) 
Notes· • <0.1 ** P<0.05 *** P<O 001 
Regression coefficients (b's) are reported with standardised coefficients (betas) shown m parenthesis Dependent variable 1s 
approval of environmental groups scale O=strongly disapprove; 0.25=disapprove; 0 5=ne1ther; 0.75=approve; !=strongly 
approve. 
For details of independent variables see Table 6.2 and Chapter 5. · 
ESC: English speaking country of binh. Poliucal ideology 1s coded in ten steps from O=far nght to !=far left; 
Source: 1990 Australian Electoral Study 
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Table 6.5: OLS Regression Estimates for Predictors of Environmental Group Approval 
(AES 1993). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.73 0.75 0 73 0 64 
Social Background 
Father's Class (Sheaf) 0.08 0.05 0 04 0 03 
Social 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 
(0 03) (0 01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Human Services 0.04* 0 02 0.02 0.02 
(0.03) (0.02) (0 02) (0 02) 
Techmcal 0.05 .. 0.02 0.01 0.02 
(0.05) (0.02) (0 01) (0.02) 
Manager -0.03** -0.02** -0.01 -0.00 
(-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.00) 
Middle Class 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0 01 
(0.01) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.01) 
Adolescent Socialisation 
Age -0 002*** -0.002••• -0.001 ••• 
(-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.09) 
Female 0 03•• 0.02•• 0.02•• 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Value Onentation 0 10••• 0 09••• 0 08*** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) 
Education (Sheaf) 0.06 0.02 0.01 
Degree 0,04** 0.01 • 0 01 
(0.06) (0 02) (0 02) 
Diploma 0.02 -0 00 0 00 
(0 02) (-0 00) (0.00) 
Present Social Location 
Class (Sheaf) 0.09 0.08 
Social 0 04 0 05 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Human 0 05** 0 06** 
(0 06) (0.07) 
Techmcal 0.00 0.01 
(0.00) (0 02) 
Manager -0 03** -0.01 
(-005) (-0.01) 
Middle Class -0 00 0 00 
(-0 01) (0.00) 
Government Sector 0 01 
-0 00 
(0 02) (-0 01) 
Residence (Sheaf) 0.08 0.08 
Urban 0.04*** 0.04*** (009) (0.09) 
Suburban 0 03** 0.03** 
(0.05) (0 06) 
No Religion 0 03** 0.02 
(0.04) (0 02) 
ESC 0 02• 0.02 
(0.03) (0 02) 
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Table 6.5 continued. 
Political Orientation 
Political Ideology 
Party ID (Sheaf) 
Other Party 
Labor 














0 06 0.09 
(2388) (2388) 
Regression coefficients (b's) are reponed with standardised coefficients (betas) shown in parenthesis. Dependent variable 1s 
approval of environmental groups scale O=strongly disapprove; 0.25=disapprove; 0.5=neither; 0.75=approve; !=strongly 
approve. 
For details of mdependent variables see Table 6 2 and Chapter 5. 
ESC: English speaking country of binh. Political ideology 1s coded in ten steps from O=far right to !=far left; 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
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Table 6.6: OLS Regression Estimates for Age Effects on Environmental Issues, and 
Approval or Environmental Groups, Controlling for Social Background, Adolescent 
Socialisation and Present Social Location. 
Approval 1990 Approval 1993 Issues 1993 
Generation Model 
Generation X (1960 +) 0 01••• 0 06••• o 05••• 
(0 12) (0.10) (0 11) 
Baby Boomers (1946-59) 0.01••• 0 04••• 0 04••• 
(0 14) (0.08) (0.11) 
Pre World War II (1900-45 reference) 
'15 Year' Cohort Model 
Cohort I (1973-75) 0.13••• n/a 
(0.07) 
Cohort 2 (1966-72) 0.08••• 0.01••• 0.04** 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 
Cohort 3 (1951-65) 0.08*** 0.01••• 0 04•• 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.12) 
Cohort 4 (1936-50) 0.04** o.o5••• 0 01 
(0.08) (0.10) (0 03) 
Cohort 5 (1921-35) -0.01 0.01 0 01 
(0.99) (0.02) (0.01) 
Cohort 6 (1900-20 reference) 
'10 Year' Cohort Model 
Cohort I (1973-75) 0.12••• n/a 
(0.07) 
Cohort 2 (1966-72) 0.08*** 0.06*** o 05•• 
(0.09) (0 08) (0 07) 
Cohort 3 (1956-65) 0 08*** 0 08*** 0 06*** 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
Cohort 4 (1946-55) 0.06••• o.o5••• 0 03** 
(0 10) (0 09) (0 09) 
Cohort 5 (1936-45) 0.03 004** 0.01 
(0.04) (0 06) (0 02) 
Cohort 6 (1926-35) -0 03 0 00 0.02 
(0 97) (0.01) (0.04) 
Cohort 7 (1900-25 reference) 
'Decade' Model 
Aged (18-19) 0.15•• 0 18*** n/a (0.06) (0.07) 
Aged (20-29) 0.07*** 0.08••• 0 07*** 
(0.11) (0 10) (0.13) 
Aged (30-39) 0 09*** 0.08••• o 05••• 
(0.15) (0 13) (0 13) 
Aged (40-49) o.o5•• 0 06*** 0.03** 
(0 08) (0.10) (0.09) 
Aged (50-59) 0 01 0 04** 0 01 (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) 
Aged (60-69) -0.00 0 02 0.01 (I 00) (0.04) (0 03) 
Aged (7o+ reference) 
n (2037) (2388) (1779) 
Notes: Estimates control for all predictor variables m Model 3, for each dependent vanable 
n/a signifies not available (in the NSSS age ranges from 22 to 93). 
Regression coefficients (b's) are reported with standardised coefficients (betas) shown in parenthesis. 
For details of independent vanables see Chapter 5. 
Sources: 1990 & 1993 Australian Electoral Studies; 1993 National Social Science-Survey. 
164 
Table 6.7: Rank Ordering of Importance of Environmental Predictor Variables by 
Dependent Variables 










Consumption age 14 
Residence 
No Religion 























Environmentalist Environmental Environmental 
Feeling Group Approval Group Approval 
Thermometer Scale Scale 
NSSS AES AES 
1993 1990 1993 
4 6 6 
8 n/a n/a 
2 3 4 
7 7 8 
6 6 8 
6 2 3 
3 6 5 
4 n/a n/a 
5 n/a 4 
4 5 7 
n/a 7 7 
7 4 2 
n/a 4 5 
1 1 1 
Note: Rank order is established by the magnitude of standardised regression coefficients and sheaf 




'Behavioural' Aspects of Environmentalism 
In this chapter, the social bases of 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism are 
empirically examined. The aims here are similar to those in Chapter 6 - to assess the 
impact of social location on environmental activism in Australia, to establish the 
relative explanatory value of competing explanations outlined in Chapters 2 to 4, and 
to examine whether the explanatory value of social location on 'the behavioural' 
aspects of environmentalism, differs from the 'attitudinal' aspects discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
Environmentalism is analysed here using the three 'behavioural' dependent 
variables which comprise: potential membership of environmental groups (AES 
only);l environmental group membership; and participation in environmental 
demonstrations in the past five years (NSSS only). These three dependent variables 
also measure different levels of commitment to environmentalism, ranging from low 
(potential membership of environmental groups) to high (participation in 
environmental protests). 
The same four empirical models employed in Chapter 6 are again used here. 
However, in this chapter logistic regression is employed rather than ordinary least 
squares methods, since the dependent variables are dichotomous (Aldrich and Nelson 
1984). The first three models are designed to evaluate social base explanations of 
environmentalism. These models include variables that measure phenomena that are 
causally prior to behaviour linked to environmental groups. The fourth model 
includes variables that are not unambiguously prior to joining environmental groups, 
1 Potential members are derived from response b) to the AES question 'How likely are you to join a 
group campaigning to protect the environment?' Response categories: a) I am already a member; b) 
Not a member, but have considered joining; c) Not a member and have not considered joining; d) 
Would never consider joining. Environmental group members are removed from the analysis of 
potential members. 
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or participating in environmental demonstrations. However, it is argued in Chapter 5 
that they are prior. 
The relative importance of predictor variables are calculated in two ways. First, 
multivariate analysis shows the net effect for each independent variable on the 
dependent variables. The independent variables producing the largest effects on the 
dependent variable may be deemed to have the greatest explanatory impact (in this case 
measured in terms of logistic regression estimates, odds ratios, and percentage 
differences at the grand mean).2 Second, I remove the independent variables from 
the regression equation and examine the change in model fit (Jones and McAllister 
1989:11): In order to achieve this: L square statistics are calculated for the full 
explanatory model,3 and for the full model less each independent variable, or block of 
independent variables. The resulting statistic is a measure of the eontribution of each 
independent variable, or block of independent variables to the fit of the model. 
Results 
Before examining the multivariate results, bivariate results are presented for the 
membership and participation in demonstration variables (Tables 7.1 and 7.2).4 The 
bivariate results reveal several social location effects. New class location appears to 
be an important determinant of environmental group support. Nineteen per cent of 
social and cultural specialists and eleven per cent of technical professionals are 
members of environmental groups, compared to 4.5 per cent of the total sample ( 1993 
AES). Those employed in new class professions also appear more likely to have 
considered joining an environmental group (potential members). Similar results 
emerge for the National Social Science Survey (NSSS), with new classes (social and 
cultural, human services and technical professionals) showing strong links with 
2 Odds ratios are calculated by taking the exponential of the logistic estimate. Percentage differences 
at the grand mean of the dependent variable are interpretable in a similar manner to OLS regression 
estimates. 
3 L-square distributions approximate chi square values when the sample is large. 
4 1990 AES bivariate results are shown in Appendix B, Table I 
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environmental groups. Father's new class location is also an important correlate of 
membership, with technical professional backgrounds particularly prominent. 
Another aspect of new class location - public sector employment - returns mixed 
results. The NSSS results show that the publicly employed are over represented 
among members and demonstrators, although this is not the case for the AES. 
However, potential members are slightly more likely to be employed in the public 
sector. 
Support for environmental groups gradually decreases with age. The only 
'glitch' in this pattern appears with the AES results where the percentage of members 
in the 20-29 age-group is lower than that for the 30-39, 40-49 and 50-59 groups. 
Those in their thirties, forties, and surprisingly seventies and over are most likely to 
participate in environmental demonstrations. 
The bivariate results show that those with higher education are overrepresented 
among the members of environmental groups, with support declining with level of 
education. Those with a degree (bachelor or higher degree) are more than twice as 
likely as the sample average to join an environmental group (AES), and are also 
overrepresented among potential members. There is little difference in gender support 
for environmental groups. Women are slightly over represented among members for 
the AES, although the opposite is true with the NSSS. However: women are more 
likely to be potential members, and much more likely to be involved in environmental 
demonstrations. Postmaterialists are overrepresented among members and potential 
members of environmental groups, and they are also much more likely to be involved 
in environmental protests. 
Other social location effects also impact upon environmental group membership 
and participation_ il!- demonstrations. Those who are not aligned with a religious 
denomination are overrepresented among members; for the AES by more than twice 
the sample average. Residential location returns contradictory results for the two 
samples. Members are more likely to be suburban' based for the AES, while rural and 
urban dwellers are overrepresented among membership of environmental groups in 
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the NSSS.5 Demonstrators are less likely to live in urban locations. Environmental 
group members are slightly more likely to be born in English speaking countries other 
than Australia. 6 
Political ideology also impacts upon environmental support. Respondents who 
place themselves on the ideological 'left' are over represented among environmental 
groups, while those on the 'right' are far less likely to be environmentally active. 
People who identify with 'other parties' (ie. Australian Democrats, Greens, and 
others) are overrepresented among members, potential members and demonstrators. 
ALP supporters are also more likely than the sample average to participate in 
demonstrations. 
The bivariate analyses indicate that social location has an impact upon 
environmental activism. However, it is not apparent from the bivariate analyses how 
much of this impact is due to inter correlations between the independent variables. In 
order to control for this, and to more rigorously assess the impact-of social location on 
the 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism, multivariate techniques are employed 
in the sections that follow. 
[Tables 7.1and7.2 about here] 
The multivariate results are discussed by dependent variables in an order 
representing different levels of commitment to environmentalism. The analysis 
commences with potential membership (a relatively low level of commitment), moves 
on to membership (a high level of commitment), and finally participation in 
demonstrations (the highest level of commitment). The estimates for predictor 
variables are net effects - those that remain after controlling for all_ predictor variables 
in each regression model. 
5 Different question wording for the membership questions between the AES and NSSS may 
contribute to differences in membership support bases (see Chapter 5). 
6 The merged NSSS data does not have a suitable country of birth question. 
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Environmental groups - potential members 
The results of analyses of potential environmental group membership are 
presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. The regression models do not include actual 
members, hence the smaller 'n's. Model 1 for 1990 and 1993 indicates that social 
background has a relatively strong impact upon potential environmental group 
membership. Respondents whose fathers were social and cultural professionals or 
technical professionals, are significantly more likely than those from working class 
backgrounds to have considered joining environmental groups in 1990 and 1993. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in 1990, respondents whose fathers were employed in a 
social and cultural profession are twenty three per cent more likely than children of 
manual workers to have considered joining an environmental group. 
In Model 2, respondent's age in years, gender, value orientations and education 
are added as predictor variables. The effect of social background is somewhat 
diminished, controlling for the impact of the variables added in Model 2, but remains 
significant for respondents whose fathers were employed in social and cultural, or 
technical professions. Age emerges as an important indicator of potential 
membership. The difference in age-based support may be illustrated by calculating the 
likelihood that two hypothetical respondents would consider joining an environmental 
group. Expressed in this way, a sixty year old person would be approximately two 
and a half times less likely than a thirty year old to have considered joining an 
environmental group in 1990, but approximately four and a half times less likely to 
have considered joining in 1993.7 
Women are approximately four percentage points more likely than men to have 
_____ consi~e~e_d j~i~g_ ip. 19_99,_ ~!hough in_ 1_923 ther~ are 110 st~tistj~ally ~ignificoot_ 
differences for gender. Value orientation is an important predictor of potential 
environmental group membership for both surveys. At the mean of the dependent 
7 The estimations for 1990 are based upon the following calculations. Where the logistic estimate 
for age in 1990 is -0.03, the difference between a 60 year old and a 30 year old is exponential ((60* 
-0.03)-(30* -0.03))= a probability of 0.41. 1/0.41= 2.46 or almost two and a half times less likely to 
have considered joining. 
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variable, postmaterialists are over twenty six per cent more likely than materialists to 
have considered joining in 1990. The impact of postmaterialist values is also of a 
similar magnitude in 1993. In fact value orientation proves to be the strongest 
predictor of potential membership for both Australian Electoral Surveys. 
Tertiary education has a moderate impact upon potential group membership. 
Respondents with degrees are seventeen percentage points more likely than those 
without tertiary qualifications to have considered joining an environmental group in 
1990, and approximately sixteen percentage points more likely to join in 1993. In 
both surveys, diplomates are also likely than those without a tertiary education to be 
potential members. 
The results for Model 3 show that new class location is a moderate predictor of 
potential environmental group membership. Respondents employed in human 
services professions are more than eleven per cent more likely than working class 
respondents to be potential members in 1990. 8 There is also a weak effect for middle 
class location in 1990, but no significant respondent class effects for 1993. Another 
indicator of new class location, government sector employment, engenders no higher 
propensity to join. 
Religiosity also impacts upon potential membership. Secular respondents are 
more than fourteen per cent more likely than the religiously affiliated to be potential 
members of an environmental group in 1990, although this decreases substantially in 
1993. Large city dwellers are also more environmentally supportive, as they are about 
four per cent more likely than those living in country areas to be potential members. 
The results for the third predictor model in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that even 
controlling for the impact of all other predictor variables, father's class location (in 
_1990 ~>I!ly), age,_yalue_orientation and tertiary education remain as significant -
predictors of potential environmental group membership. 
Model 4 adds the political orientation variables; self-identifi~d political ideology, 
and political party identification. Controlling for the impact of all other predictors, 
8 The human services category approximates Gouldner's (1979), 'humanistic intellectuals'. 
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those who identify as far left wing are about sixteen per cent more likely than those on 
the far right to be potential members in 1990. This difference increases to twenty two 
per cent in 1993. It is noteworthy that the increased strength of political ideology 
from 1990 to 1993 for potential membership stands in contrast to the environmental 
group approval results in Chapter 6, where it decreased slightly between the two 
surveys. 
Supporters of 'other' parties (Australian Democrats, greens and others) are 
much more environmentally supportive than Coalition partisans, by almost sixteen per 
cent in 1990. This is hardly surprising, given the proximity of the new political 
parties to the environment movement. However, Australian Labor Party supporters 
are also about eight to nine per cent more likely to consider joinin~ than Coalition 
supporters. The results also indicate a slight shift in the impact of party identification. 
The likelihood of ALP supporters to consider joining increases slightly from 1990 to 
1993, while the opposite tendency is apparent for 'other' party supporters. This trend 
however, is very weak. 
From these results, a profile of a typical potential environmental group member 
may be drawn. Such as person tends to be young, postmaterialist, and highly 
educated. He or she is also ideologically leftwing and supports either a new politics 
party (Australian Democrat or Green) or the ALP. On the basis of the 1993 results, it 
is possible to calculate predicted probability values for such a person. 9 The 
probability that a twenty-five year old person with these characteristics will consider 
joining an environmental group is 0.67. In other words, approximately seven out of 
ten people with these characteristics are potential members. Compared with the 
sample percentage of potential members at 0.18 or about two in ten, the likelihood of 
_ .eote_nt~_al me!!!bership i~ mor~ ~h~ tripled for su~h a_p~rson. 
9 Predicted probabilities are calculated using the following formula. Predicted probability= 
exponential(intercept + all relevant logistic estimates)/ l +exponential( intercept + all relevant logistic 
estimates). In this case the calculations are based upon the 1993 Model 4 results for a 25 year old 
postmaterialist with a degree, who is left wing and an 'other' party supporter. This is calculated as 
follows; exp(-1.99 + [25* -0.03] + 1.10 + 0.75 + [0.8*1.09] + 0.73) =2.03. 2.03/3.03=0.67. Age 
estimate of 25*-0.03= -0.75, represents 25 years multiplied by the age estimate of -0.03. The 
political ideology estimate is derived as follows: 0.8* 1.09=0.87, where 0.8 represents 'left' on the 
political ideology scale ranging 0-1, and l.09 is the logistic estimate. 
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The impact of social location on potential environmental group membership is 
generally weak. Social class effects are almost conspicuous by their absence, with the 
exception of a modest new class result for 1990. In fact, age emerges as having the 
most important social location effect on this 'behavioural' dependent variable, as it 
does for the 'attitudinal' variables.10 
[Table 7.3 and 7.4 about here] 
Environmental groups - membership 
Potential membership is one thing, but to actually join an environmental group 
indicates a substantially higher level of commitment to environmentalism. The social 
bases of environmental group membership are now examined. However, in addition 
to the Australian Electoral Study (AES) data, it is also possible to analyse 
environmental group membership using National Social Science Survey (NSSS) data. 
The NSSS data also allows the use of variables that measure cultural consumption 
(lifestyle) and fathers education. 
Model 1 shows the impact of social background variables on environmental 
group membership. It is notable that there are some differences between the surveys, 
especially for father's class location. The analysis of the 1990 AES data shows that 
respondents whose fathers were social and cultural professionals when respondents 
were aged 14, are nineteen per cent more likely to join environmental groups than 
those from working class backgrounds. Yet the 1993 AES results only show 
significant effects for children of technical professionals (9%) and middle class fathers 
(4%), while there are no significant father's class effects for the NSSS. 
Father's education is an important predictor of membership. The likelihood of a 
respondent joining an environmental group increases at the mean of the dependent 
variable by 0.8 per cent for every extra year of fathers education (Table 7.7: Model 1). 
On the other hand, respondent's education is only a moderate predictor of 
membership. Those with degrees or diplomas are more likely than non-tertiary 
10 The relative effects of the independent variables are examined in more detail below. 
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educated respondents to join an environmental group, although the differences are 
small. For the AES, those with a degree ar~ five per cent more likely to join than the 
non tertiary educated in 1990, increasing to nine per cent in 1993. 
Some additional analyses of the relationship between education and membership 
were also conducted using 1993 AES data (see Appendix B Table II). Degrees were 
divided into higher degree, postgraduate diploma, and bachelor degree. The results 
show that higher degree holders are about four times more likely than those without a 
tertiary education to join an environmental group, although no other significant 
education effects were produced for actual members. There are also educational 
differences between actual and potential members. Those with diplomas, degrees, 
postgraduate diplomas, or higher degrees are all approximately twice as likely to have 
considered joining as the non tertiary educated. 
It seems that for membership, it is not so much tertiary education that is 
important, but holding a higher degree, while for potential membership, it is tertiary 
education per se that is important. Such findings - particularly the higher degree 
results - support the notion that environmental activists stem from an 'intellectual' 
status category. 
Of particular interest is the finding that respondent's cultural consumption 
during adolescence is a significant predictor of environmental group membership 
(Table 7.7). The cultural consumption scale measures consumption of 'beaux arts' 
(attendance at art museums and galleries, classical concerts, theatre, ballet), and 
'scholastic literature' (reading 'serious' novels or poetry, science, mathematics, 
technology, history books or biographies) at age fourteen. Used here as a lifestyle 
indicator, comparison of the highest cultural consumers with the lowest translates to 
seventeen per cent increase in the likelihood of joining. I I The re~ults suggest that 
style of life has an effect on the likelihood of joining an environmental group. I2 It is 
l I However, few respondents are at the upper extreme of the adolescent cultural consumption scale 
(see mean scores, Appendix C). Parents cultural consumption is omitted from the analysis for 
Models 2 to 4, as it is highly correlated with respondents cultural consumption at age I4 (r=0.47). 
I2 A separate analysis of environmental group membership was conducted with the NSSS sample 
divided by gender. Results showed that cultural consumption at age 14 is a significant predictor, but 
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important to note that this is an indicator of adolescent cultural consumption, and 
therefore reflects the influence of family status/lifestyle. 
Model 3 adds respondents' present social location variables. The results show 
that controlling for the impact of other predictors, social and cultural professionals 
return the largest percentage differences at the mean for both Electoral Studies. Social 
professionals are almost ten percentage points more likely to join an environmental 
group than manual workers in 1990, increasing to thirteen percentage points in 1993. 
The 1993 AES results also show that technical professionals and managers are more 
likely to join environmental groups than manual workers. On the other hand, analyses 
of the NSSS data show a quite different picture, with no statistically significant results 
produced for class location. It is possible that variations in question construction 
between the AES and NSSS contribute to this result.13 While there are some class 
effects for membership, it is notable that employment sector - another indicator of new 
class location - shows no significant results. 
There are also a number of other 'social base' effects. Interestingly, suburban 
location produces a modest but significant negative effect for the NSSS. The results 
suggest that people who live in the suburbs are slightly less likely to join an 
environmental group than rural dwellers. This result contrasts the urban based 
'potential membership' discussed above. Religious affiliation also has a significant, 
but weak effect on membership. The 1993 AES and NSSS results show that those 
with no religious affiliation are three to four percentage points more likely than the 
religiously aligned to join. Immigrants from English speaking countries other than 
Australia also appear to value the environment more than those born in Australia or in 
other overseas countries, as they are slightly more likely to join environmental groups 
(AES 1993: 3%, p>0.05). 
With the exception of class location, value orientation emerges as the strongest 
predictor of environmental group membership (see Tables 7.5 to 7.7; Model 3), as it 
for female membership only (estimate 1.65; odds ratio 5.24; p::;<0.05). For male membership a 
positive but non significant result is produced (estimate 0.47; odds ratio 1.61; p>O.l). 
13 For question wording see Chapter 5. 
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does for potential membership. The NSSS results produce the largest percentage 
differences at the mean for the postmaterialist value scale (18% ), while for the AES 
the difference is eleven per cent in 1993, and ten per cent in 1990. Postmaterialism 
also seems to have a stronger effect upon environmental activism .than upon 
environmental concerns ('attitudinal' measures). 
The impact of the political orientation variables are generally much weaker for 
membership than for potential membership. 'Leftists' are more likely to join, 
although the self-identified political ideology scale (AES only) is only a moderate 
predictor of environmental group membership (1990: 7.0% p>0.05; 1993: 8.4%). 
The partisanship variables produce significant results for both Australian Electoral 
Studies. New politics party supporters are seven per cent more likely than Coalition 
supporters to join an environmental group in 1993. NSSS results show that both new 
politics party (8.1 %) and ALP (3.7%) partisans are more likely to join. As with 
potential membership, support from those who identify with new politics parties is 
stronger than among ALP supporters. New politics partisan support also increases 
marginally from 1990 to 1993 (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). There are no real surprises here. 
The increased support from these partisans probably reflects the growth of green 
parties, and the alignment of environmental movement participants with the Australian 
Democrats. 
It is interesting to note that the independent variables producing the largest 
effects for environmental group membership vary between the surveys. Class 
location (especially in the social and cultural professionals category) is the strongest 
predictor for the 1993 AES, while in 1990,father's class background (again social 
and cultural professionals) shows the largest effect, closely followed by respondent's 
class location (again in social and cultural professions). No class effects are produced 
for the NSSS data, where value orientations and adolescent cultural consumption have 
the strongest effect upon membership. The impact of value orientations are Weaker 
but still moderate predictors of environmental group membership in the AES data, 
with political ideology producing an effect of similar size to value orientations in 
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1993. Non social base variables are important determinants of joining environmental 
groups, although political partisanship has a notably weaker impact on the 
I 
'behavioural' variables, than the 'attitudinal' variables discussed in Chapter 6. 
Once again predicted probabilities may be calculated, on this occasion for actual 
rather than potential environmental members. From the analysis of the 1993 AES, an 
ideal typical environmental group member is a woman who holds a university degree, 
who is employed in a social and cultural profession, is non-religious, a 
postmaterialist, politically leftwing and identifies with an 'other' political party. 
Approximately seven out of ten people with these characteristics will join an 
environmental group (probability= 0.66).14 Given that the probability of anyone 
from the general population joining an environmental group is only 0.045 (4.5% for 
the 1993 AES), or less than one in twenty, it is apparent that a person with such 
characteristics is dramatically more likely to join. Nevertheless, it should be stressed 
that these probabilities are based upon an ideal-typical supporter having all of these 
characteristics. Such a category comprises a very small percentage of the population. 
Moreover; these are characteristics that are not unique to environmental supporters. 
M~mbers of such a category would almost certainly be more likely to join other new 
politics groups and movements. 
[Table 7.5-7.7 about here] 
Environmental protesters and demonstrators 
The third dependent variable operationalised in this chapter provides the 
strongest measure of commitment to environmentalism with the available data.15 
While joining an environmental group indicates a high level of commitment, not all 
members are involved in an active sense. On the other hand, participation in protest 
14 The probability of joining is based upon the 1993 AES using the following calculations: 
exponential(-5.12 + 0.43 + 1.22 + 0.64 + 1.45 + 0.57 + [0.8*1.15] + 1.00)= 1.97. 1.97/2.97=0.66. 
The political ideology estimate is derived as follows: 0.8* 1.15=0.92, where 0.8 represents 'left' on 
the political ideology scale ranging 0-1, and 1.15 is the logistic estimate. 
15 The demonstration dependent variable was derived from the question; 'In the last 5 years have you 
taken part in a protest or demonstration about an environmental issue?' 
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activities clearly involves the surrender of time and energy to the environmental cause. 
The difference between members and protesters is highlighted by the fact that while 
thirty-nine per cent of participants in environmental demonstrations are members of 
environmental groups, only eighteen per cent of environmental group members have 
been involved in environmental protests in the past five years. 
The results of logistic regression analyses of environmental· demonstrators is 
presented in Table 7.8. Some social background effects are evident in the results of 
Model 1. Respondents whose parents consumed 'high' culture are moderately more 
likely to demonstrate for an environmental cause, although class background and 
father's education have little effect (with the exception of the children of managers 
who are three per cent more likely to protest than children of manual workers). 
In Model 2, value orientations, age, cultural consumption, and education 
variables are added, while parent's cultural consumption is removed from the 
analysis. Women emerge as slightly more likely to protest than men, while education 
is also a significant predictor. Respondents with a degree (odds ratio= 1.79) or some 
tertiary education (odds ratio= 2.07) are about twice are likely as the non-tertiary 
educated to take part in protests. As is the case with membership,_ value orientation 
proves to be a strong predictor of participation in demonstrations. At the mean of the 
dependent variable postmaterialists are some fifteen per cent more likely than 
materialists to participate in environmental demonstrations. Those who consumed 
high culture during adolescence are also more likely to be environmentally active. In 
general, the results for the demonstration variable are similar to those for membership. 
Some weak, but interesting results appear when the remaining independent 
variables are added for Models 3 and 4. The impact of respondent's social location 
variables are minimal, and there are no statistically significant class effects. However, 
government sector employment does emerge as a weak predictor of environmental 
protest activity. Government employees are approximately twice as likely as non 
government employees to participate in environmental protests (odds ratio= 1.7). 
This is the only indication in this or the previous chapter that employment sector has 
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any impact upon environmental support. While the importance of_ such a weak finding 
should not be overstated, it may reflect a tendency on behalf of the highly unionised 
public sector to engage in protest activities. 
Religion also has some impact on protest activity. Those indicating no religious 
affiliation are about five per cent more likely to demonstrate than the religiously 
aligned, which is slightly stronger than the effect shown for membership. 
Interestingly, partisanship has little effect on propensity to protest. ALP 
supporters are more likely to demonstrate than their Coalition counterparts, although 
the effect is very modest (2.5% p>0.05). More surprisingly, the new politics (other 
party) variable does not show a significant result for protesters, in contrast to the 
moderate results it produces for membership and potential membership. 
Controlling for the impact of father's background, adolescent socialisation, 
present social location and political ideology, value orientations and adolescent cultural 
consumption have the strongest effects on ones propensity to participate in 
environmental protests. An ideal-typical environmental protester is a non-religiously 
aligned, postmaterialist woman who supports the ALP. During adolescence she was a 
consumer of high culture, and her father was employed as a manager. Approximately 
four out of ten people (predicted probability= 0.40) with these characteristics will 
participate in environmental demonstrations, compared to the probability of anyone in 
the population protesting at less then one in twenty (0.045 or 4.5 % demonstrators in 
the NSSS).16 
*** 
In general the importance of social location decreases in an inverse relationship 
to the level of commitment to environmentalism. Age is relatively important for 
potential membership, and class for membership, although neither impact significantly 
upon participation in demonstrations. Alternatively, the relative importance of value 
orientations, religiosity and gender increases with commitment. This reflects the fact 
16 The calculations are based on the following: exp(-5.56 + 0.69 + 0.68 + 1.53 + [0.8*1.35] + 0.70 
+ 0.47)= 0.66; 0.66/1.66= 0.40. The cultural consumption estimate is based upon a 'high' score of 
0.8 on the 0 to l cultural consumption scale (calculated as 0.8*1.35=1.08). 
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that protests are issue-based. Environmental protesters are concerned with quality of 
life issues, and quality of life is not related to sectional (class) interests, nor is it the 
exclusive domain of any particular age group. 
[Table 7.8 about here] 
The relative importance of social location on environmental activism 
In this section, an evaluation of the relative impact of the independent variables 
is undertaken. Each influence, or group of influences (independent variables) is 
deleted from the regression model and the decrease in the likelihood ratio (L-square) 
from the full model is noted. This provides another method of evaluating the relative 
importance of predictor variables. 
The results presented in Appendix B, Tables III and IV show the contribution to 
the fit of the model for all influences on potential membership. The most important 
predictor is age, followed by value orientations. Younger people, and those holding 
postmaterialist value orientations are more likely to have considered joining an 
environmental group than members of any other social category .. Political party 
identification and education are also important, as is no religion (in 1990 only). Class 
location does not show a significant fit with the data for either AES sample. 
However, the results in Appendix B, Tables V-VII show that class is the most 
important contributor to model fit for environmental group membership (AES data). 
Value orientations are also significant, and rank first for the NSSS data. Age does not 
produce a significant improvement in fit for membership, although father's education 
and cultural consumption at age 14 also make small but significant contributions to the 
model fit (NSSS). 
Value orientation is the strongest contributor for participation in demonstrations 
(Appendix B, Table VIII). No religious affiliation and gender are also important, yet 
with the exception of political party identification, no other variables significantly 
improve the model fit (at p<0.05). 
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Overall, the model fit statistics show that the impact of social location and other 
effects vary according to the aspect of environmentalism being measured. Class 
location ranks highly for membership but is unimportant for pote~tial membership and 
demonstrations. Age has the most important effect on potential membership, while 
the impact of value orientations ranks consistently high on all environmental 
measures. 
The analyses above show that age and value orientations are relatively important 
influences on environmental behaviour, while gender differences in support are also 
found for a number of dependent variables. In the following sections, the impact of 
these variables on environmentalism is examined in greater detail. 
Generation and age effects 
The impact of age as a predictor differs according to the aspect of 
environmentalism under consideration. For membership and demonstrating, age 
shows no significant effects. However, age does have an important impact on 
potential membership. In order to test for generation and cohort differences, a 
separate analysis of potential membership is conducted (Table 7.9).17 
The generation model shows that controlling for the impact of other predictor 
variables, both postwar generations are more likely than the pre World War II 
generation to consider joining an environmental group. In 1990, the two postwar 
generation effects are of similar magnitude - generation X' ers and baby boomers are 
approximately twice as likely to be potential members as the prewar generation. In 
1993 the pattern is similar, although generation X' ers return a slightly larger effect 
than baby boomers. 
The 'fifteen year' cohort model reflects a gradual decline in age based support 
for potential membership for both 1990 and 1993, as does the 'ten year' cohort 
model. On the basis of these results, a life cycle interpretation of age based support 
for potential membership seems plausible. 
17 Significant interaction effects were found for the predictor model (Model 4) for environmental 
group membership and the post war generation. The results shown in Table 7 .9 are generation and 
cohort effects controlling for the impact of all Model 4 variables for potential membership. 
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The 'decade' age group model shows a similar pattern of support with a few 
important differences. Support for potential membership is substantially higher 
during the teenage years (especially in 1993), then dips during the twenties but 
remains at stable levels throughout the thirties. It is only after forty years of age that 
support begins to steadily decline. There is also a slight increase in the magnitude of 
the age effects for almost all age groups from 1990 to 1993. These nuances in age 
based support are not as apparent when age is operationalised using cohort models. 
Controlling for other predictor variables, a gradual decline in support by age 
groups and cohorts is apparent. This implies that a life cycle effect is present for 
potential membership. However, the most important age related finding is that age is 
important only for potential membership.IS No age based differences in support are 
found for actual members or demonstrators. This is an interesting finding in the light 
of previous studies, that show young people are more likely to join environmental 
groups. 
[Table 7.9 about here] 
Pre and postwar generations 
The results of the age analyses indicate that there are some differences in 
environmental support for the pre and post World War II generations. In order to 
examine these differences further, the 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Study data 
are combined, and then divided into prewar and postwar generations (born before or 
after 1946).19 Membership and potential membership dependent variables are 
subsequently regressed upon the independent variables for Model 4 (Table 7 .10). 
18 The potential membership results are similar to the age pattern for the 'attitudinal' aspects of 
environmentalism (approval of environmental groups) shown in Chapter 6. 
19 The combined AES sample has an N of 193 for membership, with a total sample size of 5060. 
The 1990 survey does not include a weighting variable so the combined sample data is unweighted. 
Residential location is omitted from the analysis of the combined AES data, as a relevant question 
was not included in the 1990 AES survey. 
182 
Respondents whose fathers were employed in social and cultural professions are 
seven times more likely to join an environmental group than children of manual 
workers for the prewar sub sample. Respondent's class location in social and cultural 
professions also has a significant influence on membership for b<?th sub samples. 
However, the impact of class location on membership and potential membership is 
stronger in the prewar sub sample, with no significant results for class location on 
potential membership in the post war sub sample. This may suggest that the 
importance of class location, especially among new class professions is declining for 
the postwar generation. Such an interpretation is consistent with explanations of 
conventional politics (for example, Franklin et al 1992) and those suggesting a decline 
in the impact of class (for example, Pakulski and Waters 1996). 
Alternatively, the impact of value orientations is stronger for the post war sub 
sample, particularly for membership. Education effects also vary between the two sub 
samples. Those with a degree are slightly more supportive for the postwar sub 
sample on both dependent variables. Having a diploma is also a significant predictor 
of membership with the prewar sub sample, anci for both sub samples on potential 
membership. 
Political ideology (left-right) also impacts differently upon the pre and post war 
cohorts. Members born after the Second World War are slightly more 'left', while no 
political ideology effects are found for the pre war sub sample. Similarly, postwar 
potential members show stronger political ideology effects than those born before the 
war. If support for environmentalism from the ideologically 'left' is an indication that 
new political issues are aligned on a new politics (left) cleavage, it appears that this 
new cleavage is also differentiated according to age. 
The partisanship results suggest that supporters of 'other' parties and the ALP 
are more likely to join environmental groups than Coalition supporters for the prewar 
sample. 'Other' party supporters born before the Second World War are 
approximately four and a half times more likely to join than Coalition supporters, 
although no significant effects are present for the post war sample. This is a 
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somewhat puzzling finding. Perhaps the stronger effects of higher education apparent 
among postwar members to some extent diminishes the impact of partisanship. 
Potential members show little difference in partisan support between the cohorts, with 
new politics party and ALP supporters again more likely to have considered joining 
environmental groups for both sub samples. 
While the pattern of age based support found above (Table 7 .9) resembles a life 
cycle rather than a generational effect, the results in Table 7 .10 show that there are 
some differences in the factors influencing environmentalism between the pre and post 
war cohorts. Class location and partisanship effects are stronger for the prewar 
generation, while for the postwar generation, education and political ideology are 
stronger, indicating that the impact of social location on environmentalism in Australia 
varies by generation. These results again echo the findings of Franklin et al (1992) on 
generational differences in voting behaviour. They found that the percentage of 
variance in left voting explained by structural location is markedly lower for postwar 
generations (1992:396). It appears that structural factors have less and less impact 
upon both 'old' and 'new' politics. 
Nevertheless it must be stressed again that these generational findings are 
tentative. In the absence of panel data it is not possible to clearly differentiate between 
life cycle and generational effects. 
[Table 7.10 about here] 
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Value orientations and age 
The results presented above and in Chapter 6 show that value orientations have a 
relatively important influence on support for environmentalism. These effects remain 
even after controlling for the effect of social background, social location, age, gender, 
cultural consumption and education. Such findings support lnglehart' s claims that 
postmaterialists are more likely to join and approve of environmental groups than 
materialists (lnglehart 1990b). However, for some dependent variables (potential 
membership, approval of environmental groups, environmental issues scale), age 
effects are also present. Younger people appear to be generally more likely to support 
environmentalism. 
This effect may be linked to another oflnglehart's hypotheses. Inglehart claims 
that postmaterialists are more supportive of quality of life issues (such as 
environmentalism) than materialists. He also maintains that younger people are more 
postmaterialist than older people. The young therefore tend to be more supportive of 
environmental groups because they are more postmaterialist than their older 
counterparts (lnglehart 1990a, 1990b). 
The surprising finding with the Australian data however, is that both age and 
value orientations show significant effects on environmental dependent variables. 
Given that both effects are significant in the multivariate analyses, it is possible that 
the relationship between age and value orientations is weak, contrary to Inglehart's 
claims. In order to examine this possibility, logistic regression analyses of 
dichotomous postmaterialist and materialist variables are conducted, with various age 
models as independent variables (Table 7.11).20 
Age proves to be a very poor predictor of postmaterialist value orientations from 
the results of the AES data. The L-square statistics in the first two columns of Table 
7.11, show that only the 'decade' age group model for 1990 differs significantly from 
20 The postrnaterialist and materialist variables are constructed from Inglehart' s four item battery 
discussed in Chapter 4 above. For the purposes of this analysis, dependent vapables are coded as 
follows: a) postrnaterialists= 1, materialists and mixed= O; b) materialists= 1, postrnaterialists and 
mixed=O. 
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the null model CL-square 16.77; df 6; p=0.01). The results show that with the 
exception of teenagers, none of the cohorts are more likely than tlie seventy and over 
category to hold postmaterialist value orientations. 
The model fit statistics for the materialist dependent variable show a slight 
improvement on those for postmaterialists, with four of the models returning 
significant model fit statistics at better than the ninety five per cent confidence level. 
However, analyses of the age based estimates and odds ratios show that there are few 
significant results for any of the age models. In general, younger cohorts are less 
likely to hold materialist values than the oldest cohorts, although it must be stressed 
that these age based differences are very modest. 
How do these fmdings impact upon Inglehart's hypotheses? Based on the 
results above, value orientation is a moderate predictor of environmentalism on most 
dependent variables. However, the results presented in Table 7.11 show that these 
generation/age differences in support for environmentalism are not due to the value 
orientati~ns held by different age groups. If lnglehart is correct, the young should not 
only be more pro environmental, but also more postmaterialist than the old. The 
results suggest that he is only partly correct. Postmaterialism is a predictor of 
environmentalism, but in Australia, the level of postmaterialism is not differentiated 
according to generations or cohorts. 
[Table 7 .11 about here] 
Gender and environmentalism 
The results in this chapter and Chapter 6 show consistent although moderate 
differences in gender based support for environmentalism. Women are generally 
more supportive of environmentalism than men. To explore this relationship further, 
further analyses of the Australian Electoral Study data are conducted.21 To maximise 
21 Significant interactions were found for gender and the predictor model (Model 4) for potential 
environmental group membership. 
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membership numbers, the 1990 and 1993 AES surveys are combined and the data is 
then divided on the basis of gender. The membership and potential membership 
dependent variables are regressed upon the independent variables (Model 4: social 
background+adolescent socialisation+present social location+political ideology). The 
results presented in Table 7.12 show a number of interesting gender based 
differences. 
While age is a weak predictor of environmental group membership, when the 
sample is divided on the basis of gender, some differences in age based support are 
apparent. Environmental support is stronger among teenagers and the 30-39 cohort 
for the female sub-sample (although only at p>0.05). Education is also marginally 
stronger for the female sub sample, while the effect of value orientations on 
membership is slightly stronger for men. 
Some gender differences in class based support for membership also emerge. 
While both social and cultural professionals and managers of both sexes are more 
likely to join environmental groups than manual workers, there is some variation in 
support among other new class categories. Female technical professionals are 
significantly more likely to join than manual workers, a result not found for men. 
There are also some significant results for father's class location, with both male and 
female children of social and cultural professionals more likely to join than children of 
manual workers. The predictive power of religious affiliation differs according to 
gender, as the 'no religion' variable has a significant influence on women members, 
but not on men. 
Gender differences are also evident for potential membership. Age is an 
important predictor of male and female potential membership, with support strongest 
among teenage potential members of both sexes.22 Support then gradually 
diminishes with age. However, it is notable that the regression estimates (and odds 
ratios) by age groups for women potential members are considerably larger. 
22 However due to the small number of teenage respondents (teenage men n=18; teenage women 
n=27), the reliability of these results is questionable. 
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The value orientation results show that both male and female postmaterialists are 
more likely to have considered joining environmental groups than materialists. 
However, while the male sub sample for potential members shows no significant class 
effects, women employed in social and cultural professions are twice as likely as 
female manual workers to have considered joining. Female human services and 
technical professionals are also more likely to be potential members than manual 
workers. This new class support for potential membership among women appears to 
be subsumed in the full sample analyses above (Tables 7.3 and 7.4). 
It is interesting that while leftwing males are more likely than rightwing males to 
join, or to have considered joining environmental groups, this is not the case for 
women. Yet, while male environmentalists are more ideologically 'left' than females, 
there are no gender differences in partisanship. New politics party supporters are 
approximately twice as likely as Coalition supporters to join or consider joining 
environmental groups, regardless of gender. Similarly, ALP supporters of both sexes 
are slightly more likely than Coalition supporters to be potential rr.iembers. 
Variations in gender support are further highlighted by an examination of the 
'percentage of the null' statistics. While there are only slight differences between the 
male and female sub samples for membership(% of null fitted: men 14%; women 
15% ), there are notable differences for potential membership (% of null fitted: men 
9%; women 14% ). The model fit statistics confirm that social location has a greater 
impact upon female than male potential membership, presumably because of the 
stronger age and class effects for women. 
[Table 7.12 about here] 
Discussion 
The analyses of environmentalism using the three 'behavioural' variables 
highlights a number of important findings. Let me begin with a puzzling generational 
configuration. Postmaterialist value orientations are consistently important influences 
on environmental behaviour in Australia. However, the association between value 
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orientations and generations is very weak. As mentioned in Chapter 3, one reason for 
this may be that unlike in European societies, the impact of major social and.economic 
events such as the Second World War, and the subsequent economic 'boom', have 
been weaker and more muted in Australia. The formative experiences of Australians 
may have varied less from one generation to the next than in other countries, and 
consequently generational effects reflected in higher levels of postmaterialist value 
priorities are also less marked. However, a comparative analysis is needed to evaluate 
the validity of such an hypothesis. 
Age is the most important indicator of potential membership, although it is a 
poor predictor of membership and participation in demonstrations. The most clear 
difference in age based support is found between the pre and post World War II 
generations for potential membership, although in general, the pattern of age based 
resembles a life cycle effect. There are no abrupt changes in age based support for 
environmentalism, such as the marked differences between cohorts that would be 
expected if generational effects were present. Support tends to gradually diminish 
with age. 
Location in 'new class' occupations is a relatively important factor for 
membership, but far less so for potential membership and participation in 
demonstrations. This may give some comfort to new class theorists. The social and 
cultural professionals that approximate Kristol's new class return the strongest results 
for membership. Human services and technical professionals, representing 
Gouldner's 'humanistic intellectuals' and 'technical intelligentsia'· respectively, are 
also significantly more likely to join or consider joining. New class location remains a 
significant - though only moderate strength predictor - of membership even after 
controlling for the impact of other factors such as postmaterialist values, suggesting 
that career socialisation may have an impact on the propensity to support 
environmental groups. 23 
23 However, it is difficult to distinguish between the impact of career socialisation effects on the 
propensity to join an environmental group, and a predisposition for environmental supporters to select 
a certain type of occupation. Parkin (1968) suggests that values may impact upon career choices, 
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Other new class versions fare much worse. Employment sector location has 
little or no effect on environmental behaviour. Public sector employment does not 
impact upon potential membership or membership, and only very weakly on the 
demonstration dependent variable. This contradicts the 'statist' new class theorists 
such as Mattausch (1989), who hypothesise that state sector employment is an 
important base of new politics. 
Status interpretations, by contrast, fare somewhat better. Education, particularly 
tertiary education, is a significant predictor of potential membership, although it 
produces far weaker results for the membership and demonstration dependent 
variables.24 However, this statement should be qualified by noting that holding a 
higher degree (PhD or Masters) is an important determinant of membership. This may 
mean that cognitive capacities have an activising impact upon membership. However, 
in general (achieved) status differences appear to be less important for understanding 
why people participate in environmental activities (demonstrate) than for explaining 
environmental sympathy (potential membership). 
Perhaps the most interesting finding relates to the cultural consumption 
'lifestyle' indicator. Controlling for other independent variables, .respondents who 
score high on the cultural consumption scale during adolescence are significantly more 
likely to join environmental groups, and to participate in environmental 
demonstrations. Perhaps this is because cultural consumption is a form of education. 
Although it differs from formal education in schools and universities, it may instil a 
certain idealism in adolescents - a taste for higher truth and meaning - that later 
emerges as support for an 'idealistic' cause. Such findings indicate that style of life 
also impacts upon environmental support. 
Secular respondents are more supportive of environmentalism than those with a 
religious affiliation, which is perhaps not surprising. However, given that support 
although the effect of value orientation is controlled for to some extent here with the inclusion of the 
value orientation variable. 
24 The impact of education on the NSSS membership and demonstrator dependent variables is only 
minimally diminished by the inclusion of cultural consumption at age 14 (see Appendix B, Tables X 
andXI). 
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among the non religious category has decreased from 1990 to 1993, environmental 
groups are possibly becoming more widely accepted among those with religious 
beliefs. It also appears that for many people the environment or 'nature' does have 
some kind of religious significance. An analysis of the NSSS data reveals that while 
almost half of all environmental group members and demonstrators believe that nature 
is spiritual or sacred in itself, only twenty per cent or less believe that it is sacred 
because it was created by God (Table 7.13). The remainder believe that nature is 
important, but not sacred.25 
(Table 7 .13 about here) 
Controlling for the effects of social location and other factors, those who believe 
that 'nature is sacred in itself are more likely than those who believe that nature is 
important but not sacred to both join environmental groups and to participate in 
environmental demonstrations (see Appendix B, Table IX). Those who believe that 
nature is 'created by god' are also more likely to participate in demonstrations, but not 
to join environmental groups. While those affiliated with traditional religious 
denominations are less likely to be environmentalists, as seen above, it seems that 
there is a link between the sacred or spiritual and the natural environment for many 
supporters. Such an interpretation supports Easthope and Holloway's (1989) 
contention that many in the environment movement see the wilderness or nature as 
'sacred'. 
A number of other factors also produce interesting results, in some cases due to 
their unexpectedly low magnitude. Urban location is a weak predictor of potential 
membership, but is not significant for joining environmental groups. Suburban 
dwellers are actually less likely to join than those living in rural areas. Perhaps these 
findings reflect a higher level of sympathy for environmental groups in the more 
25 These responses are derived from the question: "Which statement comes closest to your views ... 
Nature is sacred because it is created by God; Nature is spiritual or sacred in itself: Nature is 
important, but not spiritual or sacred?" 
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populated areas. On the other hand, they may also indicate a tendency for rural 
dwellers to participate in certain types of environmental groups (such as Landcare and 
Greening Australia). Certainly the impact of such groups has a more direct impact 
upon rural communities. 
The country of birth variable shows no significant results on any of the 
'behavioural' dependent variables with the exception of environmental group 
membership in 1993 (AES only). There is therefore little support for the notion that 
people born in English speaking countries ~ther than Australia, are more sympathetic 
toward environmentalism than others. 
Political ideology is a moderate predictor of environmentalism. Those who 
place themselves on the left of the political spectrum are generally more supportive of 
environmentalism than those on the right. These results support previous studies that 
find links between the ideological 'left' and support for new political groups (for 
example, Kitschelt 1990, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). 
The impact of political partisanship is strong, with new politics party and ALP 
supporters more likely to be environmentally active than supporters of the Coalition. 
The effect of new politics partisanship although strong, is not surprising. This 
category is largely comprised of the Australian Democrats and Greens. Like the 
Greens, the Democrats seek to capture the 'green' vote (McAllister and Studlar 1993), 
and have strong ties with environmental groups. 
The ALP has successfully courted the support of environmental organisations at 
Federal elections since winning office in 1983 (Papadakis 1994), and therefore the 
ALP partisan results are not unexpected. However, it is interesting to note that the 
impact of party identification in general is weaker on the 'behavioural' than the 
'attitudinal' dependent variables. In Chapter 6, political partisanship emerges as the 
strongest predictor on all 'attitudinal' dependent variables, while it ranks consistently 
lower on environmental group membership, potential membership and participation in 
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demonstrations.26 It seems that partisanship has an impact upon the formation of 
attitudes toward environmentalism, but is less important in influencing behaviour. 
Finally, gender differences contribute to a number of social location effects for 
environmental behaviour. The relatively strong age effects for potential membership 
appear to be largely due to stronger age effects among women. Similarly, it seems to 
be secular women, rather than the secular per se that are environmentally active, while 
activism among the ideological 'left' appears to be overwhelmingly male based. 
26 Party identification ranks second on membership in the analysis of NSSS data, but not better 
than third for other dependent variables. 
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Table 7.1: Bivariate Analysis of Environmental Group Membership (percentages) 




Social & Cultural Professionals 6 33 43 18 (38) 
Human Service Professionals 6 19 60 15 (103) 
Technical Professionals 10 28 41 20 (137) 
Managers 5 17 52 26 (515) 
Middle Class 6 20 52 22 (229) 
Workers 3 18 52 26 (1018) 
Respondent's Class 
Social & Cultural Professionals 19 29 43 8 (52) 
Human Service Professionals 8 28 47 16 (226) 
Technical Professionals II 25 48 15 (168) 
Managers 7 14 55 24 (268) 
Middle Class 2 21 53 24 (624) 
Workers 3 17 53 27 (664) 
'Decades' 
18-19 12 43 26 19 (24) 
20-29 3 29 50 18 (283) 
30-39 6 28 48 17 (444) 
40-49 6 19 55 21 (489) 
50-59 5 15 55 25 (374) 
60-69 3 13 53 30 (372) 
70+ 2 8 44 46 (294) 
Gender 
Male 4 '18 54 23 (1156) 
Female 5 20 48 28 (1166) 
Value Orientation 
Postmaterialist 10 31 41 17 (323) 
Matenalist 2 12 56 30 (495) 
Mixed 4 19 51 26 (1536) 
Education 
Degree 12 32 44 13 (340) 
Diploma 6 28 48 17 (191) 
Other 3 20 52 24 (773) 
No Post Secondary Educatton 3 12 53 32 (960) 
Employment Sector 
Public 5 22 54 19 (623) 
Other 5 19 51 25 (1357) 
Residence 
Urban 4 22 51 24 (774) 
Suburban 6 19 51 24 (612) 
Rural 4 16 51 28 (965) 
Religiosity 
Religion 4 18 52 27 (2032) 
No Religion 10 26 46 18 (334) 
Country of Birth 
English Speaking Connery 7 20 47 25 (248) 
Australia, NZ and Other Countries 4 19 51 26 (2078) 
Political Orientation 
Left 9 34 39 19 (369) 
Middle 4 19 55 23 (987) 
Right 3 15 54 28 (638) 
Political Party Identification 
Coalition 3 14 51 31 (956) 
Other 15 29 38 17 (62) 
ALP 4 24 49 22 (1038) 
Sample 4.5 18.I 51.5 25.9 
notes: weighted n=2388 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
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Table 7.2: Bivariate Analysis of Environmental Group Membership and 
Participation in Demonstrations (percentages) 
Variable Members Not a Demonstrate Not N 
Member Demonstrate 
Father's Class 
Social & Cultural Professionals 12 88 10 90 (42) 
Human Service Professiooals 8 92 3 97 (38) 
Technical Professionals 14 86 5 95 (150) 
Managers 11 89 7 93 (432) 
Middle Class 9 91 3 97 (279) 
Workers 8 92 3 97 (686) 
Respondent's Class 
Social & Cultural Professionals 15 . 85 8 92 (65) 
Human Service Professionals 16 84 8 92 (181) 
Technical Professionals 15 85 4 96 (171) 
Managers 10 90 5 95 (187) 
Middle Class 8 92 3 97 (470) 
Workers 6 94 4 96 (380) 
'Decades' 
18-19 
20-29 II 89 3 97 (168) 
30-39 11 89 6 94 (349) 
40-49 10 90 6 94 (421) 
50-59 10 90 3 97 (313) 
60-69 8 92 3 97 (282) 
70+ 8 92 6 94 (213) 
Gender 
Male 10 90 3 97 (909) 
Female 9 91 6 94 (866) 
Value Orientation 
Postmaterialist 18 82 11 89 (229) 
Materialist 4 96 3 97 (260) 
Mixed 9 91 3 97 (1156) 
Education 
Degree 17 83 8 92 (309) 
Some Tertiary 15 85 8 92 (141) 
No Tertiary 7 93 3 97 (1329) 
Employment Sector 
Public 13 87 7 93 (450) 
Other 9 91 4 96 (1329) 
Residence 
Urban 11 89 3 97 (203) 
Suburban 9 91 5 95 (1236) 
Rural 12 89 5 95 (324) 
Religious Denomination 
Religion 8 92 3 97 (1367) 
No Rehgion 14 86 8 92 (412) 
Political Party Identification 
Coalition 7 93 3 97 (733) 
Other 20 80 8 92 (89) 
ALP 10 90 5 95 (778) 
Sample 9.7 90.3 4.5 95.5 
notes: n=l 779 
Source: 1993 National Social Science Survey 
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Table 7.3: Logistic Regression Estimates {percentages at Grand Mean) 
Predictors of Potential Environmental Group Members (AES 1990). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -1.42 -1.01 -1.26 
Father's Class 
Social 1.01••• 0.68** 0 10•• 
(23.0) (13.6) (14.1) 
Human Services 0.54 0.26 0.22 
(10.S) (4.7) (4.0) 
Technical 0.10•• 0.53** 0.49** 
(14.1) (10.3) (9.4) 
Manager 0.10 0.06 0 07 
(1.7) (1.0) (1.2) 
Middle Class 0.31 * 0.13 0.07 
(5.7) (2.3) (1.2) 
Age -0.02••• -0.03••• 
(-0.3) (-0.5) 
Female 0.23** 0.16 
(4.2) (2.8) 
Value Orientation 1.20••• l.14*** 
(26.2) (24.7) 
Degree 0.84*** 0 51•• 
(17.4) (9.9) 











Middle Class 0.27* 
(4.9) 
Government Sector 0.20 
(3.6) 
Other Bases 
No Religion 0.70*** 
(14.1) 










































Table 7.3 continued. 



















2066 65 2066.65 
1862.16 1834.91 
204 49 231.74 
18 21 
% of null fitted 0.01 0.08 0.10. 0.11 
potential memberslup n 428 428 428 428 
n 
Notes: 
1979 1979 1979 1979 
• <0.l •• P<0.05 ••• P<0.001. Logistic regression estimates are reported. Percentages differences at the mean of the 
dependent variable are shown in parenthesis Dependent Variable 1s potential membership of envrronmental groups (actual 
members are excluded from the analysis). 
Class: Techmcal Professionals: Natural scientists, engineers, surveyors, computmg professionals, miscellaneous 
professionals (excluding librarians) mathematicians, statisticians and actuanes, other professionals, economists, accountants, 
public relations officers, other business professionals, techmcal officers (medical science, engmeering, and air and sea 
transport); Social & Cultural Professionals: Medical practitioners and lawyers, university and CAE teachers, Artists and related 
professionals, education researchers, other social scientists, architects, ministers of religion; Human Semces Professionals: 
Health D1agnos1s and Treatment (excluding medical practitioners), teachers, social workers, hbrarians, counsellors, nurses, 
psychologists; Middle Class: Clerks, Sales & Personal Service Workers, Police, Miscellaneous para-professionals; Workmg 
class (reference category): Trades, Plant and Maclune Operators, and Drivers; Labourers and Related Workers 
Value Orientation: O=materiahst; 0.5=nuxed, l=postmatenalist. Political Ideology 1s a scale 10 steps from far nght to far left. 
Party Identification scale· Coalition= Liberal and National parties, Other= Australian Democrats, greens and other; 
ALP=Austra11an Labor Party. 
source: 1993 National Social Science Survey 
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Table 7.4: Logistic Regression Estimates (Percentages at Grand Mean) for 
Predictors of Potential Environmental Group Members (AES 1993). 
Model I Model 2 
Intercept -1.49 -0.93 
Social 0.81•• 0.32 (16.8) (5.4) 
Human Services 0.13 -0.16 
(2.1) (-2 3) 
Techrucal 0.70 ... 0.26 (13.0) (4.3) 
Manager -0.02 0.02 
(-0.3) (0.3) 
Middle Class 0.19 -0.02 
(3.1) (-0.3) 
Age -0.03 ... 
(-0 5) 
Female 0 15 
(2 4) 






































































































Table 7.4 continued 
Political Ideology 1.09••• (21.9) 
Other Party 0 73•• (13.6) 
Labor o.52••• 
(9 2) 
Null Model 2260.69 2260.69 2260.69 2260.69 
Full Model 2243 93 2067.21 2053.05 2008.90 
L2 16.76 193.48 207.64 251. 79 
df 5 10 20 23 
% of null fitted 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.11 
potential membership n 448 448 448 448 
n 2281 2281 2281 2281 
Notes: • p<O.I •• p<O 05 ••• p<0.001 Logistic regression estimates are reported. Percentages differences at the mean of the dependent 
variable are shown in parenthesis Dependent Vanable is potenual memberslup of environmental groups (actual members are 
excluded from the analysts). 
Classes: Technical professionals: scientists, buildmg professionals, engineers, and busmess professionals, medical and 
science technical officers and technicians, engineenng and building technical officers and technicians, air and sea transport 
technical workers; Social and Cultural professionals. university and T AFE teachers and mstructors, arts and health 
professionals, health diagnosis and treatment professionals; Human Services professionals· teachers, social workers, nurses, 
pohce and other para- professionals. 
Managers: all managers and managing supervisors; Middle class· Clerks, Sales & Personal Service Workers; Working class 
(reference category): Trades, Plant and Maclune Operators, and Dnvers; Labourers and Related Workers. 
Value Onentation: O=matenahst; 0.5=mixed, l=postmateriahst Party Identificat1on scale: Coa1Jt1on= Liberal and National 
parties; Other= Australian Democrats, greens and other; ALP=Austrahan Labor Party Pohtical Ideology is a scale I 0 steps 
from far nght to far left. 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
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Table 7.5: Logistic Regression Estimates (Percentages at Grand Mean) for 


















































































































































































Notes: * p<O.I ** p<O.OS *** p<0.001 
Logistic regression estimates are reported. Percentages differences at the mean of the dependent vanable are shown in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is membership of environmental groups. . 
Independent vanables as per Table 7 .3. For addiuonal explanauon see research and design chapter 
Source: 1990 Australian Electoral Study 
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Table 7 .6: Logistic Regression Estimates ·(Percentages at Grand Mean) for 


























































































































































































Notes: * p<O. J •• p<0.05 ••• p<O 001 
Logisuc regression estimates are reported. Percentages differences at the mean of the dependent variable are shown in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable is membership of environmental groups. 
Independent variables as per Table 7.4. For additional explanation see research and design chapter. 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
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Table 7.7: Logistic Regression Estimates (Percentages at Grand Mean) for 
Predictors of Environmental Group Membership (NSSS 1993). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -3.SS -4.06 -4.03 
Fathers Educauon (years) 0 09** 0.01•• 0.01•• 
(08) (0.06) (0.6) 
Father's Class 
Social -0.22 -0.31 -0.33 
(-1.7) (-2.4) (-2.S) 
Human Services -0.52 -0.SS -0.66 
(-3.6) (-3.8) (-4.4) 
Techrucal 0.23 0.21 0.19 
(2.2) (2.0) (1.8) 
Manager 0.24 0.21 0.18. 
(2.3) (2.0) (1.7) 
Middle Class 0.04 -0.04 -0.009 
(0.4) (-0.3) (-0.1) 
Parents Culture 0.73 
(8.4) 
Age (years) -0.003 -0.004 
(-0.0) (-0.0) 
Female -0 08 -0.03 
(-0.7) (-0.3) 
Value Orientation (scale) 1.36*** 1.29••• 
(19.6) (18.2) 
Cultural Consumption at 1.24** 1 22** 
age 14 (scale) (17.2) (16.8) 
Degree 0.62** 0.39* 
(6.9) (3.9) 





Human 0 38 
(3 8) 
Technical 0 39 
(3.9) 
Manager 0 03 
(0.3) 
Middle Class -0.07 
(-0 6) 
























































Table 7.7 continued. 
Other Party 0.71 ** (8.1) 
Labor 0 37•• 
(3.7) 
Null Model 1121 53 1121 53 1121.53 1121.53 
Full Model 1098.34 1055.70 1041.25 1034 21 
L2 23.19 65.83 80.28 87 32 
df 7 12 21 23 
% of null fitted 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.08 
membershlp n 170 170 170 170 
n 1779 1779 1779 1779 
Notes: • p<0.1 •• p<0.05 ••• p<0.001 
Logistic regression estimates are reported. Percentages differences at the mean of the dependent vanable are shown in 
parenthesis. Dependent variable 1s membershlp of enVJronmental groups. 
Independent vanables as per Table 7 3. For additional explanation see research and design chapter. 
Source: 1993 National Social Science Survey 
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Table 7.8: Logistic Regression Estimates (Percentages at Grand Mean) for 




































































































































Table 7.8 continued. 




Null Model 652 63 6~2.63 652.63- 652.63 
Full Model 636.57 606.53 588.59 585 09 
L2 16.05 46.09 64.04 67.53 
df 7 12 21 23 
% of null fitted 0.02 0.07 0.10 0 10 
demonstrators n 80 80 80 80 
n 1779 1779 1779 1779 
Notes: * p<O.l ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 
Logistic regression estimates are reported. Percentages differences at the mean of the dependent vanable are shown in 
parenthesis Dependent variable 1s participation in environmental protests or demonstrations. 
Independent variables as per Table 7 7. For addittonal explanation see research and design chapter. 
Source: 1993 National Social Science Survey 
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Table 7.9: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) for Age Effects on Potential 
Membership or Environmental Groups, Controlling for Social Background, 
Adolescent Socialisation, Present Social Location and Political Ideology. 
Potential Members Potential Members 
1990 1993 
Generation Model 
Generation X (1960 +) 0.76*** 0.96••• 
(2.13) (2.61) 
Baby Boomers (1946-59) o so••• 0.64*** 
(2.22) (1.89) 
Pre World War II (1900-45) (reference) 
'15 Year' Cohort Model 
Cohort I (1973-75) 1.94*** 
(6.94) 
Cohort 2 (1966-72) 1.38*** 1.17*** 
(3.97) (3.24) 
Cohort 3 (1951-65) 1.08*** 1.18*** 
(2.94) (3.27) 
Cohort 4 (1936-50) 0.90*** 0.65** 
(2 45) (1.91) 
Cohort 5 (1921-35) 0.24 0.23 
(1.27) (1.26) 
Cohort 6 (1900-20 reference) 
'10 Year' Cohort Model 
Cohort 1 (1973-75) 1.96*** 
(7.11) 
Cohort 2 (1966-72) 112*** 1.20*** 
(3 06) (3 31) 
Cohort 3 (1956-65) 0.81 ••• 1.34*** 
(2.24) (3.80) 
Cohort 4 (1946-55) 0.87*** 0.84*** 
(2.38) (2 32) 
Cohort 5 (1936-45) 0 42* 0.62** 
(1.52) (1.86) 
Cohort 6 (1926-35) -0.22 0 36 
(0 80) (1.44) 
Cohort 7 (1900-25 reference) 
Age Groups 
Aged (18-19) 1.42*** 2 46*** 
(4.13) (I I 7) 
Aged (20-29) I 10*** 1.34*** 
(3.00) (3.81) 
Aged (30-39) 1.16*** 1.32*** 
(3 19) (3.74) 
Aged (40-49) 0.96*** 0 82*** 
(2.61) (2 27) 
Aged (50-59) 0.46 0.55** 
(1.58) (1.73) 
Aged (60-69) 0.28 0.45** 
(I 32) (1.56) 
Aged (70+ reference) 
N 1979 2281 
Noles: Esumaies control for all Model 4 predictor variables. Odds rauos are shown in parenthesis. Dependent variable is potenual 
membershtp of environmental groups. 
Sources: 1990 & 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
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Table 7.10: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) for Predictors of 





















Other Social Bases 
No Rebgion 









% of model fitted 







































































































































































































Notes: Odds ratios are shown in parenthesis. Dependent vanables are membership and potential membership of environmental 
groups. Independent variables as per Model 4, less residenual loca110n. 1990 and 1993 AES samples are combmed. and 
d1v1ded mto pre and post WWII sub samples. 
Sources: Combined 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
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Table 7.11: Logistic Regression (Estimates) Odds Ratios for Age Effects on Value 
Orientations. 
Postmaterlallsts Materialists 
1990 1993 1990 1993 
Generation Model 
Generation X (1960 +) 0.10 0 27* -0.34** -0.29•• (1.10) (I 30) (0.71) (0.75) 
Baby Boomers (1946-59) -0.09 0 13 0 03 -0.22• 
(0.91) (I 13) (I 03) (0.80) 
Pre World War II (1900-45 
reference) 
L Square (null-full model) I 15 3 28 7.12 6 43 
df 2 2 2 2 
p ns ns 0.02 0.04 
'15 Year' Cohort Model 
Cohort I (1973-75) 0.55 0 98* 
(I 74) (2 65) 
Cohort 2 (1966-72) 0.57** -0.29 -0 32 0.26 
(1.76) (0.75) (0.73) (1.30) 
Cohort 3 (1951-65) 0.22 -0.19 -0 17 0.29 
(1.24) (0.83) (0 84) (1.33) 
Cohort 4 (1936-50) 0.06 -0 04 0.00 0.35* 
(I 06) (0 96) (1.00) (142) 
Cohort 5 (1921-35) 0.19 0.12 0.06 0 02 
(I 20) (1.13) (1.06) (1.02) 
Cohort 6 ( 1900-20 reference) 
L Square (null-full model) 5.31 6 17 5.35 11.59 
df 4 5 4 5 
p ns ns - ns 0 04 
'10 Year 'Cohort Model 
Cohort I (1973-75) 0.58 0 88* 
(I 79) (2 42) 
Cohort 2 (1966-72) 0 41* -0 26 -0 31 0.17 
(I 50) (0.77) (0 73) (I 19) 
Cohort 3 (1956-65) -0.12 -0.26 -0 29* 0 18 
(0 89) (0.77) (0 75) (I 23) 
Cohort 4 (I 946-55) -0 02 0 01 0 10 0 29* 
(0 98) (I 01) (I 10) (1.34) 
Cohort 5 (1936-45) 0 17 -0 01 -0 14 0 19 
(I 18) (0 99) (0.87) (I 21) 
Cohort 6 (1926-35) -0 05 0.25 0 10 -0 18 
(0.95) (I 28) (I 10) (0.84) 
Cohort 7 (1900-25 reference) 
L Square (null-full model) 5 72 8 88 10.57 13 12 
df 5 6 5 6 
p ns ns ns 0 04 
'Decade' Model 
Aged (18-19) 1 so••• -0 66 -0 63 -0 36 
(6 04) (0 52) (0 53) (0 70) 
Aged (20-29) 0.22 0 24 -0 36* -0.18 
(1.24) (1.27) (0.70) (0 83) 
Aged (30-39) 0.27 0.27 -0.08 
-0 22 
( 1.30) (I 30) (0 92) (0.80) 
Aged (40-49) -0.10 0 00 0.02 -0.27* 
(0.90) (I 00) • (I .02) (0 76) 
Aged (50-59) 0.41 0 04 -0.07 -0 14 
(1.50) (I 04) (0 93) (0 87) 
Aged (60-69) 0 10 -0 04 0.12 0.09 (l 10) (0 96) (1.12) (I 09) 
Aged (70+ reference) 
L Square (null-full model) 16.77 5.66 9.02 7.14 
df 6 6 6 6 
p 0 01 ns ns ns 
n 258 419 508 629 
Notes· Odds ratios are reported in parenthesis. 'ns' represents model not significant at p<0.05. 
Sources: 1993 National Social Science Survey; 1990 & 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
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Table 7.12: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) for Predictors of 
Environmental Group Membership by Gender (AES) 


























Other Social Bases 
No Religion 













































































































































































































































Dependent Var n 8 5 106 449 512 
n 2435 2549 2350 2443 
Notes: • p<O. l •• ii<0.05 ••• p<0.001. Odds rauos are reported in parenthesis Dependent variables are membership and potenual 
membership of environmental groups. 1990 and 1993 AES sample are combined, then dlVlded on baSIS of gender. 
Sources: Combined 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
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Table 7.13: Religious Values and Nature for Environmental Groups and 
Demonstrators {per cent). 
Members 
Nature is ... 
important because it was created by 
God 
is spiritual or sacred in itself 
is important but not sacred 










Social bases of environmentalism? 
We may now return to the key questions posed in Chapter ~. Does 
environmentalism in Australia have well articulated 'social bases'? Are environmental 
issue-concerns and activism socially located in new classes, generations, status 
groups, and/or other social categories? The answer to these questions seems to be 
yes and no. The social bases of environmentalism are diverse and social location is a 
matter of degree. In other words, environmentalism in Australia is socially located, 
but only to a limited extent. The social location independent variables explain only a 
very small proportion of environmental concerns and activism. Further, the impact of 
social location varies for different aspects of environmentalism. Socio-structural 
accounts generally fare better in relation to the less inclusive 'behavioural' aspects of 
environmentalism, but they are of very limited utility for explaining the more inclusive 
'attitudinal' aspects. 
Another aim of this research has been to establish which of the most popular 
social base accounts -new class, status/lifestyle and generational - best explain the 
pattern of environmental concerns and activism in Australia. Once again, the answer 
is not straightforward, and depends upon the aspect of environmentalism that is 
considered. By and large, class and age/generational accounts fare poorly, but relative 
to other social location accounts they are the strongest, and have approximately equal 
explanatory power. 
In order to summarise the relative impact of social location and other effects on 
different aspects of environmentalism, I present 'strength rankings' for all predictor 
variables on each aspect of environmentalism in Table 8.1.l While class and age 
1 Ranking is achieved by showing the independent variables, or groups ofindependent variables that 
produce the four largest beta coefficients for the 'attitudinal' dependent variables, and the four largest 
improvements to the model fit for the 'behavioural' dependent variables. It should be noted that for 
father's class location, class location, education, employment sector, and partisanship, the ranking 
applies to blocks of variables. For example, the number I ranking for class location on membership 
refers to the impact of the group of respondent's class variables. 
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generally show the strongest social location effects, there are a nu.mber of variations in 
the results.2 
[Table 8.1 about here] 
• The popular 'new class' accounts claim that those located in 'social and 
cultural', or 'human services' professions are most likely to join environmental 
groups. These claims are to some degree supported here, as class ranks frrst from all 
predictors of environmental group membership. This may, as some theorists suggest, 
reflect the specific interests and orientations of these class-type categories. Another 
reason that certain professional groups emerge as stronger supporters of 
environmental groups, may have more to do with occupational characteristics. 
Professionals have more flexible employment and being less constrained in their 
. 
working conditions have more time to spend on environmental and other group 
activities. 
However, a strong qualification needs to be added to these findings. Class 
effects seem to be important predictors of environmentalism, but only relative to other 
social location effects. In general, the impact of occupational new class location on 
environmental support is weak. 
• The 'statist' versions of the new class, advanced by authors such as 
Mattausch (1989), fare even worse. With the exception of public sector employees 
who are slightly more likely to participate in environmental protests than those 
employed elsewhere, employment sector has no detectable impact upon environmental 
support in Australia. 
• Attempts to link environmental support with a new, tertiary educated 'new 
class' (for example, Eckersley 1989, Rootes 1995) are not supported by the 
Australian data. While highly educated people are slightly more sympathetic toward 
environmentalism, the impact of education is generally weak. Nevertheless, some 
caution is necessary in drawing such conclusions as this research examines only 
2 The discussion of the findings draws upon the results reported in previous chapters, as well as the 
rankings shown in Table 8.1 
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differences in level of education. It is possible that it is not tertiary education per se 
that differentiates environmental support, but type of education. An empirical 
examination of environmental support by tertiary disciplines may well yield rather 
different results. I tend to agree with Rootes ( 1995) that support for 
environmentalism may be stronger among graduates of the more 'radical', arts and 
humanities disciplines. However, the wisdom of calling this a class effect is 
questionable. 
• Generally, the weakness of class based support for environmental concerns 
and new politics should not be surprising, as it mirrors the declining importance of 
social class as a determinant of conventional (old) political behaviour (for example, 
see Franklin et al 1992, Clark et al 1993). It also confirms the class-less nature of 
new social movements (for example, see Cohen 1985, Pakulski 1993a). 
• Surprisingly, age and generations also have only a limited impact on most 
aspects of environmentalism. In fact, age effects are entirely absent for environmental 
group membership, and participation in demonstrations. This is an important finding, 
as previous studies show that the young tend to be more supportive of environmental 
groups (for example, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980, Watts and Wandesforde-Smith 
1981, Inglehart 1990a, 1990b, Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Abramson and Inglehart 
1992, Inglehart and Abramson 1994). Again, there is some variation in the impact of 
age on different aspects of environmentalism. While there are no significant age 
effects for the variables measuring the highest levels of commitment to 
environmentalism (group members,and demonstrators), younger people are more 
likely to consider joining and to approve of environmental groups, and to sympathise 
with environmental issue concerns. But once again, these age effects are of moderate 
strength only in relation to other social location effects. 
• There is little evidence to suggest that environmentalism is generationally 
located in any consistent-way. The only apparent generational difference is a very 
modest one between those born before, and after the Second World War. As noted 
above, this seems to be in line with Mannheim's (1972) suggestion that the strength of 
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generational articulation may vary, and that this variation may reflect different 
historical factors and cultural circumstances. 
• Perhaps less surprisingly, gender differences are apparent. Women are more 
likely than men to be concerned about environmental issues, and to feel favourably 
toward environmentalists. They are also more likely to participate in environmental 
protest activities. More surprisingly, gender based differences in environmental 
support seem to underlie some social location effects. As suggested in Chapter 3, 
gender differences may be theorised in terms of status, or as symptoms of a new 
gender cleavage (see Hampel et al 1995). 
• Among the other 'minor' social location factors, religiosity proves to be the 
most consistent (although weak) predictor of environmental support. Non-religious 
persons are generally more sympathetic toward environmentalism. This may support 
the link between environmentalism and secularism, or as suggested above, it may 
mean that environmental supporters tend to.hold non-conventional religious beliefs. 
After all, the survey results show that many supporters see nature as sacred in its own 
right, in line with Easthope and Holloway's (1989) contention that environmentalists 
attribute sacred or spiritual qualities to 'wilderness'. 
• Residential location has some impact upon environmental support, although in 
this respect the results differ somewhat from the outcomes of European studies of 
environmental groups. In Australia, big city dwellers are more sympathetic toward 
environmentalism, although 'suburbanites' are actually less likely to join 
environmental groups than those living in the country. As argued above, this may 
reflect the increased involvement of the Australian rural population in environmental 
groups such as Landcare and Greening Australia. Another possibility is that 
environmental groups in Australia focus upon different issues than their European 
counterparts. For example, urban concerns, such as air pollution and the preservation 
of historic buildings, are relatively less important in Australia than in Europe and the 
United States. However, given the results of previous research, and given the 
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popular perceptions of environmental supporters as urban dwellers, it is surprising 
that stronger urban effects are not apparent here. 
• Notwithstanding the relative weakness of social location effects, this research 
shows that postmaterialist, professionals, who are high consumers of 'culture' during 
adolescence, are most likely to be environmental group members. This seems to add 
empirical weight to the argument advanced by Crook et al ( 1992: 146) \\'.ho suggest 
that the support bases of new social movements "are contingent rather than structurally 
determined ... socio-cultural rather than socio-economic, and ... related to consumption 
and lifestyle rather than to production". The results imply that support for 
environmental groups stems from 'intellectual' status categories, rather than a (new) 
class, or younger generation(s). They also indicate that intellectuals are as heavily 
involved in new political activities as they have been in conventional politics. 
• Finally, the findings indicate that the support base of environmental groups 
seems to be more clearly circumscribed than the social base of environmental 
concerns. However, the inconsistent and generally weak impact of new class, 
age/generation, and education also implies that support for environmentalism tends to 
cross cut traditional political cleavage lines. Such findings fit Feher and Heller' s 
(L~84:35-36) notion of the environmental movement as "fluid and dynamic", with "no 
predefined space", and as flowing "over the whole 'surface' of society in search of 
supporters". 
If social location is not important, what· is? 
Some non-social location variables show more promise. For example, 
postmaterialists are consi~tently more environmentally sympathetic than materialists, 
especially in relation to 'behavioural' aspects of environmentalism. lnglehart's 
(1990a, 1990b) suggestions that postmaterialists are more supportive of 
environmentalism seems to hold in Australia. Yet, as seen above, another part of 
Inglehart's account proves less successful - generational location offers little 
explanatory mileage. Inglehart' s argument that younger generations are more likely to 
support environmentalism because they are more postmaterialist, is not supported by 
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the data. Not only are generational differences in environmental support weak, 
postmaterialism is not differentiated according to age. Therefore, differences in age 
based support for environmentalism are not due to generational shifts in value 
priorities. This is a further indication that life cycle interpretations of the modest age 
differences shown above may be more appropriate than generational explanations. 
It is also interesting to note that a 'left' placement on the left-right political 
ideology scale is a reasonably consistent predictor of environmentalism. Some argue 
that the very meaning of the 'left' has been changing, and that the left-right political 
cleavage now includes new sets of political concerns, such as environmentalism (for 
example, Inglehart 1984, Inglehart and Rabier 1986, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). 
The results lend some support to such claims. While a 'left' association with 
environmentalism is not necessarily an indication of radicalism, it does seem to imply 
that the traditional content of the left-right ideological cleavage is changing. 
Political partisanship is consistently the strongest predictor of the 'attitudinal' 
aspects of environmentalism, although it is less important for 'behavioural' aspects. 
Such a finding is, of course, not surprising. The green parties in Australia have 
grown out of the broader environmental movement, while the Australian Democrats 
have also cultivated strong green links. More surprising are relatively strong links 
between environmental supporters and Labor partisans. The 'Michigan Model' of 
politics provides one explanation for this: if the "political thought and action" of 
partisans is guided by party spokespeople and leaders (Miller 1976:23), environmental 
support should be higher among Labor partisans than Coalition supporters, due to the 
pro environmental stance adopted by the ALP over the last decade or more. 
In summary, new politics, especially environmental new politics seems to defy 
the old 'social base' paradigm. It floats through a variety of social locations and 
appears to be patterned according to value orientations and partisan preferences to a 
greater extent than by standard socio-structural factors. 
216 
Implications for political sociology 
By demonstrating that the overall utility of social base accounts for explaining 
environmental concerns and activism is poor, this research raises a number of 
questions about the theoretical foundations of political sociology. The weakness of 
social location effects provides fuel for the more radical critics of traditional 
sociological explanations of politics, and for more 'culturalist' accounts. Social base 
effects are not strong enough to repel the attacks of critics who posit the decline of 
structural determinants (for example, Franklin et al 1992) or even the 'end of the 
social' (see Featherstone 1987). Environmentalism, like other aspects of the new 
politics, appears to be relatively detached from the 'old' social-structural bases of 
politics and affected to a greater extent by socio-cultural factors. . 
This has already led to a revival of 'culturalist' accounts (for example, Gibbins 
1989). Commentators, such as Dalton (1988), may be correct in suggesting that new 
politics is issue-based rather than structurally located. He points out that as "issue-
group cleavages are more difficult to institutionalise or 'freeze' via social group 
identifications linked to mass organisations, they may not be as stable" (1988:175).3 
Another possibility is that the weakness of social base effects indicates a state of flux. 
The support base of environmentalism shifts according to the issues currently in 
vogue, especially in response to the influence of the mass media. This suggestion has 
been found in some media studies (for example, Hansen 1993). Others, such as 
Papadakis ( 1993: 199) suggest that environmentalism "has become an integral part of 
the political culture". If he is correct, support for environmental new politics may 
prove to be as shifting and fluid as the support base of conventional politics in modem 
Western democracies. Given this fluid and shifting nature of environmental support, 
questions arise as to the stability and persistence of environmentalism as a political 
3 The issue based nature of conventional politics is also noted by Franklin et al (1992): "In parallel 
to the decline in cleavage politics, all the countries we have studied have seen an apparent rise in issue 
voting ... there are hints at several points in the country studies that, if all the issues of importance to 
voters had been measured and given their due weight, then the rise of issue voting would have 
compensated more or less precisely for the decline in cleavage politics" (1992:399-400). The rise in 
the importance of issues is therefore not only confined to new politics. 
217 
issue. Perhaps, as some analysts suggest, environmental concerns, groups and green 
parties will prove to be transient phenomena. 
The future of environmentalism 
In this section I offer some more speculative remarks relating to the future of 
environmentalism. If environmental support is driven by issue concerns, other 
problems arise. A point is reached where popular support for the-environment reaches 
its peak. After this it becomes increasingly difficult to mobilise mass support on 
environmental issues alone. Environmental mobilisations may wane as the number 
and media profile of environmental 'crises' decline. When threatened by destruction 
or extinction, areas of spectacular scenic value and exotic flora and fauna become 
powerful and emotive mobilising images in visual and print media. In such cases they 
easily trigger concerns and mobilise mass support. But with recent growth in 
environmental protection (for example, the extension of World Heritage areas and 
National Parks), the source of potential 'crises' may diminish, and their mass 
mobilising potential may decline. 
One may also speculate that environmentalism as a set of political issues is being 
gradually absorbed by the large political parties in Australia. The Australian Labor 
Party has courted the environmental movement for more than a decade, and in the 
1996 federal election campaign even the previously anti-environmental Coalition 
sought to capture the green vote. The Green parties are also making a bid for greater 
political representation in Federal politics, while at the same time distancing 
themselves from the Australian Democrats, the other 'new politics' party. This 
indicates that environmental concerns have become 'mainstream' - a process that 
seems to be reflected in their weakly articulated social bases and their 'floating nature'. 
A serious failure by the Greens could mean their gradual exit from the political arena, 
or lead to a much touted amalgamation of the Greens and Australian Democrats. 
Alternatively, success for the Greens may herald the beginning of a true multi-party 
system in Australia, at least in the Senate. This may further 'mainstream' 
218 
environmental issues and further detach them from the traditional social bases. 
Finally, green success in representative politics may also open a divide between green 
parties and the environmental movement. Some tensions between the two have 
already been noted by political commentators. 
Future research 
New theoretical ground needs to be broken before a better understanding of the 
support base of environmental new politics is achieved. Some hints as to the nature of 
some potential explanations appear in the results reported here. As shown above, 
consumption of high culture emerges as an indicator of environmental support, 
suggesting that environmentalism may be related to lifestyle. This would support the 
popular accounts of environmentalism that link it with specific subcultures and 
alternative lifestyles. It may prove fruitful to explore further the relationship between 
environmentalism, lifestyle, and cultural consumption. Such status-consumption 
based accounts could prove more successful in explaining the new political 
configurations emerging in advanced Western societies (see also Crook et al 1992). 
Another important area that requires further research relates to education. As 
suggested above, theorists such as Rootes (1995) argue that tertiary education is an 
important determinant of environmental activism, particularly among certain 
disciplines such as the arts and humanities. An exploration of this area may well 
uncover certain nuances in education-based support for environmental new politics. 
Reference to the importance of type of education is made in Chapter 4. Further 
research in this area may help to clarify the relationship between education and 
environmental support. 
The importance of issue based politics as suggested by Dalton (1988), and 
Franklin et al ( 1992), also requires more systematic and rigorous research. If issues 
'flow across' the social structure, why are some issues more important than others, 
and how do they become important? While the major parties largely control the 
conventional political issue agenda, new political issues, such as environmental 
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issues, often enter conventional politics due to pressure from 'outside' the 
conventional political sphere: from protest groups. But does this merely reflect the 
influence of new social movements, or does it signal that conventional politics is 
changing, and becoming more open to new political issues? If it is, the divide 
between 'old' and 'new' politics may be narrowing or even merging. As conventional 
political parties lose their stable bases of support, they are forced to try and 
accommodate a diversity of political issues, including the new political issues. 
Further, if issues are the driving force of new politics, are concerns over issues 
held prior to joining environmental groups, and participating in environmental protest 
activities, or are these concerns amplified in the process of joining/participating? 
Probably both, however, a better understanding of the nature this process may help to · 
explain why people become active in environmental politics. 
Another area of interest is the degree to which environmental social movements, 
groups and organisations impact upon the political attitudes and behaviour of their 
supporters. Do they operate in a similar manner to conventional political parties, as 
hypothesised in the Michigan model? Possibly, members and participants in 
environmental organisations have similar qualities to political partisans, in that they 
look to the group, or organisation for guidance on political issues. This tendency to 
'follow' should be curtailed, to an extent, by the higher levels of education of 
environmentalists, although in Australia, as noted above, education has a rather 
modest impact upon environmental support. 
*** 
This research has shown that the classic 'social base' accounts of politics, even 
the modified 'new class' accounts are of very limited use for explaining environmental 
new politics in Australia. While calling for the abandonment of such explanations 
may be premature, it seems appropriate to recognise that they no longer deserve pride 
of place in political sociology. It is time to explore other possibilities, perhaps along 
the lines of lifestyle/consumption categories, and to undertake a more detailed 
examination of issue-based support for 'new' and 'old' politics. Should this occur, 
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social base accounts may come to be seen as supplementary rather than primary 
explanations in future sociological studies of politics. 
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Table 8.1: The Relative Impact of Social Base and Other Effects on 
Environmentalism 
Attitudinal Aspects Behavioural Aspects 
Issues Approval Feelings Potential Members Members Protesters 
of Members (AES) (NSSS) 
Groups 
Social Base 
Father's Class 4 4 
Father's Education n/a n/a n/a 3 
Class Location 4 4 2 1 
Age/Generation 3 3 1 
Education 3 
Cultural Cons. n/a 4 n/a n/a 4 
Gender 2 3 3 
Religion 4 4 2 
Ethnicity n/a n/a n/a n/a 




Values 2 2 2 1 1 
Ideology n/a I n/a n/a n/a 
Partisanship 1 1 1 4 2 
note: 'Attitudinal' rankings from Table 6.7, 'behavioural' rankings from Appendix B, Tables III-VIII. 
'Approval of Groups' refers to 1993 only. 
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Appendix A 
Table I: ASCO Groups as Predictors of Environmental Group Membership 
Membership Potential Membership Membership 
1990 1990 
Managers 0.70 0.00 
(2.01) (1.00) 
Professionals 1.60*** 0.89*** 
(4.95) (2.43) 
Para professionals 0.67 0.96*** 
(1.97) (2.61) 
Clerks 0.14 0.52*** 
(1.15) (1.68) 
Sales -0.51 0.23 
(0.60) (1.25) 
Null model 527.15 2066.65 
Full model 500.93 2019.18 
L2 26.21 47.47 
df 5 5 
dependent var n 58 428 
n 2037 1979 
Notes: Odds ratio=exp(pararneter estimate). Parameter estimates included m parenthesis 
Occupational Groups are classified according to Australian Standard Classificauon of 




































Full category utles are· Managers and Adnurustrators; Professionals; Para-professionals; Tradespersons; Clerks; Salespersons 
and Personal Service Workers. Reference category: Plant Machine Operators, and Drivers; Labourers and Related Workers. 
Sources: 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
I 
Table II: Kriesi Class Model as Predictors of Environmental Group Membership 
Membership Potential Membership 
















0.81** Technical Specialists 
(3.89) 





























Notes: aThere are no protective services workers among actual members of envrronmental groups. 
Classes coded in a manner followmg Knes1 (1989) from ASCO Umt Groups Trachtional professionals medical practiuoners 
and lawyers, Farmers and farm managers; Social and Cultural professionals. Mechcal services professionals (excluchng medical 
pracutioners), teachers, Umversity and CAE teachers, social workers, counsellors, Ministers of Religion, Artists and related 
professionals, psychologists, educauon researchers, other social sc1en11sts, llbranans, nurses; Adrmmstrauve and Commercial 
Specialists: Managers (excluding farmers and farm managers), Managing Supervisors, Economists, Accountants, Public 
Relations Officers, Personnel Specialists, Other Busmess Professionals, Techmcal Specialists. Natural Scientists, Architects, 
Engineers, Computing Specialists, Miscellaneous Professionals, Mathematicians, Stausucians, Actuanes, Other Professionals, 
Craft Specialists: Medical and Science Technical Officers, Engmeenng & Building Associates, Air & Sea Transport Workers; 
Middle: Clerks, Sales & Personal Service Workers; Working class (reference category): Trades, Plant and Maclune Operators, 
and Dnvers; Labourers and Related Workers 
Source: 1990 Australian Electoral Study 
II 
Table III: Brint Class Models as Predictors of Environmental Group Membership 
Membership Potential Membership Membership Potential Membership 
1990 1990 1993 1993 
Social Professionals 2.29**" I 09"*• 2 18••• 1.10"*" 
(9 87) (2.97) (8 84) (3.00) 
Human Services 1.23°• I 13*** 1 24••• 0.81••• 
(3.42) (3 09) (3 45) (2.41) 
Technical 1.02** 0 58•• 1.56*** 0 75••• 
(2.77) (1.78) (4.75) (2 11) 
Managers 0 70 0.00 0.97"* -0 04 
(2 01) (1.00) (2.63) (0.96) 
Middle -0.01 0 47••• -0.11 0.37*" 
(0.99) (1.60) (0.89) (I 44) 
Null model 527.15 2066.65 872.99 2260.69 
Full model 497.72 2018.76 817.60 2217.87 
L2 29.42 47.89 55 39 42.82 
df 5 5 5 5 
dependant n 58 428 107 448 
n 
Notes: 
2037 1979 2388 2281 
Codin& for 1990. Techmcal Professionals: Natural scientists, engmeers, surveyors, compuung professionals, miscellaneous 
professionals (excluding librarians) mathemaUc1ans, statisticians and actuaries, other professionals, economists, accountants, 
public relauons officers, other busmess professionals, technical officers (medical science, engmeering, and air and sea 
transport), Social & Cultural Professionals: Medical practitioners and lawyers, umvers1ty and CAE teachers, Amsts and related 
professionals, education researchers, other social sc1enusts, arclutects, nunisters of religion; Human Semces Professionals· 
Health Diagnosis and Treatment (excluding mechcal pracutioners), teachers, social workers, librarians, counsellors, nurses, 
psychologists, Middle Class· Clerks, Sales & Personal Service Workers, Police, Miscellaneous para-professionals, Working 
class (reference category)· Trades, Plant and Machine Operators, and Dnvers; Labourers and Related Workers 
Codin& for 1993 Techmcal professionals: sc1enusts, bwlding professionals, engmeers, and busmess professionals, medical 
and science tecluucal officers and technicians, engmeenng and bwlding technical officers and technicians, air and sea 
transport tecluucal workers; Social and Cultural professionals: university and TAFE teachers and instructors, arts and health 
professionals, health diagnosis and treatment professionals, Human Services professionals: teachers, social workers, nurses, 
police and other para-professionals. 
Managers: all managers and managmg supervisors, Middle class Clerks, Sales & Personal Semce Workers; Working class 
(reference category)· Trades, Plant and Maclune Operators, and Drivers; Labourers and Related Workers. 
Sources: 1990 and 1993 Australian Electoral Studies 
III 
Table IV: Ehrenreichs' Class Model as a Predictor of Environmental Group 
Membership 
Membership Potential Membership 
1993 1993 
Petit Bourgeois 0 82** 0.11 
(2.27) (1.12) 
Bourgeoisie 0.88** 0.16 
(2.43) (1.17) 
PM Cl 0.81** 0.43** 
(2.24) (1.53) 
PMC2 I.SI*** 0.87••• 
(4.52) (2.38) 
Middle -0.17 0.34** 
(0.84) (1.40) 
Null model 872.99 2260.69 
Full model 833.95 2233.13 
L2 39 04 27 56 
elf s s 




Classes are coded from ASCO Minor groups. Classes: Bourgeois: self employed with two or more employees; Petite 
Bourgeois: self employed with none or one employee; PMCI: managers, scientists, building professionals and engineers, 
miscellaneous professionals; PMC2: health diagnosis and treatment professionals, school teachers, other teachers sand 
instructors, artists and related professionals; Middle. clerks and sales, personnel service workers Working class of trades, 
semi-skilled, unskilled 1s reference category. 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
IV 
Table V: Goldthorpe Class Model as Predictor of Environmental Group 
Membership 
Membership Potential Membership 
1993 1993 
I 77••• o 82••• 
(5 87) (2.27) 
II I 32*** 0.53··· 
(3 74) (I 69) 
III 0.01 0.38** 
(I 01) (I 46) 
IV 0 89** -0.07 
(2.43) (0.93) 
v 0 54 -0.06 
(1.72) (0 94) 
Null model 872.99 2260.69 
Full model 819.40 2229.85 
L2 53.59 30 84 
df 5 5 




Goldthorpe classes are coded to Goldthorpe (1982) 12 class model, and reduced to 7 classes. 
Class I: legislators and government officials, general managers, specialist managers, natural sc1enttsts, bwlding profess10nals 
and engineers, health diagnosttc and treatment practitioners, university and CAE teachers, TAFE teachers, extra systemic-
teachers and mstructors, social professionals, business professionals, rruscellaneous professionals. 
Class II: Managing supervisors (sales and service, and other busmess), school teachers, artists and related professionals, para-
professionals, air and sea transport technical workers, registered nurses, police, miscellaneous para-professionals. 
Class IIIA: clerks, stenographers and typists, receptiomsts, telephonists, and messengers, salespersons, tellers, cashiers, and 
ticket salespersons Class IIIB: personal service workers. Class IIIA & IIIB are combmed. 
Class IVA: self employed tradespeople with employees. Class IVB: self employed tradespeople without employees. Class 
IVC: farmers and farm managers Class IV A. IVB, IVC are combined. 
Class V. medical and science techmcal officers and techmc1ans, engmeenng and building associates and techmc1ans Class 
VI: stalled manual workers (non self-employed tradespeople) 
Class VIIA. serru-slalled and unskilled workers (not mcludmg agncultural workers). Class VIIB: agricultural labourers and 
related workers. Classes VI, VIIA and VIIB are the working class reference group. 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
v 
Table: VI Logistic Regression Estimates (odds ratios) of Social Location on 


































'lo of null fitted 
dependent var N 
n 
Nore: odds ratios shown in parenthesis 

















































































































Table I: Bivariate Analysis of Environmental Group Membership (percentages) 




Social & Cultural Professionals 16 35 35 15 (55) 
Human Service Profess100als s 28 51 16 (43) 
Technical Professionals 4 32 49 14 (93) 
Managers 3 21 58 19 (484) 
Middle Class 3 24 59 13 (222) 
Workers 2 19 64 IS (964) 
Respondent's Class 
Social & Cultural Professionals 15 32 44 8 (59) 
Human Service Professionals 6 37 45 12 (151) 
Techmcal Professionals s 25 60 11 (148) 
Managers 4 16 63 17 (228) 
Middle Class 2 24 61 13 (577) 
Workers 2 18 63 18 (586) 
'Decade' Cohorts 
18-19 0 37 47 16 (19) 
20-29 3 28 57 12 (329) 
30-39 4 29 59 8 (460) 
40-49 2 24 60 14 (401) 
50-59 2 15 63 20 (280) 
60-69 4 12 61 23 (287) 
70+ 0 9 63 29 (182) 
Gender 
Male 2 19 61 17 (971) 
Female 3 23 59 14 (1010) 
V aloe Orientation 
Materiahst I 15 65 19 (501) 
Postmatenalist 8 36 44 11 (253) 
Mixed 3 21 61 15 (1236) 
Education 
Degree 8 38 44 10 (204) 
Diploma 5 32 51 13 (200) 
Other 3 22 60 16 (565) 
No Post Secondary Educatton 1 16 65 18 (948) 
Employment Sector 
Public 3 20 62 16 (1266) 
Other 4 27 55 13 (498) 
Religiosity 
Religion 2 19 62 16 (1740) 
No Religion 6 37 44 13 (255) 
Country of Birth 
English Speaking Countries 3 18 63 16 (188) 
Australia, NZ and Other Countries 3 22 60 16 (1786) 
Political Orientation 
Left 7 38 44 11 (280) 
Middle 2 21 62 15 (882) 
Right 2 17 64 17 (602) 
Political Party Identification 
Coahtion 2 15 64 20 (802) 
Other 7 35 46 12 (224) 
ALP 3 24 60 13 (895) 
Total 2.9 21.5 59 8 15.7 
notes: n=2037 
Source: 1990 Australian Electoral Study 
VII 
Table II: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) for Predictors of 


































% of null fitted 

























































































































• p<O. l •• p<O.OS ••• p<0.00 I 
Logistic regression estimates are reported. Odds ratios are shown in parenthesis. Dependent variable is memberslup of 
environmental 11roups. 
Independent vanables as per Table 7.4, Chapter 7 For addmonal explanation see Chapter 5. 
Source: 1993 Australian Electoral Study 
VIII 
Table III: The Relative Explanatory Impact or Predictor Variables on Potential 
Environmental Group Membership (AES 1990). 
Model Model L-Square Difference Test p value Rank 
elf Full less Modeldf Order 
Test 
Full Model 21 231.74 
" less Fathers Class 16 223.38 8.36 5 . ns 
"less Age 20 198.76 32.98 1 <0.001 
" less Gender 20 230.56 1.18 1 ns 
" less Values 20 201.18 30.56 1 <0.001 2 
" less Education 19 221.55 10.19 2 <0.01 5 
" less Present Class 16 223.18 8.56 5 ns 
" less Employment Sector 20 230.89 0.85 1 ns 
" less No Religion 20 218.13 13.61 1 <0.001 4 
" less English Speaking 20 231.52 0.22 1 ns 
" less Political Ideology 20 226.29 5.45 1 <0.02 6 
" less Party ID 19 215.51 16.23 2 <0.001 3 
potential members n=428 
n=l979 
ns: not significant at p<0.05 
Table IV: The Relative Explanatory Impact of Predictor Variables on Potential 
Environmental Group Membership (AES 1993). 
Model Model L-Square Difference Test p value Rank 
elf Full less Modeldf Order 
Test 
Full Model 23 251.78 
" less Fathers Class 18 248.65 3.13 5 · ns 
"less Age 22 199.52 52.26 1 <0.001 
" less Gender 22 251.13 0.65 1 ns 
" less Values 22 220.04 31.74 1 <0.001 2 
" less Education 21 229.76 22.02 2 <0.001 3 
" less Present Class 18 249.33 2.45 5 ns 
" less Employment Sector 22 251.76 0.02 1 ns 
" less Urban Location 21 248.71 3.07 2 ns 
" less No Religion 21 250.38 1.40 1 ns 
" less English Speaking 22 250.31 1.47 1 ns 
" less Political Ideology 22 239.32 12.46 1 <0.001 5 
" less Party ID 21 232.23 19.55 2 <0.001 4 
potential members n=448 
n=2281 
ns: not significant at p<0.05 
IX 
Table V: The Relative Explanatory Impact of Predictor Variables on Environmental 
Group Membership (AES 1990). 
Model 
Full Model 
" less Fathers Class 
"less Age 
" less Gender 
" less Values 
" less Education 
" less Present Class 
" less Employment Sector 
" less No Religion 
" less English Speaking 
" less Political Ideology 
" less Party ID 
members n=58 
n=2037 



























































Table VI: The Relative Explanatory Impact of Predictor Variables on Environmental 
Group Membership (AES 1993). 
Model 
Full Model 
" less Fathers Class 
"less Age 
" less Gender 
"less Values 
" less Education 
" less Present Class 
" less Employment Sector 
"less Urban Location 
" less No Religion 
" less English Speaking 
" less Political Ideology 
" less Party ID 
members n=l07 
n=2388 
















L-Square Difference Test 
Full less Model df 
Test 
116.45 
112.80 3.65 5 
116.31 0.14 1 
112. 70 3.75 1 
105.34 11.11 1 
112.07 4.38 2 
95.84 20.61 5 
114.59 1.86 1 
110.05 6.4 2 
111.42 5.03 1 
113 .22 3.23 1 
112.56 3.89 1 





















Table VII: The Relative Explanatory Impact of Predictor Variables on Environmental 
Group Membership (NSSS 1993). 
Model Model L-Square Difference Test p value Rank 
df Full less Model Order 
Test df 
Full Model 23 87.32 
" less Fathers Education 22 81.70 5.62 1 <0.02 3 
" less Fathers Class 18 84.04 3.28 5 ns 
"less Age 22 87.26 0.06 1 ns 
" less Gender 22 87.32 0 1 ns 
" less Values 22 71.48 15.84 1 <0.001 1 
"Culture at Age 14 22 82.51 4.81 1 <0.05 4 
" less Education 21 83.43 3.89 2 ns 
" less Present Class 18 83.62 3.70 5 ns 
" less Employment Sector 22 87.05 0.27 1 ns 
"Urban Location 21 82.95 4.37 2 ns 
" less No Religion 22 83.51 3.81 1 ns 
" less Party ID 21 80.28 7.04 2 <0.05 2 
members n=l70 
n=1779 
ns: not significant at p<0.05 
Table VIII: The Relative Explanatory Impact of Predictor Variables on Environmental 
Demonstrators (NSSS 1993). 
Model 
Full Model 
" less Fathers Education 
" less Fathers Class 
"less Age 
" less Gender 
" less Values 
"Culture at Age 14 
" less Education 
" less Present Class 
" less Employment Sector 
"Urban Location 
" less No Religion 
" less Party ID 
protesters n=80 
n=1779 


































































Table IX: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) for Predictors of 
Environmental Group Membership and Demonstrators with Religion Variables. 
Members . Demonstrators 
Intercept ·4.29 -4.64 -S.56 -6.11 
Fathers Education (years) 0.01•• 0.01•• 0.03 0.03 
(1.07) (1.08) (1.03) (I 03) 
Father's Class 
Social -0.32 -0.45 0 67 0.63 (0.73) (0.63) (1.95) (1.87) 
Human Services -0 61 -0.62 -0 83 -0 77 (0.54) (0.54) (0.43) (0.46) 
Techrucal 0.17 0.11 0 09 0.07 (1.18) (1.12) (1.09) (1.08) 
Manager 0.21 0.19 0.69** 0.61•• 
(1.23) (1.21) (1.99) (194) 
Middle Class -0.04 -0.01 -0.17 -0.18 
(0.96) (0.99) (0.84) (0.83) 
Age (years) 0.001 0.004 0 002 0 004 
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
Female -0.003 -0.04 0.68•• 0.63** 
(1.00) (0.96) (1.97) (1.87) 
Value Orientation (scale) 1.26 ... 1.11••• 1.53••• 1.47** 
(3.52) (3.23) (4.62) (4.34) 
Cultural Consumption at 1.16 .. 1.07 .. 1.35** 1.27* 
age 14 (scale) (3.19) (2.92) (3.85) (3.54) 
Degree 0.41* 0.43* 0.44 0.46 
(1.51) (I 54) (1.55) (1.59) 
Some Tertiary 0.41 0.37 0.60 0.60 
(1.51) (!.44) (1.82). (1.82) 
Class' 
Social 0.12 0 14 -0.32 -0.32 
(I 13) (1.15) (0.72) (0.72) 
Human 0.39 0.36 -0.20 -0 23 
(1.48) (1.43) (0.82) (0.79) 
Techrucal 0.44 o.51 • -0.43 -0 39 
(1.55) (1.66) (0.65) (0 67) 
Manager 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.20 
(I 27) (1.14) (1.17) (1.23) 
Middle Class -0 02 -0.06 -0.5 -0.52 
(0.98) (0.95) (0 61) (0.59) 
Government Sector 0 10 0.10 0.47* 0 47• 
(1.10) (1.10) (1.60) (1.60) 
Other Bases 
Urban Location -0.35 -0.29 -0 62 -0 56 
(0 70) (0.75) (0.54) (0.57) 
Suburban -0.44•• -0.38* -0.15 -0.06 
(0.64) (0.69) (0 86) (0.94) 
No Religion 0.36** 0.30 0.70** 0.76** 
(1.43) (1.35) (2.01) (2.13) 
Other Party 0.11 •• 0.56* 0.43 0.26 
(2.03) (1.75) (1.54) (1.29) 
Labor 0.37** 0.32• 0.47• 0.42 
(1.45) (1.37) (I 60) (I 53) 
Nature Sacred 0.89*** 1.00*** 
(2.43) (2.73) 
Nature created by God 0.08 0.69** 
(1.09) (1.99) 
Null Model 1121.53 1121.53 652.63 652.63 
Full Model 1034.21 1011.08 585.09 570.52 
L2 87.32 110.45 67.53 82 11 
df 23 25 23 25 
% of null fitted 0.08 0.10 0 10 0 13 
dependent var n 170 170 80 80 
n 1779 1779 1779 1779 
Source: National Social Science Survey 1993 
XII 
Table X: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds Ratios) for Predictors of 
Environmental Group Membership (NSSS). 
Intercept 









Value Onentabon (scale) 
Cultural Consumption at 




















% of null fitted 




















































































































































































































































































Table XI: Logistic Regression Estimates (Odds ratios) for Predictors of 
Environmental Demonstrators less Parent's Cultural Consumption (NSSS). 
Intercept 









Value Orientation (scale) 
Cultural Consumption at 




















% of null fitted 




















































































































































































































































































Table XII: OLS Regression Estimates for Predictors of Environmental Issues Scale 
less Adolescent Cultural Consumption (NSSS). 
Model 2a Model 2 Model 3a Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 
Intercept 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.66 
Social Background 
Father's Education 0 00 0 001 0 001 0 00 0.00 0.00 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0 02) (0.01) 
Father's Class 
Social -0.03 -0.04 -0 04 -0 04 -0.04 -0 04 
(-0.03) (-004) (-004) (-0.04) (-0 04) (-0 04) 
Human Services -0 02 -0.02 -0 03 -0 03 -0 02 -0 02 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0 02) 
Technical -0.03** -0 03•• -0.03** -0 03•• -003** -0.03•• 
(-0.05) (-0.05) (-005) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Manager -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0 02•• -0.02• 
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Middle Class -0.03** -0.03*" -0 02•• -0.02•• -0.02** -0.02•• 
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0 06) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
Adolescent Socialisation 
Age -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 ••• -0.001 ... -0.001 ••• -0 001 ••• 
(-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0 09) 
Female 0.05**• 0.05*** o.o5••• 0.04••• o.o5••• 0.05*** 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Value Onentation 0.03** 0.03 0.03** 0.02 0.02* 0.02 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0 04) (0 04) (0.04) 
Culture (at age 14) 0.06** 0 06** 0.05** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Education 
Degree -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0 02• -0 02 -0.02• 
(-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0 05) 
Some Tertiary 0.01 0 01 0.00 0 00 0.00 0 00 
(0.01) (0 01) (001) (0.01) (0 01) (0.00) 
Present Social Location 
Class 
Social & Cultural 0.02 0 02 0 02 0.02 
(003) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Human Services 0 01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
(0.02) (0 02) (0 03) (0 03) 
Techrucal -0.02 -0.02* -0 01 -0.01 
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-0 03) (-0 03) 
Manager -0 04** -0.04** -0 03** -0.03** 
(-0.08) (-0.08) (-005) (-0 05) 
Middle Class -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0 01 
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-002) (-0.02) 
Government Sector 0 01 0.01 0 00 0 00 
(0 04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Residence 
Urban Location 0.02 0 02 0 01 0.01 
(0 04) (0 03) (0 02) (0 02) 
Suburban -0.00 -0 00 -0 01 -0 01 
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.03) (-0 03) 
No Religion 0 02•• 0.02•• 0.02• 0 01 • (0.06) (0.06) (004) (0 04) 
Party ID 
Other Parties 0.09*** 0 09*** (0 13) (0 12) 
ALP 0.06*•• 0 06*** 
(0 18) (0.18) 
R2 (adjusted for df) 0.04 0 05 0 06 0.06 0.09 0 10 
n (1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) 
Source: National Social Science Survey 1993 
xv 
Table XIII: OLS Regression Estimates for Predictors of Environmentalist Feeling 
Thermometer less Adolescent Cultural Consumption (NSSS). 
Model 2a Model 2 Model 3a Model 3 Model 4a Model 4 
Intercept 0.51 0.50 0.47 0 46 0 40 0.39 
Social Background 
Father's Education 0.003 0.002 0 001 0.001 0.002 0.00 (0.04) (0.03) (0 02) (0.02) (0 03) (0 02) 
Father's Class 
Social 0.05 0 05 0 04 0 03 0.04 0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0 03) (0 02) 
Human Services -0 06 -0.06 -0 01• -0 01• -0.05 -0 05 
(-0.03) (-0.03) (-0 04) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.03) 
Techrucal 0.03 0.03 0 03 0.02 0 03 -0.03 
(0.04) (0.03) (003) (0 03) (0.04) (-0.04) 
Manager -0.02• -0 02• -0 02 -0.02 -0.00 -0 00 
(-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.00) (-0 00) 
Middle Class -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0 01 
(-0 02) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0 02) (-0 02) 
Adolescent Socialisation 
Age -0.001 •• -0.001 ** -0.001 •• -0.001 •• -0 001• -0.001 • 
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-006) (-0 06) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Female 0.06*** 0.05*** · o 05••• o.o5••• 0 05*** 0 05*** 
(0 13) (0.12) (0 11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) 
Value Orientation 0.04** 0.04* 0 04*• 0.04* 0 03* 0.03 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0 04) (0 03) 
Culture (at age 14) 0.11** 0.10** 0.09** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Education 
Degree 0.03* 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0 00 -0.01 
(0.05) (0.03) (-001) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0 02) 
Some Tertiary 0.05•• 0.05•• 0.03 0 03 0.03 0 03 
(0.06) (0.05) (0 04) (0.03) (0 04) (0.03) 
Present Social Location 
Class 
Social 0.09•• 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Human 0 01••• 0.07** 0 08*** 0 08*** 
(0.10) (0.09) (0 11) (0 11) 
Technical 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
(0 01) (0.01) (0.03) (0 03) 
Manager -0.04** -0 04** -0 01 -0.01 
(-0.05) (-0 05) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
Middle Class 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 
(0.01) (0 00) (0.04) (0.03) 
Government Sector 0 00 0.00 -0.01 -0 02 
(0 00) (0.00) (-0 03) (-0.03) 
Residence 
Urban Location 005** 0.04** 0 03 0 03 
(0.06) (0 06) (0 04) (0 04) 
Suburban 0 04** 0.04** 0 03** 0.03•• 
(0 08) (0.08) (0.05) (0 05) 
No Rebg1on 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04** 0 03•• 
(0 09) (0 09) (0 06) (0 06) 
Party ID 
Other Parties 0.14*** 0.14*** 
(0.13) (0.13) 
ALP 0.11*** 0 11 ••• 
(0 24) (0 24) 
R 2 (AdJUSted for df) 0.04 0 04 0.06 0.06 0 12 0.12 
n (1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) (1779) 
Source: National Social Science Survey 1993 
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Appendix c 
Means, Standard Deviations and Range for NSSS Variables 
Vanable Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Issues Scale 0.68 0.15 0-1 
Feeling Thennometer 0.54 0 23 -0-1 
Members I 9 0 29 1-2 
Demonstrators 1.95 0 21 1-2 
Fathers Educabon (years) 9.74 3.17 3-15 
Parents Cultural Consumption 0.29 0.18 0-1 
Fathers Class 
Social & cultural 0.02 0 15 110 
Human services 0.02 0.14 110 
Techrucal specialist 0.08 0.28 1/0 
Managers 0.24 0.43 110 
Middle Class 0.15 0.36 110 
Age (years) 49.46 15 08 22-92 
20-29 0.09 0.29 110 
30-39 0.2 0.4 110 
40-49 0 24 0.43 1/0 
50-59 0.18 0.38 110 
60-69 0 16 0 37 • 110 
Female 0.49 0 5 110 
Adolescent Cultural Consumption 0 21 0 16 0-1 
Postmatenahst scale 0.49 0.26 0-1 
Degree 0.17 0.38 110 
Some Tertiary 0.08 0 27 1/0 
Class 
Social & Cultural 0.04 0.19 110 
Human Sernces 0.1 0.3 I/O 
Techrucal Specialtsts 0 I 0.29 I/O ' 
Managers 0.11 0.31 I/O 
Middle Class 0.26 0.44 1/0 
Government Employment 0.25 0.43 110 
Urban 0.11 0.32 110 
Suburban 0.69 0.46 1/0 
No rehg1on 0.23 0 42 1/0 
Other party 0.05 0.22 · 110 
ALP 0.44 0.5 1/0 
Source: National Social Science Survey 1993 
XVII 
Means, Standard Deviations and Range for 1990 AES Variables 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Range 
Member 1.97 0.17 1-2 
Potential member 1.78 0 41 1-2 
Approve of groups 0.72 0 24 0-1 
Fathers Class 
Social & cultural 0.03 0.16 110 
Human services 0 02 0.14 I/O 
Techrucal specialist 0.05 0 21 I/O 
Managers 0.24 0 43 I/O 
Middle Class 0.11 0.31 I/O 
Age (years) 45.91 16.18 18-88 
18-19 0 01 0.1 1/0 
20-29 0.16 0.37 I/O 
30-39 0.23 0.42 1/0 
40-49 0.2 0.4 1/0 
50-59 0 14 0.35 I/O 
60-69 0 14 0.35 I/O 
Female 0 51 05 I/O 
Postmatenalist scale 0 44 0 3 0-1 
Degree 0.1 0 3 110 
Diploma 0.1 0.3 I/O 
Class 
Social & cultural 0.03 0.17 I/O 
Human services 0.08 0 27 I/O 
Technical specialist 0 07 0.26 I/O 
Managers 0.11 0 32 110 
Middle Class 0 29 0.45 110 
Government Employment 0.25 0 43 I/O 
No rehg1on 0.13 0.33 I/O 
Enghsh Speaking Country 0 I 0.29 I/O 
Political Ideology (left-right) 0 45 0.2 0-1 
Other party 0 07 0 26 I/O 
ALP 0 45 0.5 110 
Source: Australian Electoral Study 1990 
XVIII 
Means, Standard Deviations and Range for 1993 AES Variables 
Vanables Mean Standard Dev1a11on Range 
Member l.9S 0.18 1-2 
Potential Member 1.8 0.35 1-2 
Approve of groups 0.73 0.21 0-1 
Fathers Class 
Social & cultural 0.02 0.11 110 
Human services 0.04 0.18 110 
Technical specialist 0.06 0.21 110 
Managers 0.22 0.37 .110 
Middle Class 0.1 0.26 1/0 
Age (years) 48.85 14.41 18-93 
18-19 0.01 0.09 110 
20-29 0.12 0.29 110 
30-39 0.19 0 35 1/0 
40-49 0.21 0.36 110 
50-59 0.16 0 32 110 
60-69 0.16 0.32 110 
Female 0.49 0.44 1/0 
Postmatenahst scale 0.46 0.26 0-1 
Degree 0 14 0.31 110 
Diploma 0.08 0.24 110 
Class 
Social & cultural 0.02 0.13 110 
Human services 0.09 0.26 1/0 
Technical specialist 0.07 0.23 110 
Managers 0.11 0.28 110 
Middle Class 0.26 0.39 110 
Government Employment 0.26 0.39 110 
No religion 0.14 0.31 110 
English Speaking Country 0.1 0.27 110 
Urban 0.33 0.42 110 
Suburban 0.26 0.39 110 
Political Ideology (left-right) 0.47 0.18 0-1 
Other party 0.03 0 14 110 
ALP 0 44 0.44 110 




2 Potenual Members 
Envir Grp Appr. 
4 Fathers Social & Cult 
5 Fathers Human Serv. 
6 Fathers Tecbmcal 
7 Fathers Managers 
8 Fathers Middle Class 
9 Fathers Manual Work 
lO Age (yrs) 
11 Women 
12 Men 
13 Values Index 
14 Degree 
15 Diploma 
16 Other Education 
17 No Post Sec Ed 
18 Social & Cultural Prof 
19 Human Services Prof 
20 Tecbmcal Prof. 
21 Manager 
22 Middle Class 
23 Manual Workers 
24 Government Sector 
25 Other Empl. Sect 
26 Urban Residence 
27 Suburban Residence 
28 Rural Residence 
29 No Rei Denom 
30 Rei Denom 
31 Austrahan Born 
32 English Spk Cntr 
33 Non-Eng. Spk Cntr 
34 Poltucal OnentallOn 
35 Other Party Id. 
36 ALP Id 
37 Coaltuon Id 
Correlations AES 1993 
2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
-.10 
16 30 
.01 .05 03 
.01 .00 03 - 03 
07 06 05 -03 -.05 
01 -02 -06 -07 -.II -13 
03 01 .01 -04 -07 -.08 -17 
-05 -01 .00 -11 -18 -21 -46 -28 
-.04 -19 -14 -03 -04 -05 .07 -04 -.02 
01 .02 05 00 00 02 01 03 -.03 02 
00 - 01 - 05 .00 00 -.01 01 -.02 05 - 02 -.96 
lO 13 14 03 00 09 - 04 .00 -03 - 05 -.02 .01 
.14 .13 09 08 07 .15 .00 .06 - 12 -.17 -.03 04 07 
03 07 02 .04 01 06 00 .06 -08 -.03 02 -02 02 -.12 
-04 .02 .03 -.02 -04 -04 -07 -.02 15 .02 -.18 .18 -02 -28 -.21 
-.07 - 14 -08 -06 -.01 -.09 .07 -.03 01 08 20 -.18 -03 - 34 -.24 -58 
.11 04 06 -.07 OJ 08 01 02 -.06 -08 -.03 03 06 .14 06 -.04 -08 
.06 08 09 03 04 08 .00 08 -08 -06 JO -.10 .03 .29 22 -08 -24 -05 
09 04 02 03 07 .09 -02 01 -03 -05 -13 13 01 .35 JO -11 -19 -04 -09 
04 - 04 - 07 OJ 01 01 .11 .00 -.07 06 - 15 .16 00 05 .04 - 02 -.03 -.05 - 11 -.10 
-06 03 01 -04 -02 .04 -03 04 03 -.10 29 -28 01 -.15 -04 -03 19 -09 -19 -.16 -21 
-.06 -02 -.02 -.02 -02 -10 -05 -.06 .15 -01 -29 .30 -02 -.23 -14 .30 -01 -09 -20 -.17 -.22 -.37 
01 05 04 01 01 04 -03 .05 -02 -04 -04 05 02 .18 .12 -02 -14 04 .29 .08 -07 -01 -.01 
00 01 -03 -.01 02 .03 02 -01 .05 -.13 -JO 12 01 -08 -06 13 03 00 -20 01 18 .16 17 -69 
-02 05 .07 .03 .03 05 -04 03 -03 08 02 -.02 01 12 01 -04 -05 07 00 08 -02 02 -.06 00 -01 
.03 00 02 01 05 02 -07 .01 02 -09 -01 01 00 -02 06 00 -02 00 -03 02 -01 07 -.02 00 04 -.41 
-01 -.05 -09 -03 -07 -06 JO -04 01 .02 -01 01 -01 -11 -06 04 .07 -06 02 -.JO 04 -08 08 00 .03 -58 -.49 
.JO 08 08 04 .00 07 00 -02 -.05 -14 -06 07 .12 13 02 -04 -06 lO 05 06 00 -04 -02 .01 .02 .02 -02 00 
-08 -.06 -05 -04 .01 -.05 .03 03 09 12 .JO -03 -12 -11 00 05 08 -09 -04 -.04 02 .06 04 .00 .02 -02 02 01 -90 
-01 -01 -04 -01 02 .01 .09 02 01 -07 07 -02 -01 -05 01 .00 07 -02 03 -.04 04 .06 -.05 01 00 - JO -06 .15 -02 09 
.04 .01 03 03 01 .02 - 08 - 01 03 09 01 00 01 00 02 00 -01 .04 .00 01 -.03 01 00 01 01 00 04 - 04 02 - 01 - 61 
-02 00 .02 -.01 -04 -03 -.04 -02 -04 01 -.10 02 00 06 -02 .00 -07 -01 -03 04 -02 -09 06 -02 00 13 03 -15 00 -.JO -70 -.13 
07 14 14 03 OJ .00 -.07 -03 05 -.18 01 -01 .JO 08 - 03 -.01 -02 04 03 04 -09 -01 06 03 .01 02 -01 -.01 .13 -.12 -04 05 01 
09 04 .07 04 02 03 -.01 -01 00 -05 .00 01 06 04 .02 .01 -04 04 05 03 01 -02 -03 04 -01 01 OJ -.02 06 -05 00 01 -01 05 
-01 .II 19 -03 00 -.03 -14 -04 .12 -07 -04 05 06 -02 -07 04 03 -01 -02 -04 -15 -01 17 07 -07 02 -04 01 .04 -02 -04 .02 03 28 -14 





4 Environmental Feelings 
5 Fathers Educatmn (yrs) 
6 Fathers Social & Cult 
7 Fathers Human Services 
Fathers Tcchmcal 
9 Fathers Managers 
10 Fathers Middle Class 




15 Values Index 
16 Cultural Consumption 
17 Degree 
Correlations NSSS 1993 
2 3 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 
21 
16 10 
20 .10 36 
09 04 03 .07 
01 04 -01 .06 
00 -01 .00 -.02 
05 01 -.01 .07 
21 
15 -02 
20 -05 -04 
.02 06 -05 -05 -.07 -09 -08 -17 
00 -03 -03 -01 03 -07 -06 -.13 -24 
-05 -05 07 01 -18 -12 -12 -24 -45 -34 
- 03 - 02 - 13 -.10 - 14 00 .00 -.06 07 - 03 -.05 
00 05 16 13 01 03 05 02 02 -05 -02 -.05 
.00 - 05 -.16 - 13 -.01 -.03 - 05 -02 - 02 .05 02 .05 -.99 
12 10 06 07 07 01 01 03 -.01 .02 - 05 - 06 .03 -.03 
.10 08 .08 .12 .18 10 .04 07 -01 01 - 10 -.05 12 -.12 10 
II 07 -01 06 19 14 05 07 02 03 -.10 -14 00 -01 .04 23 
18 Some Teruary Educauon 05 05 01 05 06 - 02 01 00 03 04 - 05 01 -03 .03 06 .05 -13 
19 NoTen1aryEducauon -.12 -09 02 -08 -.19 -11 -05 -06 -.03 -04 11 09 01 -.01 - 08 - 23 - 76 -.49 
20 Social & Cuhural Prof 
21 Human Services Prof. 
22 Tcchmeal Prof 
23 Manager 
24 Middle Class 
25 Manual Workers 
26 Government Employ 
27 Other Employment 
28 Urban Residence 
29 Suburban Residence 
30 Rural Residence 
31 No Rehgmus Denom 
32 Rehgmus Denommatmn 
33 Other Party Id 
34 ALPld 
35 Coalition Id 
.04 03 03 08 12 .13 -01 
07 06 07 13 07 08 09 
06 00 -.04 00 06 02 00 
.00 01 - II -09 -01 -05 -.01 






01 -.06 -03 -05 05 
01 -07 -.05 20 -20 
03 -02 -08 -.18 18 
02 -.04 .05 - 17 17 




21 .03 -19 
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